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Why Factions Matter: 
A Theory of Party Dominance at the Subnational Level 
 
Hector Ibarra-Rueda, Ph.D. 
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Supervisors:  Raúl L. Madrid and Kenneth Greene 
 
What explains the resilience of formerly nationally dominant parties at the 
subnational level? This dissertation demonstrates that factionalism is key. When intra-
party factions are united, subnational dominant parties retain power even under adverse 
electoral conditions. By contrast, divisions and conflicts among internal groups lead these 
parties to lose even in favorable electoral contexts. I test these claims using a variety of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence from Mexico, focusing on the electoral performance 
of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) in contemporary gubernatorial elections. 
Democratization potentially undermines unity in dominant parties because it 
provides politicians with viable exit options (i.e., joining the opposition) and because 
authoritarian central party committees no longer control subnational politics.  Yet, I argue 
that factions can cooperate under democracy when they were more autonomous from the 
center during the authoritarian period.  The negotiation skills acquired in the past help 
them “get along” in the absence of an external enforcer.  By contrast, previously 
subordinated factions never acquired such skills and quickly became antagonistic to each 
other under democracy.  As I show, collaboration had positive electoral consequences in 
subnational elections whereas antagonism had pernicious ones. 
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Chapter 1: A Factional Approach of Subnational Dominant Party 
Persistence and Decline 
Dominant parties have remained in power for decades in countries across Africa, 
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East; however, by the century’s end, most dominant 
parties at the national level had given way to fully competitive democracies (Greene 
2007; Magaloni 2006). One such case was Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), which controlled federal power for more than seven decades before losing the 
presidency to a challenger party in 2000.1 Yet in Mexico, as in a handful of other former 
regimes based on hegemonic or dominant parties (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006), 
turnover at the national level did not quickly yield turnover in subnational elections. As 
late as 2010, the PRI had remained in power, without interruption since 1929, in ten of 
thirty-two states.2 Clearly, national-level democratization, and the PRI’s associated loss 
of access to federally funded pork and patronage as well as the national-level machinery 
to perpetrate electoral fraud, does not explain the PRI’s persistence in these states. What, 
then, accounts for continued subnational dominance in some states but not in others? 
Given their persistence across regions and eras, dominant parties have attracted 
attention from numerous scholars in the last six decades (see Key 1984; Duverger 1959; 
Epstein 1967; Huntington and Moore 1970; Arian and Barnes 1974; Sartori 1976; Pempel 
1990; Rimanelli 1999a; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007; Scheiner 2006; Friedman and 
Wong 2008; Bogaards and Boucek 2010). Their importance resides not only in their 
theoretical, empirical, and normative implications, but also in their ubiquity: dominant 
                                                
1 The National Revolutionary Party (PNR) was this party’s first name, from 1929 to 1938. It was renamed 
as the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) from 1938 to 1946 when it acquired its current 
denomination as the PRI. 
2 Including Mexico City. 
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parties can be present in authoritarian and democratic regimes.3 In addition to being the 
most stable and durable form of authoritarianism (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; 
Huntington 1968), dominant party systems are the most common autocracies existing at 
the global level (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Around 70 percent of the 50 authoritarian 
regimes that Geddes counted in 1999 were based on dominant parties (1999), and in 
Africa the bulk of all regimes have traditionally been single-party autocracies (Bratton 
and Van de Walle 1997). Moreover, dominant party authoritarian regimes (Greene 2007) 
have existed in highly dissimilar regions, e.g., Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Middle 
East, and are in the process of consolidation in several former soviet republics, e.g., 
Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Magaloni 2006). In contemporary times, 
dominant parties have also been present in diverse democratic polities, e.g., India, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, and Sweden (Magaloni 2006).4 In democratic regimes, however, single-party 
primacy is considered often an anomaly, because the lack of political alternation makes 
rulers less responsive to their constituencies.5 In sum, one-party dominance challenges 
the conventional wisdom that parties are “unavoidable” for democracy (Stokes 1999) by 
showing that parties have also the potential to erode the bases of consolidated 
democracies (Scheiner 2006) and even foster durable autocracies (Brownlee 2007). 
Using quantitative and qualitative evidence from the PRI in Mexico, this 
dissertation argues and demonstrates that internal factions are decisive for the fate of 
dominant parties at the subnational level. In so doing, it sheds light on the reasons and 
                                                
3 Greene (2007) argues that dominant parties can exist in democratic and autocratic settings, whereas 
Sartori (1976) says that they are “predominant” parties in democratic systems and “hegemonic” parties in 
authoritarian regimes. 
4 All the authors cited in this paragraph use widely varying definitions of party dominance. 
5 Scheiner makes this point to support his concern about the incompatibility of democracy and the lack of 
effective multi-party competition that one-party dominance implies: “It is turnover in office – where the 
rascals are actually thrown out of power – that indicates that accountability genuinely exists, thereby 
increasing the pressure on parties to act responsively to the public. And it is responsiveness based on 
accountability that upholds the democratic links in representative democracy” (2006, 9). 
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ways in which factions matter for single-party primacy. The prevailing view 
acknowledges the importance of internal factions for one-party dominance in autocratic 
and democratic regimes (De Remes 2000; Higley and Burton 2006; Hiskey and Canache 
2005; Magaloni 2006; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), but it tends to subordinate their 
role to other factors, such as economic context and access to clientelistic resources 
(Boucek 2010; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006). By contrast, this 
dissertation shows that factions have an independent effect over the prospects for 
dominant party longevity at the subnational level. 
The prevailing theories of dominant parties are associated to the regimes’ nature, 
i.e., democratic or autocratic, in which these parties operate. Authoritarian explanations 
of dominant parties argue that regimes play an active and decisive role in creating and 
sustaining these parties, even though they differ in the specific autocratic mechanism that 
they think is key. Two distinctive accounts of dominant parties proceed from this 
framework. The first is the coercive or pure authoritarian explanation, which stresses that 
autocratic regimes will do whatever it takes, in terms of using the force at their disposal, 
to keep their parties in office (Eisenstadt 2004; Gibson 2005; Magaloni 2006). The 
clientelist approach, the second account, posits that rulers rely mainly on the extensive 
and discretionary use of public resources to buy the popular support that their parties 
require to continue in power (Greene 2007; Gyimah-Boadi 1997; Khator 1999; Quinn 
1993, 1999, 2002; Rimanelli 1999b; Scheiner 2006; Widner 1997). 
By contrast, democratic theories rest on features of open partisan competition to 
explain dominant party longevity. The retrospective voting model ties the existence of 
dominant parties to their performance in office. From this perspective, dominant parties 
are the product of most voters’ continuous rewards to incumbent parties for their 
satisfactory work (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966). The spatial approach portrays dominant 
 4 
parties as a function of those parties to run under policy platforms that are closer to the 
preferences of most voters in comparison with opposition parties (Adams, Merill, and 
Grofman 2005; Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1997). The party factions explanation I 
advance is also rooted in the democratic framework, because it argues that the fate of 
dominant parties is a function of their internal dynamics and not of regime effects. 
 
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
Mexico is a suitable case in which to explore single-party supremacy not only 
because the PRI’s long dominance at the national level has inspired important theoretical 
developments on the topic (e.g., Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006),6 but also because its 
persistence as a leading subnational force seems to be at odds with the prevailing 
explanations for dominant party longevity at the national level. There are four additional 
methodological and substantive reasons that justify the subnational approach of this 
dissertation. First, by examining one-party dominance at the subnational level in Mexico, 
I increase the number of observations of dominant parties, which enables me to 
circumvent the degrees of freedom problem (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) that 
characterizes most scholarly works on the topic, given that they are based on single-case 
or small-N studies.7 Second, the subnational focus makes it possible to draw more valid 
findings and inferences by providing more homogeneous cases than cross-national 
studies, which are usually affected by serious heterogeneity problems among their units 
of observation (Snyder 2001). Third, by controlling for national-level characteristics, I 
                                                
6 Mexico has also inspired important theoretical accounts on electoral, political, and public policy 
transformations at the subnational level. For example, see (Beer 2001; Hiskey 2003; Hiskey and Bowler 
2005; Hiskey and Canache 2005; Rodríguez and Ward 1994, 1995; Ward 1998; Ward and Durden 2002; 
Ward and Rodríguez 1999). 
7 Greene (2010) is an exception of this. 
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can demonstrate that dominant parties still experience significant variation in their 
longevity in power (e.g., Boucek 2012). 
Fourth, subnational studies are substantively relevant in their own right, because 
they address the geographic dimension of political phenomena that is commonly 
overlooked by national level studies (Gibson 2005). In particular, most studies on 
democratization mistakenly assume that democratic change is evenly distributed across 
the subnational units of the countries they examine (Gibson 2005; Rokkan 1970; Snyder 
2001). Consequently, these studies have ignored the persistence (Gibson 2005) and even 
proliferation of subnational authoritarian regimes (Snyder 2001), which has prevented 
them from perceiving the potential existence of subnational autocratic enclaves that may 
put those emerging democracies at risk (Fox 1994).8 By examining the phenomenon of 
dominant parties at the subnational level, my research responds to the call of Fox (1994), 
Gibson (2005), and Snyder (2001) who stress that the exploration of subnational factors 
represents an important and innovative research agenda to study democratic 
transformation and consolidation of national regimes. 
This study contributes to several different literatures. Regarding dominant parties, 
the dissertation examines the conditions under which a theoretically and empirically 
underexplored instance may occur: that a dominant party in a non-democratic regime 
continues being dominant at the subnational level in a democratic one. As a result, it is 
linked with scholarly works that have provided important insights into the adaptation and 
comeback of former autocratic single-parties in new democratic contexts (e.g., Grzymala-
Busse 2002; Mahr and Nagle 1995; McAllister and White 1995; Waller 1995). 
                                                
8 If there is variation across subnational units is a question that has to be assessed empirically. The 
important point here is to examine if such a variation exists or not rather than merely assuming that it is 
inexistent without any test or evidence supporting this assumption. 
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Although scholars have found a consistent connection between single-party 
dominance and internal factions, studies on the topic are surprisingly limited and have 
been mainly confined to national parliamentary and unitary regimes (e.g., Belloni and 
Beller 1978; Boucek 2009, 2010). Therefore, this dissertation constitutes the first 
systematic effort to expand the contemporary analysis of the link between dominant 
parties and factions towards federal regimes and subnational politics.9 Although this 
dissertation focuses on the electoral resilience of nationally dominant parties at the 
subnational level, its approach might be relevant for other parties as well. 
First and foremost this dissertation is about democratization and adaptation of 
dominant parties to democratic transformation. By providing a level playing field for 
electoral competition, democratization forces dominant parties to decentralize candidate 
selection at the subnational level and empowers local factions. As a result, I show that the 
fate of dominant parties in subnational elections rests in the hands of local groups. Under 
democratic conditions, I show that internal cohesion is essential for dominant parties to 
retain office. Democratization, however, makes it more challenging to achieve party 
unity. On the one hand, democratic transformation by definition eliminates the use of 
external, authoritarian mechanisms to enforce party cohesion. On the other hand, 
democratic change also impedes internal unity by providing viable exit options for 
factions since opposition parties are, by definition, more capable of winning office. 
In spite of these effects, democratization does not necessarily mean the end of 
dominant parties at the subnational level. I show that dominant parties can still continue 
winning subnational elections even in the presence of emergent democratic conditions as 
long as they preserve internal cohesion and thus their electoral strength. Their prospects 
                                                
9 Although Langston (2003) explores the prospects of former dominant parties at the subnational level to 
regain power, this dissertation directly addresses the persistence and decline of dominant parties at the 
subnational level. 
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to remain united depend on the level of autonomy in decision-making that local factions 
attained vis-à-vis the national party leadership in pre-democratic times. Factions that 
were more autonomous under authoritarianism tend to interact with each other to advance 
their political interests. This interaction creates an incipient sense of cooperation among 
factions that expands when they are fully empowered by democratization. Collaborative 
factionalism emerges in these cases leading dominant parties to retain office. 
By contrast, less autonomous factions under authoritarianism do not interact with 
each other or their interaction is so limited that they do not provide a fertile soil for the 
seeds of cooperation to germinate. As a consequence, when democratization empowers 
subordinated factions, they engage in acrimonious disputes over the control of the party. 
The resulting antagonistic factionalism causes dominant parties to lose office. 
I show that other existing explanations fail to account for the resilience of the PRI 
at the subnational level. Arguments that characterize the states where the PRI continues 
to win as “authoritarian enclaves” suggest that the incumbent party has reproduced the 
mechanisms for vote-buying and election fraud that propelled its national-level 
dominance for so many decades (Cornelius 1999, 2000; Eisenstadt 1999; Gibson 2005; 
Klesner and Lawson 2001; Lawson 2000). Yet the PRI has lost in seven of nine states 
that analysts labeled as authoritarian. Other literature on party competition in fully 
democratic contexts might argue that good performance in office by one PRI governor 
would help elect a copartisan (note that reelection is prohibited), or that poor quality 
opposition candidates, meager campaign funding, poorly run campaigns, or failure of 
opposition parties to coordinate the anti-PRI vote might permit continued PRI 
dominance. However, as I show in this dissertation, the PRI can remain in power despite 
having unpopular governors and facing a strong opposition. It can also lose office even in 
the presence of popular governors and a weak opposition. 
 8 
I argue that in states where the PRI survived in power in spite of Mexico’s 
democratization, its subsequent electoral fate rests in the hands of its top politicians. 
Where intra-party factions remain cohesive (i.e., collaborative factionalism), the PRI has 
been able to defeat all challengers by a handsome margin, even when it faces a totally 
unified opposition and has highly unpopular outgoing governors, low levels of 
corporatism, or even high degrees of socioeconomic marginalization (see the statistical 
analysis presented in Chapter 2). By contrast, where PRI factions divide and wage public 
fights, sometimes leading to high-level defections (i.e., antagonistic factionalism), not 
even a popular governor (see the case of the 1997 election in Nuevo León in Chapter 4) 
or a languid and uncoordinated opposition can save it from losing (see the case of the 
1998 election in Zacatecas in Chapter 2). 
The following section defines the key terms that are used in this dissertation. The 
chapter then examines alternative accounts deriving from dominant party and standard 
party competition theories that may explain the PRI’s resilience at the subnational level. 
It continues by presenting my argument for why and how factions matter for incumbent 
parties to retain or lose power before theorizing on the alternative paths conducive to 
internal unity or division for dominant parties at the subnational level. It also specifies the 
conditions under which subnational factions unite or divide when they are fully 
empowered to decide on the distribution of power (mainly the nominations for public 
offices). The chapter proceeds to explain how preexisting levels of 
autonomy/subordination of the local factions vis-à-vis national party leaders influence the 
prospects for those factions to support each other or engage in conflicts when they are 
fully empowered to define candidacies for public offices. It then indicates how the 
theoretical claims presented in this chapter apply to the case of the PRI in Mexico. The 
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I define subnational dominant parties as parties that have continuously held the 
executive office in given political and geographical jurisdictions immediately below the 
national level (which are usually labeled as states or provinces)10 for at least twenty years 
through periodic multiparty elections. I adopt existing definitions of dominant parties 
operating in the national arena (Greene 2007, 12-17; Magaloni 2006, 36-37). These 
conceptualizations emphasize the criteria of continuous length in office, multiparty 
competition, and open elections occurring at regular intervals as the central features 
defining dominant parties. Consequently, my definition basically translates this notion to 
the subnational level. Because this dissertation focuses on states where governorships the 
PRI had never lost prior to 1995, all cases it examines conform to this definition. 
Party factions constitute a broad notion of intra-party groupings that may involve 
different dimensions, e.g., size, durability, organizational structure, goals, functions, and 
so on; thus their definition and operationalization depends on their context of study 
(Boucek 2009; Beller and Belloni 1978). For example, factions are clearly identifiable in 
political settings, such as Japan, where their participation is formalized and stable across 
time to the point that they represent specific ideologies and their public endorsement to 
the candidates they support constitutes an important cue for common voters (Browne and 
Kim 2003). Their identification is more challenging in contexts where factions are 
informally organized and their malleable political participation is only salient through the 
                                                
10 I use the terms state and local as synonyms of this subnational level of politics. Accordingly, for 
example, I employ the terms subnational factions, state factions, and local factions interchangeably. 
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candidates they support, as has historically occurred in the United States at the 
subnational level (Key 1984). As in the United States, factions participating in the PRI in 
Mexico are informally structured and their participation is only evident through the 
politicians around which they organize their activism.11 . 
Considering that the empirical focus of this dissertation is to assess the impact of 
party factions operating at the subnational level in the electoral performance of the PRI in 
gubernatorial elections, I follow Key (1984, 16) in defining party faction12 as any group 
of party members who unite to support certain contenders to obtain the party nomination  
in a given gubernatorial election. However, I also include in the concept those groups that 
are organized around other party leading figures13 who are politically involved in 
gubernatorial elections, considering that their activism affects party (dis)unity as well. 
Since under this definition factions can be only identified in the context of specific 
contenders or leading politicians, I also follow Key in assuming that each of these 
competitors or high-ranking politicians represents a faction that supports him or her. 
I use the terms the center, party central authorities, or party national leaders to 
denote the main decision-makers of dominant parties who are situated at the national 
level. The final word in subnational party politics depends on the correlation of forces 
between the center and state factions, as addressed in this dissertation. Accordingly, I 
employ the terms PRI’s national leaders, PRI’s national leadership, PRI’s central 
authorities, and the center (the preferred word among Mexican politicians, scholars, and 
                                                
11 Existing works focus on Mexican factions operating in the national arena, which are labeled as 
camarillas (see Camp 1995; Cornelius 1996; Langston 1995; Smith 1979). The distinctive feature of these 
groups is that each of them is informally organized around a political leader. 
12 I employ the terms party factions, party groups, factions, and groups interchangeably. 
13 These leading politicians include current and former governors, former contenders for gubernatorial 
candidacies, and high-ranking members of the corresponding states’ governments; and their participation 
may take place inside the PRI or in opposition parties (the latter constitutes an expression of party 
disunity). 
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newspaper observers) interchangeably to designate fundamentally the national Presidency 
and secondarily the federal Secretary of Government and the presidency of the PRI’s 
National Executive Committee (CEN) as the main instances of political decision-making 
of this party at the national level (Langston 2011, 150-154). 
Interaction among factions is another key concept used in this dissertation. The 
term does not encompass all forms of contact that may exist between politicians and thus 
between factions. By contrast, it defines a specific form of communication through which 
factions predominantly attempt to obtain political positions for their members. As this 
dissertation explains, there are two ways for factions to gain political posts. One is 
through subordination to the center: They get positions from the center as a reward for 
their obedience to the center’s decisions. The other is through interaction with other 
factions: Multiple factions negotiate the distribution of political positions among 
themselves. Where I state that the interaction of factions is limited or absent, I do not 
mean that factions or their members have no contact with other factions or politicians. 
What I mean is that factions do not rely on negotiation with other factions to advance 
their interests, i.e., to obtain political positions. 
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR SUBNATIONAL PARTY DOMINANCE 
In this section I discuss existing approaches to explain the success or failure of 
dominant parties at the subnational level,14 addressing their limitations in explaining the 
case of the PRI in Mexico. The autocratic framework stresses that former national 
authoritarian dominant parties that left power after a democratization process can remain 
in office in those subnational jurisdictions where they are able to preserve the non-
                                                
14 It is important to note that the prevailing explanations are derived from studies on dominant parties 
operating at the national level. 
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democratic advantages they lost at the national level. In fact, this is the most common 
approach that has been used to explain the PRI’s resilience at the subnational level. This 
perspective argues that the PRI could only continue to win elections if it were able to 
reproduce a host of authoritarian mechanisms that helped it control federal power for 
more than seven decades. 
According to these “authoritarian enclave” explanations, the PRI wins in 
backwater states that suffer from high levels of socio-economic marginalization and 
where the party machinery still includes extensive clientelist networks as well as groups 
practiced in the art of electoral fraud and/or old-style repression (Cornelius 1999, 2000; 
Eisenstadt 1999; Gibson 2005; Klesner and Lawson 2001; Lawson 2000). One of the 
main problems of this approach is that its proponents fail to provide consistent empirical 
support of their claims. For example, in his seminal contribution on subnational 
authoritarianism, Gibson’s vague assertion that the National Action Party’s (PAN) 
candidate Vicente Fox “needed interlocutors in the opposition” when he obtained the 
Mexico’s Presidency in 2000 and that the “PRI governors were major power brokers in 
the new political context” (2005, 116) is insufficient to explain why PAN President Fox 
allowed PRI governor José Murat to use all federal offices and resources allocated in 
Oaxaca for maintaining his “authoritarian regime” in this state in the early 2000s (117). 
In fact, Gibson does not offer any evidence that Murat had served as one of the brokers 
that Fox needed, that for this reason he received full control over the federal resources in 
Oaxaca, and that he effectively controlled these resources. Furthermore, other than 
mentioning the existence of “reports of widespread fraud,” without referring to their 
content or even source (102), Gibson does not offer any other evidence of how and to 
what extent the PRI used fraud or other authoritarian means to win the Oaxaca’s 2004 
gubernatorial election. 
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More importantly, as intuitively appealing as the authoritarian enclave 
explanation may be, it fails to adequately explain where the PRI wins and where it loses. 
In fact, the PRI has lost in seven out of nine states scholars labeled as authoritarian 
enclaves. These states are Chiapas, Guerrero, Morelos, Puebla, Tabasco, Yucatán, and 
even Oaxaca, considered the paradigm of subnational autocracy in Mexico (Cornelius 
1999, 2000; Eisenstadt 1999; Gibson 2005; Klesner and Lawson 2001; Lawson 2000).15 
Clientelism—a concept encompassing different forms of vote buying—is another 
prominent explanation for the continuous reelection of incumbent parties (Magaloni 
2006).16 Arguments about clientelism indicate that the fate of incumbent parties depends 
on their pocketbook. They will persist if they have resources to buy enough votes to win 
and, conversely, they will lose in times of shortages. Under a similar logic, other 
approaches have linked the duration of incumbents in office with the relative abundance 
of public resources at their disposal (e.g., Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008). By 
providing more public goods with less taxation, sub-national incumbent parties or 
politicians benefit electorally from obtaining these plentiful resources from central 
governments (Gervasoni 2010b). Regarding Mexico, scholars have also pointed out the 
importance of corporatism in enabling the PRI to dominate the national electoral arena 
for 71 years. The claim is that the PRI was able to win elections continuously through the 
political mobilization of the broad social sectors that it corporatized.17 In particular, for 
decades the PRI regime granted diverse benefits (e.g., affordable housing, health 
                                                
15 Campeche and Veracruz are the only states that the PRI has preserved. 
16 It is important to note that some scholars have used clientelist arguments to explain dominant parties in 
democratic settings (e.g., Scheiner 2006). Although Greene (2007), who has appropriately bridged the 
democratic and authoritarian explanations of dominant parties by noting that these parties usually combine 
democratic and non-democratic mechanisms to remain in power, puts vote-buying in the democratic side, I 
situate clientelism in the autocratic realm in line with the “authoritarian enclave” literature (Cornelius 1999, 
2000; Eisenstadt 1999; Gibson 2005; Klesner and Lawson 2001; Lawson 2000). 
17 Corporatism typically refers to the policy through the State controls and obtains political support from 
labor organizations in exchange for material benefits and political positions (Collier 1979). 
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insurance, convenient retirement plans, and better salaries) and awarded political 
positions to the main unions of urban workers and public employees, which provided 
political support to the party in exchange (Camp 2003; Collier and Collier 2002; 
Cornelius and Craig 1991; Cornelius 1996). 
A contrasting image comes from observers who view Mexico’s democratization 
as a sea-change that swept away the prior mechanisms of single-party dominance 
everywhere, including subnational elections. As a result, perhaps the PRI’s ability to win 
in some states after 1994 should be viewed as a different phenomenon, one that might 
respond to standard variables in the party competition literature such as the incumbent’s 
popularity, the opposition’s strength, and the quality of candidates and campaigns. 
One argument stresses that incumbent parties benefit from the incapacity of 
opposition parties to integrate into a sole coalition able to defeat them as well as from 
citizens’ reluctance (mainly due to ideological reasons) to vote strategically, i.e., to 
coordinate to support a single, strong competitor, abandoning their preferred but less 
electorally viable party or coalition (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). Scholars embracing 
this approach argue that when opposition leaders and voters put aside their ideological 
differences and focus on the regime (democratic-authoritarian) cleavage in cases such as 
Mexico during the period of PRI dominance, the corresponding dominant party faces a 
serious risk of being defeated (Crespo 1999; Greene 2007, 2008; Howard and Roessler 
2006; Magaloni 2006). According to this view, we may expect the PRI to lose 
subnational elections in states where it faces a unified opposition and, conversely, to win 
in states where the opposition is fragmented. 
Another claim is that incumbent parties benefit from their governmental 
performance. More specifically, retrospective voting theories posit that voters examine 
incumbents’ record in office to decide whether to reward or punish their parties (Adams, 
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Merill, and Grofman 2005; Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1997). Once they obtain 
office, there is a strong tendency for incumbent parties to remain in power if they keep a 
positive record; electors will reward them with their votes as long as they continue 
delivering the benefits that voters expect from them (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966). In other 
words, incumbent parties will remain in power as long as voters continue to approve of 
their performance in office. 
Although existing evidence suggests that these explanations have certain 
applicability in the Mexican case, it also shows that they are insufficient to account for 
the PRI resilience at the subnational level. Table 1.1 shows the percentages of wins and 
losses that the PRI had in gubernatorial elections from 1995 to 2010 where the values of 
selected variables were above their corresponding means. The variables are related to the 
alternative explanations presented in this section and their complete description and basic 
statistics are presented in Tables 3A and 4A in Appendix. As Table 1.1 indicates, 35.9 
percent of the PRI’s wins occurred in elections where state governments had more public 
resources than the average (and thus, plausibly more access to clientelist goods), but 31.6 
percent of its losses also happened under similar conditions. Moreover, contrary to 
expectations, more federal funding (another plausible indicator of access to discretionary 
resources) seems to be more associated with the PRI’s defeats than with its victories, 
because 52.6 percent of this party’s losses took place in elections where state 
governments received more federal resources, whereas only 33.3 percent of its wins 
occurred in similar contexts. 
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Table 1.1. Applicability of Existing Explanations to the PRI Performance in 
Gubernatorial Elections, 1995-2010. 
Existing Explanations Expected Outcome Variable1 Actual Outcome 
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1The operationalization and basic statistics of these variables are presented in Tables 3A 
and 4A in Appendix. 
 
Certainly the PRI did moderately better in more marginalized states and much 
better in elections with more popular governors, more corporatist potential, and more 
fragmented opposition. None of these factors, however, led inexorably to PRI victories, 
because this party still lost a significant number of elections under these conditions. Of its 
total number of defeats, 42.1 percent happened in more marginalized states, 47.4 percent 
occurred in spite of having more popular governors, 36.8 percent took place in contexts 
of more corporatist potential, and 21.1 percent happened despite facing a more divided 
opposition. As a result, this evidence indicates that the existing explanations are 
insufficient to account for the PRI’s endurance at the subnational level. 
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In this dissertation I conduct a more systematic test of the outlined approaches as 
well as my own theory of the PRI’s electoral fate in gubernatorial elections (see Chapter 
2). By doing so, I show that a better understanding of subnational party dominance 
should take into account the crucial and independent role that internal factions play in 
determining the fate of their parties.18  
 
THE FACTIONAL EXPLANATION FOR SUBNATIONAL DOMINANT PARTY PERSISTENCE 
AND DECLINE 
I argue that unity among internal factions, or lack thereof, is the key determinant 
of whether dominant parties retain or lose power. Internal problems are able to bring an 
end to dominant parties (Bogaards and Boucek 2010) even if they have favorable 
conditions with regard to other relevant factors, whereas internal unity fosters electoral 
victories even under adverse electoral contexts. Two mechanisms translate the level 
factional (dis)unity into dominant party success or failure at the polls. 
First, intra-party conflicts tend to take away voters who were previously attracted 
by the political stability and policy certainty associated with the strength and unity of 
dominant parties (Boucek 2010). This segment of the electorate can be sizeable because 
dominant parties typically campaign on their unique ability to govern and compare their 
political knowledge and skill to the opposition parties that have never been in power. 
Internal problems may raise questions among voters about the party’s capacity to govern. 
For example, voters may question the party’s ability to still ruling effectively if it seems 
to be unable to deal with internal issues. In other words, how can the party deal with the 
                                                
18 Extant frameworks admit the importance of party factions for single-party dominance but consider that 
the actions of these groups are an epiphenomenon of other factors, such as socioeconomic context and 
access to clientelistic resources (e.g., Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006) as well as institutional 
configurations (e.g., Cox and Rosenbluth 1996) and level of electoral competitiveness (Boucek 2010). 
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more challenging duty of governing an entire society if it is not able to get the less 
complicated task of solving intra-party problems done? Internal conflicts may also raise 
questions among voters about possible dramatic changes in the party’s platforms. For 
instance, some factions may commit to policies attractive to radical partisans in order to 
win internal disputes but at the expense of alienating moderate voters, who were 
persuaded by the previously centrist policy platforms that usually characterize dominant 
parties. Moreover, internal problems may also create uncertainty and, thus alienation, 
among voters about possible outcomes and consequences of unfolding conflicts. For 
example, which factions will win or lose? And what implications will it have for the 
party? The mere existence of conflicts indicates that the coalition that brings the party 
together is breaking, so some politicians and groups will eventually lose, alienating those 
voters who support them. 
Second, exiting factions may either join the opposition or even create their own 
parties to run against their former party (Epstein 1958; Langston 2002, 2006b), carrying 
with them the support of citizens who otherwise would vote for the defectors’ former 
party. As Bogaards and Boucek point out, “in competitive democracies, political 
earthquakes and realigning elections signaling breakdowns in single-party dominance are 
often triggered by splits and defections from ruling parties by intra-party actors who exit 
and join the opposition or set up break-away parties of factions in order to bring about 
political change” (2010, 110). In fact, in the Mexican case a new era of competitive 
elections started in the late 1980s when prominent but recently excluded politicians left 
the PRI to challenge their former party by assembling a multi-party electoral front in the 
1988 federal elections and later creating the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) to 
compete in subsequent elections (Bruhn 1997). 
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Because dominant parties typically exist in contexts of low electoral 
competitiveness, the opposition is sometimes willing to nominate the defectors from 
those parties. Opposition parties may perceive that running defectors as their own 
candidates is the best way to win office, considering that in those settings the most 
popular and competent politicians tend to belong to dominant parties (Epstein 1967; 
Scheiner 2006). Additionally, because dominant parties are often broadly centrist 
coalitions, they are characterized by pragmatism and ideological diversity (Greene 2007; 
Magaloni 2006). This diversity can facilitate the incorporation of certain high-level 
defectors into the opposition, even when the opposition is highly ideological. The broad 
coalitions that dominant parties usually encompass often include left-wing and right-wing 
politicians who may fit well with ideologically left-wing or right-wing opposition parties 
(Collier and Collier 2002; Smith 1979). As a result, when these politicians leave the 
dominant party due to internal conflicts, they may be promoted by parties that better 
match their ideological preferences. 
More commonly, centrist and pragmatic defectors are able to assemble coalitions 
including both leftist and rightist parties and/or voters, by setting aside ideological 
differences and emphasizing the “need” of political alternation instead. In the Mexican 
case, multi-party coalitions headed by PRI defectors with the avowed aim of putting the 
PRI out of governorships became more common after 1994. This strategy, however, has 
been even more salient in recent years under the direct promotion of the national leaders 
of the leftist PRD and the rightist National Action Party (PAN), the other two main 
parties in Mexico. For instance, these parties assembled coalitions led by PRI defectors to 
run in four out of the eight gubernatorial elections that took place in 2010.19 
                                                
19 These states are Durango, Oaxaca, Puebla, and Sinaloa. 
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The nomination of defectors by opposition parties may not occur where dominant 
parties face challenger parties that are already fairly competitive. If opposition parties are 
competitive, they may be less prone to nominate outsiders, because they already have 
popular politicians to rely on, so the exit options for factions of dominant parties are 
limited. In those cases, however, inter-factional unity may be equally or even more 
important for dominant parties. In fact, in highly competitive elections, dominant parties 
are more sensitive to internal disputes. As a result, even a mild variation in the level of 
internal cohesion, e.g., the lack of support from the losing factions, could be highly costly 
for incumbent parties. 
In this context, intra-party battles have three additional negative effects that are 
more salient for dominant parties in more competitive elections. First, internal conflicts 
diminish the party’s efficiency, i.e., the possibility of mobilizing large portions of their 
membership. Second, intra-party struggles distort the campaign messages of parties and 
candidates, devaluing their public image, because they tend to devote more time and 
resources to addressing internal problems and responding to internal attacks rather than 
promoting their policy platforms. In addition, the mass media’s tendency to focus on 
conflicts and crises rather than policy issues (Leighley 2003) makes voters more likely to 
receive messages about the party’s internal disputes. Third, conflicts among factions 
convey weakness, encouraging challengers and creating bandwagon effects among voters 
in favor of the opposition. 
Conversely, when factions opt to coordinate, these last three effects act in the 
opposite direction, favoring the dominant parties’ electoral prospects. First, internal unity 
provides the foundations for the party’s candidates to attract and mobilize voters. When 
all factions are integrated, government, party, candidates, and factions support each other, 
forming a dense network that works actively for their common goal of winning elections. 
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Second, internal cohesion enables dominant parties and their candidates to devote their 
energies to the campaigns. For instance, they are able to focus their campaigns on issues 
of public interest and strive to convey professionalism, competence, and reliability, which 
are aspects that typically make dominant parties highly appealing to voters (Boucek 
2010). The absence of factional squabbles may also result in more favorable mass media 
coverage. Third, the unity of factions contributes to the image of strength characterizing 
dominant parties, which discourages opposition activists from working hard and impedes 
the emergence of competitive challengers. Therefore, in competitive elections, high 
levels of internal unity increase the odds that dominant parties will retain office. 
An initial approximation suggests the applicability of this argument to the 
Mexican case. As Table 1.2 shows, from 1995 to 2010 the PRI won all elections for state 
governorships it faced under conditions of strong internal unity, and it lost only one out 
of five elections when its level of internal cohesion was moderate.20 By contrast, the party 
was defeated in more than a half of the elections in which it participated while having 
internal problems.  
The difference in proportions is statistically significant at the 99.99 percent level, 
indicating that the level of internal cohesion and the PRI’s prospects of winning are 
strongly associated.21  
  
                                                
20 See Chapter 2 and Tables 1A and 2A in appendix for a complete description of these categories of 
cohesion as well as of the cases each of them comprises. 
21 Chapter 2 presents a more systematic evaluation of the effects of internal unity for the PRI’s 
performance in gubernatorial elections. 
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Table 1.2. Performance of the PRI in Gubernatorial Elections by Level of Internal 
Cohesion, 1995-2010. 


































CONNECTION TO PRIOR RESEARCH 
The argument that factions matter for parties’ electoral performance is not 
new. Work on American political parties in the 1950s and 1960s examined the dynamics 
of factionalism (e.g., Epstein 1958, 1967; Key 1984). More recently, Langston (2003) has 
studied the role that factional unity has played in facilitating electoral comebacks by 
Mexico’s PRI at the subnational level. 
 I build on Langston’s important work on factionalism in the PRI.  We both agree 
that factional disunity can damage the party’s electoral prospects, but we disagree about 
the conditions that generate such intra-party disputes. Langston argues that unity is more 
likely when there are “a single acknowledged leader capable of enforcing agreements” 
among factions, few factions, and “credible, acceptable nomination rules” (2003, 295). 
Although these conditions can lead to unity, the evidence from across all states shows 
that other forces must also be at work.  
Analysts agree that sitting governors in Mexico act as leaders of their state parties.  
Some even characterize them as viceroys (e.g., Ward and Rodríguez 1999).  Thus, if 
leadership matters for enforcing agreements among factions, we would expect more unity 
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in states where the PRI holds the governorship. In fact, Langston explicitly argues that 
sitting governors play such a leadership role and that taking over the role of the missing 
governor is one of the main challenges for the PRI in the states where it loses the 
governorship (2003, 295). Yet in 37 of 58 gubernatorial elections where the PRI held the 
governorship (63.8 percent) that I examine in more detail below, the party suffered from 
deep factional disputes and lost.  
Langston’s argument that fewer factions would make accommodation easier is 
bolstered by her case studies. Chihuahua’s PRI had two major factions that reached 
accommodative agreements whereas Baja California with three factions and Guanajuato 
with four factions suffered from factional antagonisms.  But if we look more broadly 
across states, this apparent relationship disappears.  As I show below in more detail, the 
PRI is in fact more cohesive where it has more factions. 
Finally, Langston argues that open primaries with clear rules foster intra-party 
unity (295, 302, 308) because they “allow winners to argue that their victories are fair, 
and losers have more incentives to accept the loss” (315). She shows that the PRI 
remained united in Chihuahua where it used an open primary to select its gubernatorial 
candidate, whereas it used other selection methods in Guanajuato and Baja California and 
suffered intractable intra-party conflicts (310-315).22  But a broader look casts doubt on 
the power of primaries to diminish factional antagonisms.  Poiré Romero (2002) showed 
that in 33 percent of all states using primaries from 1994 to 2000, losing factions defected 
from the PRI rather than unifying with the winning faction.  A lower proportion of state 
party organizations, just 22 percent, suffered defections when they used closed selection 
procedures (150). Estévez, Diaz-Cayeros, and Magaloni reach similar conclusions and 
                                                
22 She indicates that the candidate for Guanajuato was selected by a convention of delegates and implies 
that the primary system was not used to select the candidate for Baja California, although she does not 
clarify what selection method was used in this case. 
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argue that “neither primaries nor leadership imposition were particularly effective in 
stemming defections of important politicians and state-level splits in the PRI” (2008a, 14; 
2008b, 46).  
Thus, although I agree with Langston that factionalism is the key to explaining the 
PRI’s electoral fortunes in gubernatorial elections, I propose a different set of causes for 
the degree of factional disagreement across cases.23 I argue that relations between the 
national PRI and its state party organizations during the period of single-party dominance 
at the federal level conditioned future factionalism in the states. Where factions were 
initially autonomous from the national PRI, they learned to accommodate each other’s 
interests after Mexico’s democratization. Where factions were instead subordinated to the 
national PRI, they never acquired the tools to negotiate among themselves and created 
debilitating antagonistic relationships after democratization. As I show in Chapter 2, this 
historical-legacies argument better accounts for the pattern of factional disagreement and 
electoral fortunes across all gubernatorial elections from 1995 to 2010. 
 
EXOGENOUS AND ENDOGENOUS PATHS TO PARTY UNITY 
I identify two alternative pathways through which party unity can be generated. 
The exogenous path is the most common way to unify diverse organizations, including 
political parties (Axelrod 1984). It consists of the existence of an external agent that 
imposes compliance among multiple participants in a given organization. Autocracies 
organized around dominant parties typically employ the exogenous path. Authoritarian 
regimes provide external agents in the form of strong central authorities to their official, 
                                                
23 In addition, my work differs from Langston’s in two fundamental aspects. First, I explicitly theorize the 
different mechanisms, such as campaign issues, defections, and effects on voters and party organization, 
through which factionalism impacts parties’ electoral fortunes. Second, I conduct a statistical analysis, 
which allows me to test alternative explanations as well as the theory I propose. 
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incumbent parties for enforcing internal unity at the subnational level through the use of 
coercive instruments (e.g., political exile, exclusion, and even prison) and, to a lesser 
extent, rewards (e.g., spoils and political positions) (Brownlee 2007; Greene 2007; 
Magaloni 2006). It is important to note that the inclination of subnational parties to 
cooperate with each other may certainly exist in autocratic settings, but it is not a 
necessary component to generate party unity, since the regime can enforce it regardless of 
whether factions are well-disposed to collaborate or not. 
Mexico followed the exogenous path of party unity during the authoritarian era, 
from 1929 to 1994.24 In this period, the PRI’s central authorities25 imposed unity among 
the local factions26 by rewarding obedient groups and leading party members, on the one 
hand, and by punishing dissidents and controversial politicians, on the other hand 
(Hernández Rodríguez 2003). Therefore, this argument is consistent with Langston’s 
empirical observation that finding politicians able to replace the missing governors as 
strong leaders was the main challenge for the PRI in the three states that this party lost 
during the autocratic period: Baja California in 1989, Guanajuato in 1991,27 and 
Chihuahua in 1992. The need for strong leaders to enforce this policy of carrots and 
sticks, which Langston detected in the cases she examined, fits perfectly the exogenous 
path of party unity that was in place in the authoritarian era. 
                                                
24 Below I explain this categorization. 
25 Here I use the terms PRI’s national leaders, central authorities, and the center interchangeably to 
designate mainly the national Presidency and alternatively the federal Secretary of Government and the 
presidency of the PRI’s National Executive Committee (CEN) as the main instances of political decision-
making of this party at the national level (Langston 2011, 150-154). 
26 I employ the terms subnational factions, local factions, and state factions interchangeably in this 
dissertation. 
27 Although the PRI officially won the 1991 election in Guanajuato, the governorship was conceded to the 
PAN in negotiations with President Salinas de Gortari (Eisenstadt 2004). 
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Alternatively, party unity can also be endogenous: factions themselves may 
decide to unite. In the absence of an external enforcer, their autonomous decisions are the 
only viable way for factions to cooperate. The endogenous path of party unity is 
generally observed in democratic settings, which by definition presuppose more 
autonomous political organizations. In democratic regimes, the central authorities of 
incumbent parties are typically unable to impose severe punishments (e.g., the possibility 
of politically excluding any citizen is precluded) or grant considerable benefits (e.g., 
accountability systems make it more difficult to arbitrary use public resources) to 
subnational factions. Because central authorities do not have the capacity to compel 
internal compliance, the goodwill of subnational party factions becomes a necessary 
condition for their cooperation under democracy. As a result, the collaboration of factions 
of dominant parties in democratic settings represents, in practice, a case of cooperation of 
multiple participants without an external enforcer. 
Regime changes have a direct impact on the basis of cooperation among multiple 
participants. The recent reconcentration of power in Russia, for example, has 
reconstituted a potent central authority able to oblige politicians in charge of lower levels 
of government to adhere to policies reinforcing centralization (Mitin 2008). Transitions to 
democracy fuel changes in the opposite direction: they dilute the enforcement capacity of 
central authorities, making the prospects of cooperation depend on the will of participants 
at the subnational level. As an illustration of this, the growing self-regulation of local 
party elites in deciding candidates and party leaders in democratizing polities has been 
observed across regions (Field and Siavelis 2008). 
The exogenous path of party unity at the subnational level was not feasible in 
Mexico from 1995 onward. From 1929 to 1994, the elections in Mexico were mainly 
tilted in favor of the PRI through the use of different authoritarian mechanisms including 
 27 
the use of public resources for vote buying and electoral fraud (Camp 2003; Crespo 1995; 
Molinar 1991). Although since 1977 the regime enacted a series of electoral reforms that 
enabled the opposition to win municipal elections in major cities and states’ capitals 
during President Miguel de la Madrid’s term (1982-1988), this political liberation did not 
allow for opposition victories in gubernatorial elections until President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari’s term (1988-1994). Certainly, during Salinas de Gortari’s term the opposition 
increased substantially its victories in municipal elections and even reached three 
governorships,28 the access to those positions was not through official electoral results 
but through political negotiations between high-ranking officials of Salinas de Gortari 
administration and national leaders of opposition parties (Eisenstadt 2004). In addition, 
these negotiations primarily benefited the PAN, the main ally in the opposition of Salinas 
de Gortari, whereas the PRD was excluded from them (Bruhn 1997; Eisenstadt 2004). 
Nevertheless, in 1994 the uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
as well as the assassinations of the PRI’s presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio 
Murrieta, and the General Secretary of the PRI’s National Executive Committee, José 
Francisco Ruiz Massieu, forced the regime to quickly negotiate with all oppositions 
parties democratic reforms, given “the fear of political instability became widespread 
among all social classes” (Camp 2003, 194). Thus, the federal government and all parties 
signed the Pact for Peace, Justice, and Democracy to enact reforms to democratize 
elections at all levels (Becerra, Salazar, and Woldenberg 2000; Camp 2003). Moreover, 
right after taking office, at the beginning of 1995 President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce and all 
political parties signed the Political National Agreement to enact new democratic reforms 
                                                
28 The PAN won the governorships of Baja California in 1989 and Chihuahua in 1992. Additionally, in 
1991 the Salinas de Gortari’s government granted de facto the governorship of Guanajuato to this party by 
promoting the resignation of the PRI elected governor Ramon Aguirre Velazquez, who had officially won 
the election, and appointing prominent PAN member Carlos Medina Plascencia as interim governor 
(Eisenstadt 2004). 
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to further improve the quality of the elections in Mexico. One of the conditions that 
opposition parties stipulated to sign this agreement was to immediately provide a 
democratic framework for the elections at the subnational level, while they and the 
federal government negotiated the reform for federal elections, which culminated in 1996 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 2000d).29 As a consequence of these changes, 
since 1995 the federal government ceased to interfere in state-level elections (Magaloni 
2006, 94). At the same time, the consolidation of independent electoral authorities and 
judges propitiated relative free, fair, and transparent elections at the subnational level 
(Camp 2003, 2011b; Chand 2001; Klesner 2001, 2006; Poiré Romero 2002, 100-101). In 
this context, during the last PRI President Ernesto Zedillo’s term (1994-2000), the PRI 
lost gubernatorial elections in 13 of 32 states, beginning on February 12, 1995 when the 
PRI lost the governorship of Jalisco by a 16-percent vote margin against the PAN.30 
Electoral institutions and scholars have not found cases of intervention from federal 
authorities, nor irregularities that could have altered the final results, nor have they found 
significant variations in the quality of gubernatorial elections in the states the PRI won 
vis-à-vis the states it lost during this period (Crespo 1999; Klesner 1999, 2006).31 
Therefore, focusing on post-1994 elections also allows me to eliminate both the federal 
government’s intervention and electoral fraud as explanations for the PRI’s resilience at 
the subnational level. 
                                                
29 For detailed accounts of the electoral reforms of Mexico during this period see (Becerra, Salazar, and 
Woldenberg 1997, 2000; Schedler 2005). 
30 In addition to Jalisco, the PRI was defeated in Mexico City, Nuevo León, and Querétaro in 1997; 
Aguascalientes, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas in 1998; Baja California Sur and Nayarit in 1999; and Chiapas and 
Morelos in 2000. Moreover, it could neither recover Baja California nor Guanajuato in 1995. 
31 As an exception, the Electoral Court of the Federal Judicial Branch (Trife) annulled the 2000 Tabasco 
election after having found major irregularities. The PRI won the extraordinary election that took place 
there a few months later. 
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These fundamental changes deprived the PRI central authorities of their 
authoritarian toolkit to enforce party unity in the states. As mentioned above, from the 
creation of the PRI in 1929 to 1994, the Mexican presidents, as the ultimate leaders of the 
PRI, had the capacity to impose unity among factions in each state by rewarding obedient 
groups and punishing undisciplined politicians using authoritarian tools (Hernández 
Rodríguez 2003). The last president who had such a power was Salinas de Gortari, who 
removed the most state governors (12) in a presidential term and even granted 
governorships and other elected positions directly to opposition parties, which those 
parties did not officially win (Hernández Rodríguez 2003; Eisenstadt 2004). 
Nevertheless, the emerging political conditions constrained the presidents’ capacity to 
decide over the PRI at the subnational level. The change was evident at the beginning of 
Zedillo’s term in 1995 when PRI groups of Tabasco successfully rebelled against 
Zedillo’s attempt to remove Roberto Madrazo Pintado from the governorship (Hernández 
Rodríguez 2003).32 
These changes gave more leverage to the subnational factions, which now had the 
increasingly competitive opposition parties as a viable exit option at their disposal. The 
new conditions forced the PRI central leaders to fully empower the local factions to 
decide all nominations in their states, including the governorships (Diaz 2005; Diaz-
Cayeros and Langston 2004; Langston 2001, 2006a; Wuhs 2006). In other words, the 
endogenous path (i.e., inter-factional cooperation) became the only possible way for the 
PRI to obtain party unity at the subnational level since 1995. 
In line with the previous discussion, I identify two periods in the subnational 
politics of Mexico for the purpose of this dissertation. The first goes from 1929 to 1994, 
                                                
32 As a consequence of this failure, Zedillo had to even dismiss his protégé Estebán Moctezuma Barragán 
as the Secretary of Government, the second most important position in Mexico’s government. 
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which I label as the authoritarian period. The second goes from 1995 onwards, which I 
define as the democratic period.33 Both periods are referred to two dimensions: the 
quality of the electoral competition and the capacity of the center to enforce party unity at 
the subnational level. In the autocratic period, elections were not democratic and the 
center had the capacity to impose party unity. By contrast, in the democratic period, 
elections were democratic and the center did not have the capacity to enforce party unity. 
Figure 1.1 summarizes how the exogenous and endogenous paths unfold to 
produce party unity. It shows that under non-democratic conditions, party unity can result 
from the action of an external enforcer (i.e., central party authorities), the will of the 
factions, or both. By contrast, under democratic conditions, party unity can only be the 
product of factions’ voluntary cooperation. The former was used in Mexican states from 
1929-1994, whereas the latter has been used since 1995. 
 
Figure 1.1. Alternative Paths to Party Unity in Mexican States. 
  




Exogenous Path  
(Enforced Compliance) 
Yes (Autocracy) Party Unity Party Unity 
No (Democracy) Party Unity Party Division 
 
Having established the two alternative paths to party unity as well as their links to 
the political contexts in which they commonly take place, now the task is to disentangle 
                                                
33 Since this categorization is only referred to gubernatorial elections, it is not affected by debates that 
situate Mexico’s democratic transition in federal elections either in the 1997 elections for federal congress 
or in the 2000 elections for president and federal congress (e.g., Greene 2007; Schedler 2005). 
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the conditions under which subnational party factions that previously united through the 
existence of an exogenous enforcer decide to remain united once such an authority ceases 
to be present. In other words, under what conditions can subnational party factions 
successfully shift from the exogenous path to the endogenous path to preserve internal 
unity? I build on insights from prevailing theories on cooperation to answer this question. 
 
LIKELIHOOD OF ACCOMMODATION AMONG FULLY EMPOWERED FACTIONS 
The primary goal of factions in dominant parties is to obtain political positions for 
their members (Camp 2002; Langston 1995; Smith 1979). In the absence of an external 
enforcing authority to distribute those positions, as occurs under democratic conditions, 
factions operate in a non-zero-sum setting (i.e., all factions lose if their party loses 
elections) in which they face conflicting incentives. On the one hand, their interests 
partially coincide, because they need mutual cooperation for their party to win elections 
(see above). On the other hand, their interests partially conflict as well, because they need 
to battle each other in order to maximize the positions they can obtain for their members. 
Since the dual nature of these groups’ incentives is basically invariant along the different 
elections in which they try to obtain political positions, the interaction among these 
factions represents a typical case of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) with multiple 
participants (Axelrod 1984, 2012; Stern et al. 2002). In other words, they face the same 
opposing incentives to collaborate or defect in each election under the expectation of “a 
continuing chance of interaction” that characterize IPD (Axelrod 1984, 16). 
Axelrod (1984, 13) has shown that tit for tat, i.e., “the policy of cooperating on 
the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the previous move” (i.e., 
either cooperating or defecting) is the optimal strategy for participants under a situation 
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of IPD. He has also demonstrated that cooperation under a situation of IPD is the best 
choice for all participants in the long run, given that its benefits are optimal (1984, 27-
54). Furthermore, in line with Axelrod’s seminal studies on the topic, further research has 
confirmed that cooperation is optimal regardless of the number of participants and even 
the presence of misunderstanding and/or misimplementation among participants (see, for 
example, Axelrod 1997a, 2000, 2012; Bicchieri 1997; Caporael et al. 1989; Ostrom 1990; 
Stern et al. 2002). This means that cooperation is the most productive choice for 
participants even in the presence of communication or implementation problems that lead 
participants to mistakenly assume defections or betrayals from their counterparts 
(Axelrod 2012). 
Although cooperation is optimal for all participants in the long run under IPD, it 
is neither the only possible and stable outcome, nor the most common one (Axelrod 
1984). To the contrary, defection is the most likely result under IPD. In fact, in initial 
interactions, participants of IPD tend not to cooperate but to defect because they are 
shortsighted by apparent short-term benefits. For example, factions may try to exclude 
each other from obtaining positions, assuming that their party can afford the defection of 
the excluded groups. Additionally, it is common that envious feelings lead participants to 
subordinate their goal of maximizing their own benefits to the one of obtaining more 
benefits than the other participants. This goal is impossible to achieve in most situations 
unless participants engage in non-cooperative, mutually destructive behavior (Axelrod 
1984, 111). 
Because its benefits occur in the long run and appear to be counterintuitive in the 
short term, cooperation is the product of a trial-and-error learning process, so its “slow 
and painful” development depends on multiple interactions (Axelrod 1984, 191). 
Through constant interaction, participants not only realize that cooperation is their best 
 33 
choice but also foster the mutual trust they need to join efforts (Axelrod 2000). In fact, 
once cooperation emerges, trustability becomes an asset in itself, around which 
participants tend to build a reputation to consolidate their mutual cooperation as well as 
to extend their collaborative transactions to other actors (Bicchieri 1997). In addition, 
constant interaction promotes a sense of group, common welfare among participants 
(Caporael et al. 1989). As a result, this group identity reinforces their cooperative 
activities and even extends their collaboration to the provision of mutual protection. Due 
to these reasons, cooperation tends to become a self-reinforcing process once established. 
Consequently, the main challenge for participants is to reach cooperation, particularly in 
initial interactions, because early defections can easily lead to vicious cycles of 
generalized desertions not only because tit for tat is the strategy that provides the most 
benefits, but also because early defections foster distrust and thus create further 
disincentives among participants to collaborate. 
As Stern et al. (2002) point out, the aforementioned scholarly works on 
cooperation, however, presuppose that participants have full control of the matter on 
which they decide whether or not to collaborate, which is not usually the case in politics. 
In different political situations the autonomy of participants to decide their affairs is 
contested by external actors. This means that participants’ level of independence to 
negotiate (i.e., interactively make agreements entailing their mutual cooperation) about 
the issues at stake depends on the outcome of their struggle with external actors. 
Therefore, their degree of autonomy to negotiate, far from being constant, varies across 
cases. 
The authority of subnational actors to decide over affairs concerning their 
localities is often constrained or even overridden by national, central actors. The margin 
of maneuver of local actors to make decisions about their affairs will depend on the level 
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of (de)centralization of the system in which they are inserted. It will be narrow in unitary 
and authoritarian regimes, which highly concentrate decision-making power in a few 
actors, and broad in federalist and democratic polities, which disperse authority across 
multiple functional and geographic layers of government. In addition to the 
(de)centralized nature of the regime, the autonomy of local actors in decision-making is a 
function of their strength, or weakness, to resist the influence of central actors. As a 
result, it is possible to find unexpected cases of relative high local autonomy even in 
deeply centralized regimes. In China, for example, in spite of the high centralization of its 
totalitarian regime, the diverse responses (ranging from compliance to resistance) of local 
actors to national policies explain the contrasting regional variation of systems of 
property rights that are emerging in that country (Whiting 2006). Similarly, cases of high 
central leverage can be found in decentralized regimes. In contemporary democratic 
Spain, for instance, the capacity of the national authorities of the Popular Party and the 
Socialist Party, the main Spanish parties, to impose candidates and policies in different 
regions depends on the level of (in)subordination they find in the corresponding local 
groups (Roller and Houten 2002; Ross 1996; Van Biezen 2003). 
The level of local actors’ compliance or challenge to the influence of central 
actors depends on the extent to which the former have developed shared agreements to 
oppose or at least minimize the involvement of central elites on local affairs. The 
emergence of powerful political figures at the local level (Tarrow 1977), the presence of 
events pointing out abusive practices of central actors affecting local interests (Hernández 
Rodríguez 2008), and the concretion of explicit projects to expand the political 
participation of domestic actors at the local and national levels (Hernández Rodríguez 
2003) are among the factors that fuel the counteraction of local actors against the central 
ones (Hopkin 2003). Their resistance is based on a consensus that local actors reach 
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against the intervention of central actors in local affairs. This agreement is built around 
an in-group pact or sense that they will be better off if they keep the central actors away 
from local affairs (Kenney and Rice 1987). 
 
HISTORY MATTERS: WHY FACTIONS COOPERATE OR CONFLICT 
In line with the outlined literature on cooperation, I argue that the prospects 
cooperation for subnational factions to foster cooperation among them depends on their 
level of independence from their national leaders to decide on party affairs. The reason is 
simple: cooperation implies participants’ control of the object over which cooperation 
may occur in the first place. Therefore, the more control factions have over the matter of 
their mutual interest, the more cooperative capacity they could acquire through their 
mutual interaction; conversely, less control over the object of interest reduces the 
likelihood of political interaction and thus of cooperation among factions. In sum, the 
level of control over the object of interest determines whether and to what extent 
participants will develop cooperative capacity. For instance, factions will not develop any 
cooperative capacity if they have no interaction—that is, in cases where their 
subordination in the decision-making process is absolute. Thus, it is only when factions 
are vested with certain level of decision-making autonomy over the distribution of power 
inside their parties, will they have the opportunity to interact with each other and thus to 
develop cooperation among them. 
In making nominations, the decision-making capacity of subnational factions is 
curtailed by their parties’ central authorities. As my argument implies, subnational 
factions can cultivate collaboration when they control decisions about those nominations, 
which implies minimal or no external influence. Accordingly, factions that tend to decide 
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the distribution of power inside their parties by themselves are in frequent interaction 
with each other for that purpose, and they are more likely to develop collaborative 
patterns than factions subordinated to external actors. In other words, factions that just 
obey orders do not exercise the interactional “muscle” around which cooperative capacity 
is built. 
Because regime type can matter for the correlation of forces between central party 
authorities and subnational factions, regime changes tend to favor one side over the other 
in their struggle for decision-making. As a result, institutional and political changes that 
decentralize authority provide more leverage in decision-making regarding local issues to 
subnational actors at the expense of central ones. Because reforms promoting federalism 
and democratization are the typical mechanisms through which authority is decentralized, 
they translate the locus of local decision-making to subnational actors. Regarding 
federalism, for example, the transference of institutional prerogatives to local levels of 
government has increased the political role of local actors through political parties in 
Western Europe (Brzinski 1999; Hopkin 2003). The reverse also applies: centralizing 
changes at the national regime diminish the participation of local actors in deciding over 
local affairs. In Russia, for instance, the recent de facto political recentralization deprived 
regional elites of influence over domestic issues they had acquired as a product of the 
incipient federalism that had emerged (Mitin 2008). 
Similarly, at the party level more electoral competition reduces the margin of 
maneuver of central actors and, conversely, gives more leverage to the local ones for 
deciding on local matters. In fact, diverse studies have confirmed that actual and potential 
electoral losses in different regions lead reluctant national party authorities to transfer the 
bulk of decision-making power to subnational groups. National party authorities trade 
their prerogative to appoint regional candidates and party leaders to subnational factions 
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in order for their party to recover political positions and improve its electoral 
competitiveness (Barnea and Rahat 2007; Bille 2001; Brancati 2008; Hopkin 2001, 2003; 
LeDuc 2001; Lundell 2004; Pennings and Hazan 2001; Rahat and Hazan 2001). 
Because by definition transitions to democracy imply more electoral competition 
for incumbent parties, such processes of political change open opportunities for local 
party factions to shift in their favor the locus of decision-making on local issues. The 
increasing involvement of local factions in deciding candidates and party leaders in 
democratizing polities has been observed around the world (Field and Siavelis 2008), 
including Mexico. The increasing electoral competitiveness that accompanied Mexico’s 
democratization has driven the PRI’s subnational factions to gain control over the 
processes for defining candidates and party leaders in their corresponding regions since 
1995 (Diaz 2005; Diaz-Cayeros and Langston 2004; Langston 2001, 2006a; Wuhs 2006). 
In sum, this theory stipulates that the combination of preexisting relations 
between central party authorities and subnational factions and exogenous forces 
promoting decentralized decision-making explains why either collaborative or 
antagonistic factionalism takes place among subnational factions of formerly national 
dominant parties. As discussed above, events such as increasing electoral competition, 
transitions to democracy, and federalist reforms in unitary polities decentralize decision-
making power over lower levels of authority. As a result, they confer primacy to local 
actors to decide on local affairs. Empowered by the high levels of decision-making 
autonomy that a change of this nature imply, local actors will engage in dynamics either 
of negotiation and agreement (i.e., cooperation), or of dissension and confrontation (i.e., 
non-cooperation or conflict) depending on their preexisting interaction. In cases of 
extensive prior interaction, subnational actors develop bargaining capacity that translates 
into collaborative factionalism when they are empowered with high decision-making 
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independence. By contrast, the lack of interaction antecedents impedes the development 
of cooperative capacity among local actors. Antagonistic factionalism results when the 
factions’ empowerment takes places under these conditions. 
My claim that preexisting conditions shape the trajectories of political phenomena 
builds on the historical-institutionalism framework, which looks at the importance of 
antecedent factors in defining political outcomes given the presence of critical events 
(Collier and Collier 2002; Hall and Taylor 1996; Mahoney 2000, 2003). Based on the 
historical-institutional approach, for example, Brownlee demonstrates how predefined 
conditions among ruling elites exert a decisive impact over the strength and endurance of 
authoritarian regimes based on hegemonic parties in moments of high opposition 
contestation (2007). In cases where one elite defeated the rival ones in the formative 
stages of their regimes (e.g., Egypt and Malaysia), rulers are strong enough to overcome 
the opposition’s challenges and thus to preserve authoritarian rule. By contrast, in cases 
where disputes among elites were not solved during the regime formation (e.g., Iran and 
Philippines), those rivalries persist and, in moments of opposition contestation, translate 
into defections of some elite groups that weaken those regimes and thus open 
opportunities for democratization. I employ a similar logic to show that events that 
decentralized decision-making unleash preexisting interaction dynamics among local 
actors, which may be decisive in subsequent periods. 
 
APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE OF MEXICO 
I argue that the democratic transition forced the PRI’s national leadership to 
transfer the bulk of the political decision-making at the subnational level to the local 
factions as a strategy to retain political support in the states. Not only did the center lose 
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its authoritarian tools (i.e., selective rewards and punishments) to enforce party unity at 
the subnational level, but also the increasing competitiveness of opposition parties gave 
local factions a viable exit option. Both developments gave local party units considerable 
leverage vis-à-vis the center. As a result, empowering the local factions was the only 
viable choice for the PRI to preserve internal unity and thus its political strength at the 
subnational level (Beer 2011, 128-133; Langston 2011, 154-159; 2006a, 2008; Diaz-
Cayeros and Langston 2004). 
When the center ceased to enforce internal unity, decision-making at the 
subnational level became came to resemble an iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) in 
which participants (i.e., factions) had a concrete object of negotiation/dispute (i.e., 
political positions), faced incentives to cooperate (i.e., increasing the odds of their party 
to win elections) and to antagonize (i.e., maximizing positions for their members), and 
also had the expectation of future interactions, or “a continuing chance of interaction” 
(Axelrod 1984, 16). Regarding the latter issue, important clarifications are in order. First, 
increasing electoral competition does not alter the “continuing chance of interaction” 
among factions, because increasing the possibility of losing elections does not cancel the 
expectation of future interactions among these political groups. Second, empirical studies 
have shown that even after losing elections at the subnational level, PRI factions expect 
to continue interacting with each other and, in fact, they do continue interacting with each 
other (Langston 2003). Third, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, electoral context (i.e., 
the level of electoral competitiveness in a given election) does not affect factions’ 
behavior but vice versa: the actions of these groups shape electoral conditions. 
Antagonistic factionalism can lead dominant parties to lose low competitive elections, 
whereas collaborative factionalism can drive them to win highly competitive elections 
(see Chapters 2, 3, and 4). 
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In the Mexican case, the central party authorities represented the main source of 
exogenous influence over PRI decision-making at the subnational level during the 
authoritarian period. In states where the local factions were historically more autonomous 
vis-à-vis the central authorities in the autocratic era, they had the opportunity to interact 
with other to advance their interests. As theories of cooperation predict (Axelrod 2000; 
Bicchieri 1997; Caporael et al. 1989), through their interaction they learned the value of 
collaboration, developed mutual trust, and even created their own group identity as a 
political class. As a result, although they were not completely independent to decide on 
their affairs, the factions in these states were self-determining enough to create the seeds 
of cooperation that flourished when they were empowered by Mexico’s democratization. 
After democratization, these factions were more apt to negotiate and reach 
consistent agreements about the distribution of political positions among them, leading to 
high levels of intra-party unity. In other words, in the new context of independence from 
the center as an external enforcer, their history of interaction led these groups to 
cooperate initially, a crucial condition to produce self-reinforcing patterns of 
collaboration (Axelrod 1984, 2000, 2012). The cooperation among these groups involved 
negotiation of the distribution of political positions in exchange for mutual political 
support, which constituted the tit-for-tat component (i.e., cooperation based on 
reciprocity) of Axelrod’s model. In these cases, factions preserved internal cohesion, 
which has helped their party win reelection after the democratic transition. Moreover, 
given the sense of identity they have developed, factions in these cases have extended 
their cooperation to the protection of their leading members even in the presence of 
political scandals. 
An important factor that helps these factions to cooperate with each other is their 
internal discipline. This intra-factional discipline is explained by the lack of a civil 
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service in Mexican state bureaucracies as well as the prohibition on immediate reelection 
for municipal and state legislative positions, which enables the leaders of factions to grant 
attainable positions to other factions without experiencing significant pressures from their 
followers. Studies on the topic have shown that the high levels of uncertainty and rotation 
of employment in Mexico’s public sector put a premium on the loyalty and discipline of 
the members of factions rather than on their personal competence, reducing significantly 
the likelihood of intra-factional defections.34 But more importantly, members of more 
independent factions have learned the value of collaboration. They are more likely to 
understand and consequently support their leaders’ need to negotiate positions in order to 
preserve the unity and strength of their party so that it can win elections, particularly in 
increasingly competitive times. As a result, they will be more prone to accept less 
relevant posts by realizing that otherwise they could kill the goose that lays the golden 
eggs. 
In those states where local factions were more subordinated to the party’s central 
authorities in the autocratic era, those factions did not interact with each other or their 
interaction was so limited that they were unable to plant the seeds of cooperation. Their 
inability to collaborate was inconsequential for the PRI in those states during the pre-
democratic era, because internal unity was exogenously imposed by the party’s central 
authorities (see Figure 1.1). But as soon as the influence of central authorities over local 
affairs diminished due to the democratization process, the newly empowered local 
factions focused their energies mainly on advancing their own members’ interests at the 
expense of others. As expected by theories of cooperation, they focused on apparent 
                                                
34 Although these claims are based on the examination of national factions (Camp 1995; Cornelius 1996, 
39-44; Grindle 1977; Grindle 1997; Langston 1995; Smith 1979), further studies have confirmed that the 
PRI subnational factions follow similar patterns (Hernández Rodríguez 1997, 1998, 2003, 2008; Langston 
2003; 2006b, 64-66). 
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short-term benefits, seeking to obtain the most political positions they could capture at 
the expense of excluding the other factions. In so doing, they operated under the biased 
assumption that the other factions’ possible responses (ranging from submissively 
accepting their exclusion to defecting from the party) were inconsequential for the party’s 
electoral success. They assumed that even in the worst-case scenario the party could 
afford the defection of the excluded groups. 
As a consequence, in the absence of collaborative antecedents, they started their 
interactions in the emergent context of autonomy from an external enforcer by 
confronting each other. In these states, the resulting antagonistic factionalism has 
demolished the most important asset of these parties in competitive times: their internal 
unity. Therefore, internal conflicts have led the PRI to lose in these states, even when 
other conditions identified in the literature should have been favorable for its reelection. 
Furthermore, in these states factions were unable to develop any sense of common 
identity or loyalty to politicians; thus in the presence of political scandals they tended to 
abandon or attach politicians in trouble even if they owed important favors and privileges 
to them. 
Figure 1.2 summarizes graphically the causal process described here. During the 
authoritarian period, the center was the main enforcer of party unity at the subnational 
level. Moreover, it was the main source of exogenous influence over local factions and 
decided on the nominations for governorships, the main offices at the subnational level 
(Diaz 2005; Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Langston 2011). This influence, however, was not 
homogenous but varied across states and time, depending on the capacity of local factions 
to contest it (Camp 1974; Diaz-Cayeros 2006, 98-122; Langston 2011, 150-154). In states 
where factions had more independence from the center to decide on the gubernatorial 
nominations, these factions interacted with each other as a means to advance their 
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political projects. The incipient cooperation they developed in those years had lasting 
consequences. As a result, when the center ceased to enforce party unity and granted full 
political autonomy to the local factions, they responded by expanding the early 
collaboration patterns they had cultivated in the previous era. In sum, they shifted from 
the exogenous path (externally imposed cooperation) to the endogenous path (voluntary 
cooperation) to preserve party unity, which enabled the PRI to continue winning the 
governorships of those states despite facing more challenging electoral conditions. 
By contrast, in states where factions were more subordinated to the center during 
the authoritarian period, these factions had limited interaction over nomination politics 
and, instead, they pursue their political interests by individually negotiating benefits with 
the center in exchange for their obedience to the center’s decisions; thus they did not 
create any basis for further cooperation. As a consequence, when the center ceased to 
enforce internal unity and gave them full political independence, these factions reacted by 
confronting each other. They failed to shift from the exogenous path to the endogenous 
path of party unity. The resulting party division led the PRI to lose the governorships in 
these states. This dissertation demonstrates that this is the factor, rather than other 
variables, such as the availability of resources to distribute among factions, that best 
explains the factions’ propensity to collaborate in the subsequent democratic era.35 This 
confirmation is in line with previous studies on cooperation, which have shown that the 
predisposition to negotiate is more important for participants to collaborate than the 
amount of available assets, because even in the presence of relative abundant resources, 
                                                
35 In fact, studies on cooperation have showed that the predisposition to negotiate is more important for 
participants to collaborate than the amount of available assets, because even in the presence of relative 
abundant resources, participants are highly likely to engage in mutually destructive behavior if their 
primary goal is to obtain more benefits than the other participants (Axelrod 1984). 
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participants are highly likely to engage in mutually destructive behavior if their primary 
goal is to obtain more benefits than the other participants (Axelrod 1984). 
Figure 1.2. Factions and Subnational Dominant Parties. 
 
 
It is important to clarify that although my approach relies, in part, on 
comparative-historical methods in examining how relatively long-term trajectories (i.e., 
factions’ preexisting levels of subordination/autonomy vis-à-vis the center) combine with 
critical events (i.e., democratization and rising electoral competitiveness) to produce 
different political outcomes (i.e., collaborative/antagonistic factionalism leading 
dominant parties to retain/lose power), it does not follow the critical juncture framework 
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(CJF). Certainly, my approach and CJF give similar weight to critical events as 
intervening variables that affect the outcomes of the phenomena under study. 
Nevertheless, there is a central difference. CJF attributes the causes of critical junctures 
to the antecedent conditions of the phenomena it explores. According to CJF, the 
antecedent conditions produce the cleavage or crisis, which “in turn triggers the critical 
juncture” (Collier and Collier 2002, 30). By contrast, my model takes critical events 
(democratization and more electoral competition in this case) as an exogenous factor. In 
other words, I do not link the preexisting levels of subordination/autonomy of local 
factions to the conditions that “triggered” democratization and electoral competitiveness 
at the state level. What my argument stresses is that once democratization and electoral 
competitiveness led the center to stop enforcing party unity at the subnational level, 
voluntary cooperation among factions became the only way to reach internal cohesion, 
and under these conditions the preexisting factions’ levels of subordination/autonomy 
vis-à-vis the center became crucial. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This dissertation examines the effects of factionalism on the electoral fate of the 
PRI in contemporary gubernatorial elections and examines the conditions under which 
these political groups unify their party by cooperating with each other, or divide it by 
engaging in mutual exclusion and confrontation. The project relies on a mixed-method 
approach to achieve its aims. 
I use statistical analysis of an original dataset on the 58 gubernatorial elections 
that took place from 1995 to 2010 in states where the PRI had never lost the 
governorship. Because this timeframe represents the aftermath of the autocratic era 
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(1929-1994), during these elections party unity, or the lack thereof, depended on the 
endogenous path—that is on the factions themselves (see Figure 1.1). Let us recall that by 
focusing on post-1994 elections I eliminate both the federal government’s intervention 
and electoral fraud as explanations for the PRI’s resilience at the subnational level (see 
above). Therefore, looking at this period allows me to test the effects of factional 
behavior on this party’s electoral results. Additionally, the statistical analysis allows me 
to explore the viability of alternative arguments about subnational dominance as well as 
alternative explanations that come from the literature on party competition and national-
level party dominance. The dataset contains information that measures different levels of 
party (dis)unity based on factional behavior in each election. The measurement draws on 
data gathered through fieldwork conducted from August 2009 to August 2010. This 
fieldwork involved extensive archival research, including the examination of reports from 
major Mexican national and state-level newspapers and other scholarly materials. The 
dataset also includes electoral results obtained from Mexican official agencies and the 
CIDAC’s database (CIDAC 2011) as well as appropriate information to test alternative 
explanations of the PRI’s performance in subnational elections. 
Existing theories argue that the electoral effects that factions may exert over 
dominant parties are not independent but an epiphenomenon of other factors, such as the 
methods that those parties employ to select their candidates, the number of existing 
factions, the amount of public resources available to those parties, and the expected level 
of electoral competitiveness (Boucek 2009, 2010; Langston 2003). I use the dataset to 
test statistically these endogenous arguments. 
Then, I analyze elections in Michoacán and Zacatecas to provide a further 
evaluation of the potential impact of the level of electoral competitiveness on factional 
behavior. More specifically, I test the claim derived from the existing literature that 
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electoral competitiveness and level of unity in dominant parties are inversely related 
(Boucek 2010). I examine the 1995 election in Michoacán that took place under highly 
competitive conditions, so party division would have been expected, according to the 
logic of existing arguments. I also explore the 1998 election in Zacatecas that occurred 
under a low competitive context, so party unity would be the predicted outcome. Yet, as I 
show, in Michoacán the PRI attained internal unity, whereas in Zacatecas the party 
experienced a costly division. This analysis is based on survey and archival data I 
obtained in the field research. This information allows me to associate specific key events 
involving factions with the variation in voting preferences and electoral results that was 
observed in both cases. In addition, these cases are appropriate for this test, because they 
share similarities regarding variables that the extant literature relates to the electoral 
performance of dominant parties but differ in the outcomes under study. 
I also use these cases as well as the other four I examine in depth in this 
dissertation to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the potential effect of the factions’ 
level of autonomy from or subordination to the national party leaders during the 
authoritarian era on the prospects for those factions to cooperate or antagonize each other 
in the subsequent democratic period. This initial analysis uses indicators designed 
according to existing studies that have explored the subordination or autonomy of the PRI 
groups at the state level vis-à-vis the center. 
The comparative approach is further expanded to compare and contrast four cases, 
drawing conclusions by examining the causal connection between the subnational 
factions’ level of autonomy from or subordination to center in the autocratic era and the 
propensity of those factions to collaborate or engage in conflict with each other under 
subsequent democratic conditions. The main cases I explore in depth are Morelos and 
Estado de México. In both cases, the historical analysis starts in the 1920s with the 
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inception of the PRI. Regarding Morelos, the evaluation concludes with the 2000 
election, when the previously undisputed PRI lost the governorship by a two-to-one vote. 
The study of the Estado de México extends to the most recent gubernatorial election in 
2011, which the PRI won by a three-to-one vote margin over its closest contender. It also 
includes two other elections (1999 and 2005) that took place in the aftermath of the 
authoritarian era. By providing three different elections in democratic times, this case 
gives me the opportunity to test for possible enduring effects of cooperation patterns 
among factions and to assess whether possible features of the 1999 election were 
exceptional or corresponded to systematic regularities. 
Looking at these historical trends helps to assess the variation in the correlation of 
forces between the corresponding local factions and the center as well as the conditions 
that shaped such variation. Through this historical analysis is also possible to establish 
the causal link between the factions’ levels of autonomy and their prospects to develop 
collaborative antecedents in the authoritarian period as well as the consequences of these 
patterns of cooperation, or the lack thereof, for the PRI’s (dis)unity and electoral 
performance in the subsequent democratic times. The selection of Morelos and Estado de 
México allows me to test the existing argument in the literature on Mexican politics, 
which posits that factions of states geographically closer to Mexico City tended to fight 
for and obtain more autonomy as a way to counteract the center’s political expansionism 
and control over the states surrounding the Mexico’s capital in the authoritarian era (see 
Hernández Rodríguez 1998). Morelos and Estado de México are the most proximate 
states to Mexico City. 
The analysis of these cases is based on 2,143 pieces of archival information 
(including books and newspaper reports) and survey data I obtained during the field 
research. It also relies on several formal and informal interviews I conducted with 
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politicians, scholars, and independent observers in these states. All these interviews were 
confidential. The main advantage of confidential interviews is that they increase the 
likelihood of obtaining accurate responses to fairly sensitive questions. Their main 
shortcoming is their level of reliability: their results are more difficult to replicate. I took 
these pros and cons into consideration in using the data from interviews. They were very 
helpful in refining my understanding of the historical information I gathered as well as of 
the arguments and theories I develop in this dissertation. However, when interviews made 
me aware of relevant factual information, I used them as cues to later look for and 
confirm such data through more reliable sources. I reserve the reference of these 
interviews as a source of factual information only in situations where the confidential or 
private nature of the data involved made them unavailable through other sources. In these 
instances I try to assess the information in question by comparing and contrasting 
versions of different interviewees and by logically situating this information in context. 
To further confirm that the patterns observed in Morelos and Estado de México 
correspond to more generalized trends and not to specific conditions of these states, I 
extended the historical comparative analysis to Nuevo León and Coahuila. Although 
these states share similarities regarding geographical location, socioeconomic conditions, 
and other variables explored in this dissertation, they present important differences in the 
trends of their corresponding PRI factions and electoral results. I explore the historical 
trajectories of these cases since the 1920s. The evaluation of Nuevo León includes the 
1997 election, when the PRI lost the governorship. The analysis of Coahuila extends to 
the 2011 gubernatorial election, which the PRI won by a tree-to-one vote margin over its 
closest competitor, and includes the 1999 and 2005 elections, which took place after the 
authoritarian period. The analysis of Nuevo León and Coahuila is based on survey and 
archival data I gathered through field research. I consulted 575 pieces of information, 
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mainly newspaper reports, journal articles, and books on these cases. Figure 1.3 situates 
geographically the cases that are examined in this dissertation. 
Figure 1.3. Cases to be Analyzed. 
 
 
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
The following chapters provide evidence to support the claims I advance in this 
chapter and examine the theoretical and empirical implications of my arguments. Chapter 
2 uses data on contemporary gubernatorial elections in Mexico to demonstrate 
statistically that the level of internal (dis)unity exerts a substantive impact over the 
electoral results of the PRI in states that this party dominates. In addition, it presents 
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statistical evidence indicating that electoral conditions, the use of primaries to select 
gubernatorial candidates, and the number of factions fail to predict inter-factional 
conflicts in the PRI. The attributed relationship between the level of electoral 
competitiveness and factional behavior is further explored through the analysis of two 
cases: the Michoacán 1995 and Zacatecas 1998 elections. The evaluation of these cases 
confirms that electoral conditions are not a reliable predictor of party cohesion, or the 
lack thereof. Chapter 2 also includes the results of statistical tests pointing out that the 
subnational factions’ levels of autonomy from or subordination to the party national 
leaders in the authoritarian period and the prospects for those factions to unite or divide 
in subsequent democratic times are strongly associated. 
Chapter 3 explores in depth the Estado de México and Coahuila as cases of 
collaborative factionalism. It analyses the inception and evolution of PRI factions in these 
states from the creation of this party in the 1920s to the most recent gubernatorial 
elections in 2010. The PRI factions in Estado de México had relatively broad levels of 
autonomy from the center to decide on the gubernatorial nominations during the 
autocratic era (1929-1994). This independence allowed these factions to interact 
politically to advance their interests, creating initial cooperative ties among them. These 
antecedents created the basis for the collaborative relations they developed once the 
center fully empowered them to decide on local politics. The internal unity that resulted 
from this pattern of collaboration has become a fundamental asset that has enabled the 
PRI to continue winning the governorship in Estado de México. Similar conditions have 
fostered the internal unity that has enabled the PRI to retain office in the case of 
Coahuila. In both cases, the cooperation among factions extended to the protection of 
leading politicians in the presence of major scandals. 
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Chapter 4 examines the antagonistic factionalism that emerged in Morelos and 
Nuevo León. The in-depth evaluation of these cases goes from the origins of the PRI 
factions in these states in the 1920s to the 2000 election in Morelos and the 1997 election 
in Nuevo León 1997, both cases in which the PRI lost the governorship. The PRI factions 
in Morelos were primarily subordinated to the center during the autocratic age, which 
hampered their political interplay. These factions were unable to obtain the seeds of 
cooperation that political interaction generates. As a consequence, when the center 
empowered them with decision-making authority at the state level, they engaged in 
confrontation and mutual exclusion in their attempts to maximize their political gains. By 
doing so, they destroyed a fundamental resource of their party in the competitive election 
it faced in 2000: internal unity. The antagonistic factionalism that resulted caused the PRI 
to lose office. The patterns of factional subordination in the authoritarian period and 
internal confrontation after the factions’ empowerment are observed in Nuevo León as 
well. As a distinctive feature of both cases, the observed antagonism included defections 
and attacks against leading politicians even from factions that owed important favors and 
privileges to them. 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. It summarizes the main claims and findings 
of this study. Then it examines the implications of my arguments for the study of 
dominant parties, incumbent parties, and political parties in general. It also discusses the 
relevance of the dissertation for the use of subnational studies in political science and the 
understanding of contemporary political phenomena in Mexico. Additionally, it addresses 
the applicability of the insights of this project to other parts of the world. Finally, it 




Chapter 2: Causes and Consequences of PRI Factionalism at the 
Subnational Level 
Do internal factions matter for the performance of formerly dominant parties at 
the subnational level? If factions matter, do their decisions to cooperate or engage in 
conflict merely respond to incentives derived from the level of electoral competitiveness 
in a given election? If factions do not act in response to electoral conditions, then what 
explains their political actions? This chapter is devoted to these questions. It tests the 
theoretical claims advanced in this dissertation as well as arguments derived from 
existing frameworks using empirical evidence from contemporary gubernatorial elections 
in Mexico. It demonstrates that factions matter for the success of formerly dominant 
parties, even controlling for the effects of variables derived from other relevant theories. 
It also shows that, somewhat surprisingly, electoral conditions fail to predict whether 
factions will cooperate with or confront each other. Moreover, it includes some data that 
suggests that there is a relationship between the pre-1995 degree of autonomy of local 
factions vis-à-vis the party’s national leadership and the propensity of those factions to 
unite or wage war after the transition to democracy. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section I present a statistical test 
of the impact of factional unity on the PRI’s fortune in recent gubernatorial elections. 
This analysis allows me to compare the impact of factions to other factors that have been 
used to explain the PRI’s electoral performance in recent years. The second section 
evaluates the extent to which factional unity depends on the level of electoral 
competitiveness. I contend that factional behavior is independent from the level of 
electoral competitiveness, whereas the existing literature on the topic argues that electoral 
prospects shape factions’ strategies and actions (see Boucek 2010). According to this 
literature, electoral competitiveness and party unity are inversely related: the more 
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competitive the election, the less the factions will unite. I explore this endogenous claim 
by examining two contrasting cases: Michoacán’s 1995 election, where the highly 
competitive conditions would predict factional conflict, and Zacatecas’ 1998 election, in 
which the PRI’s anticipated triumph would be expected to engender internal unity for the 
PRI. The third section presents a preliminary test of the link between the pre-1995 level 
of autonomy of the local factions vis-à-vis the national party leaders and the level of 
factional unity after the transition to democracy. The final section summarizes the 
findings of this chapter. 
 
PRI’S INTERNAL COHESION AND MARGIN OF VOTE 
This section tests my approach and alternative arguments to explain the electoral 
performance of dominant parties by using data on contemporary gubernatorial elections 
in Mexico. Specifically, I evaluate the effect of the PRI’s internal level of cohesion on its 
electoral fate in the 58 gubernatorial contests from 1995 to 2010 where the PRI was the 
incumbent. I focus on gubernatorial elections because although state legislatures and 
municipal authorities have gained leverage in recent years (Beer 2001; Hiskey and 
Canache 2005), governors are still the main players in subnational politics in Mexico. 
Governors commonly have full command of their parties’ organizations and nomination 
processes in their states, in addition to controlling the policy-making process and 
allocation of most public resources, which are usually oriented to political and electoral 
ends even in the presence of opposition-controlled state legislatures (Beer 2011; Diaz-
Cayeros 2005). 
Focusing on post-1994 elections allows me to eliminate both the federal 
government’s intervention and electoral fraud as explanations for the PRI’s resilience at 
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the subnational level. Most observers agree that following the 1994 electoral reform, the 
federal government ceased to interfere in state-level elections level (Camp 2003, 2011b; 
Chand 2001; Klesner 2001, 2006; Poiré Romero 2002, 100-101; Magaloni 2006, 94). At 
the same time, the consolidation of independent electoral authorities and judges 
propitiated relative free, fair, and transparent elections at the subnational level after 1994 
(Camp 2003, 2011b; Chand 2001; Klesner 2001, 2006; Poiré Romero 2002, 100-101). In 
this context, during the last PRI President Ernesto Zedillo’s term (1994-2000), the PRI 
lost gubernatorial elections in 12 of 30 states. Electoral institutions and scholars have not 
found cases of intervention from federal authorities, nor irregularities that could have 
altered the final results, nor have they found significant variations in the quality of 
gubernatorial elections in the states the PRI won vis-à-vis the states it lost during this 
period (Crespo 1999; Klesner 1999, 2006).36 
I measure the PRI’s electoral performance in gubernatorial elections as the 
percentage point difference between the vote for the PRI and the vote for its main 
competitor calculated in terms of the total valid vote for each candidate in each election. 
The values of this variable range from -28.05 percentage points corresponding to the 
Morelos 2000 election, where the PRI obtained 27.8 percent of the vote vis-à-vis the 55.9 
percent received by the PAN, to 31.5 percentage points in the 2010 election in 
Tamaulipas where the vote share for the PRI was 63.1 percent and for the runner-up PAN 
was 31.6 percent. 
I measure the PRI’s internal cohesion by coding the actions of the party factions 
once the gubernatorial candidate has been selected. Possible actions include supporting, 
not supporting, or opposing the nominee, as well as exiting the party to support 
                                                
36 As an exception, the Electoral Court of the Federal Judicial Branch (Trife) annulled the 2000 Tabasco 
election after having found major irregularities. The PRI won the extraordinary election that took place 
there a few months later. 
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opposition parties or become opposition or independent candidates.  Strong cohesion 
results when there are no splits and the outgoing governor and all competitors37 support 
the nominee. Moderate cohesion describes cases where minor splits occur (such as a 
minor competitor quitting to support an opposition party) but they are counteracted by the 
support that the governor and main contenders provide to the nominee. It also includes 
cases where no splits occur but the nominee receives support from the main competitors 
but not from the governor. Conversely, it includes cases where the governor supports the 
candidate but some major competitors do not. Weak cohesion occurs when neither the 
governor nor other important competitors support the nominee or when leading 
contenders or politicians leave the party to become opposition candidates. (Table 1A in 
appendix provides further details on measurement). 
In measuring party cohesion, I use features that can be assessed prior to elections 
to identify major and minor internal competitors. Specifically, I define major competitors 
as politicians who have been politically active in their states at least five years prior to the 
election year and held high ranking executive, legislative, or partisan positions at the 
national level or important executive or legislative positions in their states before getting 
involved in the selection process. Minor competitors are politicians who do not meet one 
or more of these criteria. 
To code internal party cohesion I use data I obtained from major Mexican 
national and state-level newspapers; I analyzed 5,627 newspaper articles in total. I 
complemented this information with scholarly materials (i.e., books and journal articles) 
where available. Of the 58 gubernatorial elections, I identify 16 cases of strong cohesion, 
5 cases of moderate cohesion, and 37 cases of weak cohesion. (Tables 2A in Appendix 
                                                
37 In my framework competitors and leading politicians, such as governors, represent factions (see Chapter 
1). 
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lists all cases grouped by category and presents a brief description of the factional 
behavior observed in each case). 
To give an idea of the categorization, I provide some examples. The 1995 election 
in Michoacán represents a case of strong cohesion because the governor and all main 
contenders for the PRI gubernatorial nomination supported the resulting candidate. By 
contrast, the 1998 election in Zacatecas represents a case of weak cohesion, given that 
one of the main internal competitors defected from the PRI and became the opposition 
nominee. Between these extremes lies the case of Durango in 2004, which is in the 
moderate category. Here, no splits occurred and the major competitors endorsed the 
nominee, but the incumbent governor refused to support the party’s nominee (Villarreal 
2004; Villarreal, Salazar, and Baldenegro 2004). Governors are relevant for party 
cohesion because they act as the ultimate party leaders at the state level, so they set the 
conditions either for negotiation and agreement or for disputes among the competing 
factions, and at the same time they usually lead one of the main factions that promotes its 
own contender (Diaz 2005; Hernández Rodríguez 2003; Langston 2003). 
One concern about the possible endogeneity of cohesion is that factions may be 
more likely to defect when they expect the PRI to lose the upcoming elections. Boucek, 
for instance, argues that in less competitive electoral markets, losing factions are more 
likely to accept defeat and remain in the party, because they will have “little to gain by 
threatening to defect,” whereas under more competitive conditions, factions not only 
obtain more bargaining leverage but also their demands are less likely to be met by the 
party, which increases the risk of exit (2010, 133-136). According to this claim, we might 
expect factionalism to be common where governors are unpopular and uncommon where 
governors enjoy widespread support. 
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To assess this hypothesis, I compare the means of governors’ approval rating of 
the categories of factions (see Table 3A in Appendix), which are 61.9 percent for states 
with strong cohesion, 56.4 percent for moderate cohesive states, and 57.5 percent for 
weak cohesive states. In all cases, these differences are not statistically significant at the 
90 percent level. To complement this test, I use a multiple logistic regression model to 
estimate the variation in the probability of states being in any of the three categories 
based on the governors’ approval rating. None of the resulting coefficients is statistically 
significant at the 90 percent level (see Table 2.1). In other words, these results do not 
provide support to the contention that the electoral prospects of PRI candidates and 
factional behavior within the PRI are related. Certainly, a more appropriate test of this 
hypothesis would be based on support for the PRI prior to each election, but 
unfortunately such data are not available for most cases. In the following section, 
nevertheless, I examine this issue in depth for two cases and demonstrate that support for 
the PRI prior to the election fails to predict the level of cohesion within the PRI. Similar 
evidence pointing to similar direction is also presented in the in-depth cases that are 
examined in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Table 2.1. Multinomial Logit Estimates of Party Cohesion Depending on Governor's 
Popularity. 
 
Strong Cohesion1 Moderate Cohesion1 
Governor's Popularity .02 .00 
 
(.02) (.03) 




Log likelihood -48.96 
1Weak cohesion is the reference category. 
* p ! .10, ** p ! .05, *** p ! .01. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. 
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Another concern about the possible endogeneity of cohesion is the contention that 
the prospects for factions to unite depend on the method of selecting gubernatorial 
candidates. In particular, different researchers have argued that primaries and party 
divisions at both the elite and mass levels are strongly linked (e.g., Langston 2003). A 
number of scholars have convincingly demonstrated that primaries do not produce party 
divisions but rather that party divisions produce primaries. These scholars argue that 
nomination methods respond to internal struggles; thus primaries do not cause but reflect 
preexisting divisions in parties (Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro, and Hirano 2009; Poiré 
Romero 2002). Other scholars, however, claim that primaries have independent 
deleterious effects on party unity by forcing factions to openly dispute candidacies and 
thus exacerbating their rivalries (Bruhn 2010, 28-29; Sullivan 1977). 
To evaluate the possible effect of primaries on party unity, I conduct a Chi-square 
test over the cases in which the PRI used primaries to select his gubernatorial candidates 
and those cases in which it did not. The results indicate that the divergence between the 
moderate category and the other two groups is statistically significant, but the difference 
between the strong and weak groups is not (see Table 2.2). 
The Chi-square test reports that the probability of having observed 12 cases with 
no primaries and four cases with primaries in the strong cohesion category and one case 
with no primaries and four cases with primaries in the moderate cohesion category, under 
the assumption that the strong and moderate cohesive groups belong to the same 
population, is only three percent. Similarly, the probability of having observed 26 cases 
with no primaries and 11 cases with primaries in the weak cohesion group and one case 
with no primaries and four cases with primaries in the moderate cohesion group, under 
the assumption that both categories belong to the same population, is three percent as 
well. By contrast, the probability of having observed 12 cases with no primaries and four 
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cases with primaries in the strong cohesion category and 26 cases with no primaries and 
11 cases with primaries in the weak cohesion category, under the assumption that both 
groups belong to the same population, is 73 percent. Therefore, these results do not offer 
support to the claim that primaries generate weak cohesion or intra-party division. In any 
case, these results suggest that the relationship between primaries and party unity may be 
non-linear, given that the highest rates of primaries are observed in cases of moderate 
cohesion. I also use a multiple logistic regression model to estimate the variation in the 
probability of states being in any of the three categories based on the use of primaries. In 
line with the results of the Chi-square test, the multiple logistic estimates indicate that 
primaries tend to favor moderate levels of cohesion, but they are equally likely to be 
associated with strong and weak levels of cohesion (see Table 2.3). 








Yes 4 4** 11 19 
No 12 1** 26 39 
Total 16 5 37 58 
* p ! .10, ** p ! .05, *** p ! .01. 
 
Table 2.3. Multinomial Logit Estimates of Party Cohesion Depending on Primaries. 
Variable Strong Cohesion1 Moderate Cohesion1 
Primaries -0.24 2.25* 
 
(.68) (1.17) 




Log likelihood -46.83 
1Weak cohesion is the reference category. 
* p ! .10, ** p ! .05, *** p ! .01. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. 
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In addition, some scholars (e.g., Langston 2003; Boucek 2009) posit that the 
number of factions matters for parties to reach internal unity. According to this 
perspective, the more factions, the less the likelihood for parties to preserve internal 
cohesion. To test this claim, I compare means number of factions corresponding to the 
different categories of party unity; this analysis found that there are 5.9 factions for states 
with strong cohesion, 5.2 for moderate cohesive states, and 5.5 for weak cohesive states. 
The results, thus, do not support this argument. States with strong cohesion concentrate 
the highest number of factions and the differences in means in all cases are not 
statistically significant at the 90 percent level. Results of a multiple logistic regression 
model I employ also confirm that the effect of number of factions is not statistically 
significant for any category of party cohesion (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4. Multinomial Logit Estimates of Party Cohesion Depending on Number of 
Factions. 
Variable Strong Cohesion1 Moderate Cohesion1 
Factions .06 -.05 
 
(.11) (.20) 




Log likelihood -49.31 
1Weak cohesion is the reference category. 
* p ! .10, ** p ! .05, *** p ! .01. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. 
 
I also test for the possible influence of access to pork on the factions’ level of 
cohesion. More pork may favor internal cohesion by giving factions more public 
resources to distribute among them, whereas less pork may reduce the incentives to reach 
internal unity. To assess this possibility, I create a pork indicator, which measures the 
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total state’s public budget devoted to personnel, public work, and social programs as 
percentage of the state’s Gross Domestic Product in the election year (see Table 3A in 
Appendix). Then, I compare the means of the pork index of the categories of factions, 
which are 3.2 for states with strong cohesion, 2.7 for moderate cohesive states, and 3.8 
for states with weak cohesion. In all cases, these differences are not statistically 
significant at the 90 percent level. By contrast, the results of a multiple logistic regression 
model I use indicate that pork exerts statistically distinctive effects over the different 
categories of cohesion. However, these effects go in the opposite direction to the one 
expected: more pork tends to be associated with less cohesion rather than with more 
cohesion (see Table 2.5). According to these results, a unit increase in the pork index 
represents a 15-percent increase in the likelihood of weak cohesion vis-à-vis strong 
cohesion. Similarly, a unit increase in pork increases the probability of weak cohesion in 
comparison with moderate cohesion by 22 percent. 
Table 2.5. Multinomial Logit Estimates of Party Cohesion Depending on Pork. 
Variable Strong Cohesion1 Moderate Cohesion1 
Pork -.16** -.24* 
 
(.08) (.15) 




Log likelihood -45.63 
1Weak cohesion is the reference category. 
* p ! .10, ** p ! .05, *** p ! .01. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. 
 
As an initial evaluation of the impact of party cohesion on the PRI’s vote margin 
over the strongest challenger, I calculate the mean vote margin across cases with different 
levels of party cohesion. In states where PRI factions exhibited strong cohesion, the party 
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won an average of 16.2 percentage points more than its strongest challenger; in moderate 
cohesion states, it won 12.2 percentage points more than the strongest challenger; and in 
weak cohesion states, it was 1.7 percentage points below the strongest challenger. The 
difference in means between weak cohesion states and all others is statistically significant 
at the 95 percent level. Thus, on average the PRI tends to lose elections in weak cohesion 
states, whereas it regularly wins by more than 12 percentage points in states with 
moderate or strong cohesion. In fact, the PRI won all sixteen elections where its cohesion 
was strong and lost only one where its cohesion was moderate. 
To evaluate the relationship between internal party cohesion and the PRI vote 
margin while also testing alternative explanations and controlling for a host of potential 
confounds, I construct OLS regression models where the dependent variable is the PRI’s 
vote margin. As explanatory variables I include factional cohesion as well as other factors 
that might to be associated with the PRI vote margin, including its vote margin in the 
previous election. 
Most gubernatorial elections in Mexico feature more than two parties.  As a 
result, opposition coordination could reduce the PRI’s vote margin whereas coordination 
failure (whether at the elite or mass level) could raise the incumbent’s margin. To 
measure opposition fragmentation, I use the SF ratio, which is ratio of the second to the 
first opposition party or coalition’s vote proportion. Lower values indicate that more 
voters coordinate to support a single, strong competitor (Cox 1997). 
A host of more traditional variables could also affect the incumbent PRI’s 
performance at the polls.  For instance, although reelection is prohibited, popular PRI 
governors might help elect their co-partisans whereas unpopular ones could doom the 
PRI’s candidate at the polls. More federal funding in the state’s public budget could 
convince voters that the incumbent party lobbies effectively on the state’s behalf.  High 
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levels of pork under PRI leadership, as measured by the state’s public budget devoted to 
personnel, public works, and social programs divided by the state’s GDP in each election 
year, could help elect PRI candidates. Presumably, pork would be more effective where 
voters are more susceptible to clientelist payoffs, as in locations that are more socio-
economically deprived. I measure this variable with an index of marginalization.38 
Corporatism measures the number of unionized private sector workers and public 
employees as a percentage of the economically active population (EAP) in each state in 
2005. The PRI might benefit electorally from the political alliance it cemented with those 
unions by granting them diverse material and political benefits for decades (Camp 2003; 
Collier and Collier 2002).39 
The first model in Table 2.6 uses the PRI’s level of internal cohesion, the PRI’s 
vote margin in the previous election, and the SF ratio as predictors of the PRI’s vote 
margin. I show this pared down model because the small number of cases means that we 
quickly run out of statistical power when including too many predictors. The party 
cohesion and SF ratio coefficients are statistically significant and their effects are in the 
expected direction. The results indicate that, all else being equal, strong and moderate 
levels of cohesion lead the PRI to obtain 16.4 and 11.2 percentage points more, 
respectively, than when the party’s internal cohesion is weak. Similarly, under this 
specification, the absence of voters’ coordination on a common opposition party or 
coalition frontrunner represents an average gain in the PRI vote margin of 13.3 
percentage points, holding the other predictors constant. 
                                                
38 The marginalization index includes the following indicators: the percentage of population over 15 years 
that is illiterate and that has less than six years of formal schooling; the percentages of households in 
overcrowded conditions, with dirt floors, and without basic services (water, sewerage, and electricity); and 
the percentage of the population that earns less than two minimum wages and lives in rural areas (see Table 
3A in Appendix). 
39 Table 3A offers a detailed description of the variables used in this section, while Table 4A presents the 
descriptive statistics of these variables. Both tables are in Appendix. 
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Table 2.6. OLS Regressions on the PRI Vote Margin(t) by State, 1995-2010.40 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
PRI Vote Margin(t-1) .02 .03 
 (.06) (.06) 
Strong cohesion(t)1 16.39*** 16.25*** 
 (3.28) (3.03) 
Moderate cohesion(t)1 11.15** 12.24*** 
 (5.27) (4.74) 
SF Ratio(t) 13.26** 12.03** 
 (5.99) (5.43) 
Governor's Popularity(t) -- .28*** 
  (.08) 
Pork(t) -- .95 
  (.74) 
Federal Funding(t) -- -.25 
  (.37) 
Corporatism(t) -- 0.83** 
  (.33) 
Marginalization(t) -- 3.07* 
  (1.83) 
Constant -5.37** -42.16*** 
 (2.64) (9.83) 
N 58 58 
Adjusted R2 .38 .52 
1Weak cohesion is the reference category. 
* p ! .10, ** p ! .05, *** p ! .01. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. 
 
The second model includes the cohesion variables as well as all alternative and 
control.41 Under this fully specified model, the cohesion variables remain statistically 
                                                
40 Table 5A in Appendix reports the correlation coefficients of the independent variables of these models. 
41 Alternatively, I create a third model including all variables in Model 2 plus a dummy variable labeled 
“PAN-PRD,” whose value is one for those elections in which both parties competed together and zero 
otherwise, and an interaction term multiplying the SF Ratio by the PAN-PRD dummy. These predictors 
were included to test the impact that the opposition coordination at the elite level may exert over the PRI 
vote margin on its own and/or in combination with the opposition voter coordination effect that the SF 
Ratio measures. Given that the coefficients of both variables are not statistically significant (the p-value for 
PAN-PRI is .87 and for SF Ratio*PAN-PRD is .49) and for the sake of parsimony, in this section I focus 
the discussion on Model 2. Nevertheless, Table 6A in appendix reports the results of Model 3. 
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significant predictors of the margin of PRI vote and the coefficients are nearly unchanged 
compared to those in the trimmed model. The PRI increases its vote margin over its 
closest contenders by 12.2 percentage points when its cohesion is moderate and by 16.3 
percentage points when it is strong, ceteris paribus. 
The importance of internal cohesion for the PRI’s electoral performance is 
illustrated by using the full model to predict the party’s vote margin. Holding all other 
predictors at their mean values, the expected margin of the PRI vote when its cohesion is 
weak is -1.1 percentage points. This indicates that the PRI is still competitive but tends to 
lose elections when facing cohesion problems. By contrast, the expected differential of 
the vote margin is 11.2 percentage points in favor of this party when its cohesion is 
moderate and is 15.2 percentage points larger when its cohesion is strong. In other words, 
reaching moderate and strong levels of cohesion not only helps the PRI win elections, but 
it also helps it do so by double-digit margins. 
Other explanations for subnational party dominance have less powerful 
substantive effects. For instance, a ten-point increase in the popularity of governors 
represents an expected increment of 2.8 percentage points in the PRI’s vote margin, 
holding all other covariates constant. A totally coordinated opposition (SF Ratio 
coefficient = 0) reduces the PRI’s expected margin by 12 percentage points. But even in 
the presence of a unified opposition and a highly unpopular PRI governor (the lowest 
approval rating in the sample is 20.5 percent), the PRI is expected to win (its expected 
vote margin is 1.2 percentage points) when the party is strongly cohesive and the other 
variables take their mean values. Similarly, a 10-point increase in the proportion of public 
employees and private sector workers who are unionized (as a percentage of the 
economic active population) translates into an 8.3-percentage point increase in the PRI’s 
vote margin. More socio-economic deprivation is also beneficial for the PRI’s electoral 
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performance. A one standard deviation rise in the marginalization index translates into a 
3-percentage point expected increase in the PRI’s vote margin. But even in Guerrero, the 
most marginalized state, the expected vote margin of 7.4 points is less than the one the 
PRI obtains in states with strong and moderate cohesion. Finally, the coefficients of pork 
and federal funding are not statistically significant, casting more doubt on arguments 
about authoritarian legacies helping the PRI to win gubernatorial elections.  
A post-estimation analysis of Model 2 confirms that internal unity is a key factor 
for the PRI to retain power. Moderate cohesion is enough for the PRI to obtain positive 
vote margins even when anyone of the other predictors that are statistically significant 
(i.e., SF ratio, Governor’s Popularity, Corporatism, and Marginalization) is set at the 
lowest value observed in the sample (see Table 4A in appendix). Where the PRI has 
moderate cohesion and all other variables are held at their mean values, the expected 
margin of the PRI vote is 7.78 percentage points when this party faces a totally unified 
opposition (SF ratio = 0), 0.49 percentage points in the presence of the most unpopular 
governor (Governor’s Popularity = 20.5), 3.04 percentage points in the state with the 
lowest corporatist rating (Corporatism = 13.42), and 5.30 percentage points in the least 
marginalized case (Marginalization = -1.74). Moreover, under conditions of strong 
internal cohesion, the PRI is likely to win even when a completely unified opposition 
combines with the lowest value of any one of the other variables that are statistically 
significant. Holding all other predictors at their mean values and having a totally unified 
opposition, the expected vote margin for the PRI with strong cohesion is 1.14 percentage 
points in the presence of the most unpopular governor, 3.68 percentage points with the 
lowest corporatist rating, and 5.95 percentage points in the least marginalized state. In 
sum, the statistical results support the argument that factional cohesion is the main driver 
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of the post 1994 success of the PRI at the subnational level, even when controlling for 
variables associated with explanations for national level party dominance. 
 
A TALE OF TWO GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS 
This section shows that factions were crucial for the electoral performance of the 
PRI in two states. It also reinforces the finding above that factional behavior did not 
result from the faction’s expectations of winning or losing. As the following case studies 
point out, party unity enabled the PRI to survive as the dominant party in the competitive 
gubernatorial election of Michoacán in 1995, whereas internal disunity was key to this 
party’s downfall in the 1998 election for governor in Zacatecas. 
Michoacán and Zacatecas had similar levels of federal funding and 
socioeconomic marginalization at the time of the elections that I analyze. Federal funds 
composed 94.62 percent of Michoacán’s public budget in 1995 and 96.89 percent of 
Zacatecas’ budget in 1998 (INEGI 2011b). In 1995, Michoacán was the 12th most 
marginalized Mexican state with a marginalization score of 0.39 points (CONAPO 2011). 
In 2000 Zacatecas also ranked 12th with a marginalization index of 0.30 points, which the 
Population National Council (CONAPO) considered high (CONAPO 2011). Given these 
similarities, the differences in electoral outcomes cannot be attributed to these two 
factors. 
Moreover, the PRI should have benefited more from corporatism in Zacatecas 
than in Michoacán, considering that public employees and unionized workers represented 
a larger share of the EAP in the former state (25.20 percent) than in the latter one (18.12 
percent) (INEGI 2011a). Nonetheless, the PRI lost in Zacatecas and won in Michoacán. 
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The retrospective voting explanation does not appear to explain the PRI’s fate in 
these cases either because the PRI ended up winning in Michoacán where, at the 
beginning of the electoral process, the approval rating of president Ernesto Zedillo was 
37.4 percent and that of PRI governor Ausencio Chávez Hernández42 was 34.4 percent 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1995b). By contrast, the PRI lost in Zacatecas 
where, at the outset of the electoral contest, the approval rating of president Zedillo was 
67.3 percent and that of the PRI governor Arturo Romo Gutiérrez was 52.9 percent 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1997d). 
Furthermore, the level of electoral competitiveness does not seem to have 
influenced factional behavior in either of these cases. In Michoacán, pre-electoral polls 
gave a modest 3.8 percentage point advantage to the PRI over its strongest challenger, the 
PRD.43 According to some scholars (Boucek 2010), major conflicts should therefore have 
arisen within the PRI. Surprisingly, however, all factions of this party remained united 
even though the PRI was supposed to face a highly competitive election. 
By contrast, in Zacatecas, polls showed that the PRI led pre-election preferences 
by 37.4 percentage points over its closest rival (in this case, the PAN) and by 44.4 
percentage points over its second closest competitor (the PRD).44 In this case, one would 
expect factional unity, considering that defectors would have “little” to gain (Boucek 
2010, 133). Nevertheless, the PRI split and ended up snatching defeat from the jaws of 
victory in this state. 
                                                
42 It is important to note that traditionally in Mexico, presidents were the maximum and undisputed leaders 
of the PRI at the national level, while governors played the same role in their respective states (Carpizo 
1978; Hernández Rodríguez 2003). 
43 Surveys anticipated that the PRI would obtain 28.6 percent of the vote, whereas the PRD would receive 
24.8 percent (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1995a). 
44 Surveys indicated that the PRI was first in voting intentions with 53.6 percent, followed by the PAN with 
16.2 percent, and the PRD with 9.2 percent (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1997d). 
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Michoacán and Zacatecas are both states where the PRD has represented the main 
competition to the PRI in recent elections. As a result, by looking at two cases where the 
PRD is the main challenger, I am more likely to hold opposition party strategy constant.  
Although facing the same challenger (the leftist PRD) may affect factional 
behavior in the PRI, it is important to note that similar patterns of cooperation and 
conflict among the PRI factions can be observed in states where the rightist PAN is the 
PRI’s strongest adversary, such as in Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. 
I now show how factional politics affected the party’s ability to win votes in each 
state. The 1995 gubernatorial election in Michoacán seemed to be particularly 
challenging for the PRI, since that election was expected to be highly competitive in 
relation to the Mexican standards at the time. In the previous election for governor in 
1992, the PRI won by a margin of just 15.85 percentage points over the PRD, which was 
a relatively small margin for that time (CIDAC 2011). Moreover, the PRD subsequently 
mounted an impressive mobilization denouncing fraud. The PRD’s protest was so strong 
that it forced the resignation of the incoming governor Eduardo Villaseñor Peña, just 21 
days after he took office, and led to the approval of a constitutional reform to call for new 
gubernatorial elections in less than four years (the normal term was six years) (Granados 
Chapa 1995; Rivera Velázquez 1998). In addition, the PRI won the senatorial elections of 
1994 by an even slimmer margin of 8.44 percentage points over the PRD, which enabled 
this latter party to gain one seat in the federal senate.45 The seat was for Cristóbal Arias 
Solís, the losing gubernatorial candidate in 1992. Arias Solís, who had extensive electoral 
experience, was again nominated as the PRD candidate to dispute the governorship in 
                                                
45 Mexican law allocates two seats in the federal senate for the winning party/coalition and one seat for the 
runner-up. 
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1995 ("Michoacán: Campañas en la modernidad"  1995). Thus, the PRI was to face a 
strong contender. 
To complicate the scenario for the PRI even more, in 1995 Mexico faced one of 
the worst economic crises of its history, which deteriorated severely the image of the PRI 
regime (Purcell and Rubio 1998). The discredit was evident in Michoacán, where the 
approval rating of President Ernesto Zedillo and PRI Governor Ausencio Chávez 
Hernández was quite low, according to a major survey conducted on June 15 by President 
Zedillo’s own administration, just 40 days before the nomination of the PRI gubernatorial 
candidate (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1995b). Another survey launched on 
July 23, a day before the PRI nominated its candidate, anticipated a very close race, 
because it indicated that the PRI had 28.6 percent of voters’ preferences, whereas the 
PRD had 24.8 percent (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1995a). Moreover, the 
survey reported that senator Sergio Magaña Martínez was the pre-candidate preferred by 
most voters; 19.3 percent of respondents expressed their support for him. 
Even though Magaña Martínez was preferred by most voters, the PRI nominated 
senator Victor Manuel Tinoco Rubí as its candidate on July 24 (Resillas 1995b). Far from 
protesting the nomination, leaving the party, or declining to support the nominee as some 
theories would predict given the adverse electoral context (Boucek 2010), Magaña 
Martínez and three other competitors, the speaker of the state’s congress Germán Ireta 
Alas, businessman Carlos Gálvez Herrera, and the state’s treasurer Manuel Antúnez, 
accompanied Tinoco Rubí to publicly present him as the PRI nominee (Resillas 1995a). 
The other two main contenders, federal legislator Armando Ballinas Mayes and José 
Ascensión Orihuela Bárcenas, delegate in Michoacán of the federal Secretary of 
Agriculture, Livestock, and Rural Development (SAGDR) and a former federal legislator 
(1991-1994), also endorsed Tinoco Rubí’s nomination (Resillas and Torres 1995). In 
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addition, governor Chávez Hernández supported Tinoco Rubí although he had originally 
preferred Ireta Alas (Martínez 2006; Rivera Velázquez 1998). 
Having unified the PRI’s factions, Tinoco Rubí was able to preserve a modest but 
a steady advantage in voters’ preferences over the PRD candidate, his closest competitor, 
during the whole campaign. Moreover, as Figure 2.1 shows, the voting intentions for the 
PRI candidate increased from 28.6 percent on February 23, a day before Tinoco Rubí’s 
nomination, to 39.01 percent, which was the vote share that the PRI received on 
November 12, the election day. As a result, the PRI was able to win the gubernatorial 
election by a vote margin of 6.68 percentage points (39.01 versus 32.33 percent) over the 
PRD (IEM 1995). 
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Figure 2.1. Vote Intentions in Michoacán, 1995. 
 
Source: Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1995b, 1995a; Pérez and Giménez 1995a, 
1995b; IEM 1995. 
 
In exchange for their support for Tinoco Rubí, all the main competitors for the 
PRI’s gubernatorial nomination received different political rewards. The PRI nominated 
Antúnez to compete for the mayorship of Morelia, Michoacán’s capital, in the same 1995 
election. Orihuela Bárcenas received subsequent positions in the federal government and 
the PRI national executive committee (CEN). In the federal Secretary of Agriculture, 
Livestock, and Rural Development (SAGDR), Orihuela Bárcenas was appointed 
president of the Mexican Council of Rubber (1995-1996) and technical secretary of the 
National Commission of Rubber (1996-1997). Then in the CEN of the PRI, he was 
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appointed delegate to the states of Chiapas and Jalisco (1997-1998) as well as secretary 
of the Second and Fourth National Electoral Precincts (1999). 
Moreover, after he became governor, Tinoco Rubí appointed Ireta Alas and 
Ballinas Mayes as the secretaries of Tourism and Urban Development and Ecology, 
respectively. Tinoco Rubí also promoted the designation of Galvan Herrera as president 
of the PRI state’s directive committee (CDE) and granted pork to Magaña Martínez to 
deliver to his constituents. In sum, the distribution of political positions and spoils 
facilitated the cohesion that enabled this party to win the contest. 
The 1998 gubernatorial election in Zacatecas appeared to be initially much more 
promising for the PRI. The PRI won the previous election for governor in 1992 by an 
impressive vote margin of 57.1 percentage points over the PRD (CIDAC 2011). In 
addition, right before the nomination of its candidate, the PRI had a broad advantage in 
terms of voting intentions over the main opposition parties. A major survey conducted on 
December 9, 1997, 52 days before the PRI nominated its candidate, showed that 53.6 
percent of voters intended to vote for the PRI, whereas only 16.2 percent of voters 
intended to vote for the National Action Party (PAN), and only 9.2 percent planned to 
vote for the PRD (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1997d). Furthermore, the quick 
recovery of the Mexican economy after the crisis of 1995 fueled the popularity of the PRI 
incumbents. In Zacatecas, the approval rating of president Ernesto Zedillo in December 
1997 was 67.3 percent (29.9 percentage points larger than in the 1995 Michoacán 
election) and that of PRI governor Arturo Romo Gutiérrez was 52.9 percent (18.5 
percentage points larger than in the case of Michoacán) (Presidencia de la República 
Mexicana 1997d). 
Having the sympathy of 17.3 percent of voters (two percentage points less than 
senator Sergio Magaña Martínez in the Michoacán case), federal legislator Ricardo 
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Monreal Avila was the most preferred politician to become the PRI candidate 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1997d). But, as happened in Michoacán, the PRI 
nominated federal legislator Marco Antonio Olvera Acevedo as its gubernatorial 
candidate instead. As in Michoacán, all the sectors and organizations of the PRI 
expressed their unanimous support for Olvera Acevedo on January 30, 1998. 
Monreal Avila, however, not only refused to endorse Olvera Acevedo but also 
attempted on January 31 to register as a pre-candidate to compete against the de facto 
nominee. The PRI national and state committees dismissed his request, refused to 
negotiate with him, and threatened to punish him if he declined to endorse Olvera 
Acevedo (Martínez 1998a; Sotelo 1998b). The PRI’s intimidation strategy failed, 
however, because Monreal Avila led massive demonstrations demanding a change in the 
candidate selection process and arguing that it was anti-democratic and exclusionary. The 
PRI refused, however, to modify the selection process, and the party’s national and state 
committees released an official statement indicating eleven “reasons” why Monreal Avila 
could not be nominated ("¿Por qué no Monreal?"  1998). All the arguments linked 
Monreal Avila’s family relatives and political supporters to diverse illegal and criminal 
activities, including drug trafficking. The anti-Monreal Avila campaign was so hostile 
that ten state legislators who supported him demanded that PRI leaders stop attacking 
Monreal Avila and offered to back Olvera Acevedo in exchange (Martínez 1998b). 
Moreover, some PRI federal legislators of other states publicly condemned the PRI’s 
actions against Monreal Avila. They argued that Monreal Avila did not deserve such 
“disproportionate” attacks, given his outstanding career as PRI politician (Juárez 1998). 
In this context, the resignation of Monreal Avila from the PRI on February 5 was 
not surprising. The PRI leaders did not make any attempt to retain Monreal Avila; by 
contrast, they dismissed his defection, claiming that “nobody is indispensable” (Martínez 
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and Hernández 1998). The national PRD leaders, meanwhile, found in Monreal Avila an 
excellent opportunity to increase the modest electoral presence of their own party in 
Zacatecas. As a result, they immediately started negotiations with Monreal Avila to 
nominate him as the PRD’s gubernatorial candidate, although they had previously 
expressed their reluctance to do so (Martínez and Hernández 1998; Mejía and Hernández 
1998). 
Monreal Avila’s resignation from the PRI and the possibility that he would 
become the PRD candidate had immediate effects on the electorate. A survey conducted 
on February 10 reported that the voters’ preferences for the PRI declined to 32.5 percent, 
21.1 percentage points less than in December, while the support for the PRD increased to 
22.8 percent, 13.6 percentage points more than in December. In other words, as a result 
of the PRI split, the PRI’s lead over the PRD plummeted from 44.4 to only 9.7 
percentage points (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1998b). Furthermore, 34.5 
percent of respondents said they wanted Monreal Avila to be the next governor, whereas 
just 14.9 percent preferred Olvera Acevedo. 
After the PRD nominated Monreal Avila as its gubernatorial candidate on 
February 15, support for the PRI continued to decline whereas support for the PRD kept 
increasing. A survey conducted only three days after Monreal Avila’s presentation as the 
PRD nominee reported a technical tie between the PRI and PRD in voters’ preferences 
with around 29 percent each (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1998c). Another 
survey conducted less than a month later (March 11) made it clear that more than two 
thirds of the potential PRD voters were mainly supporting Monreal Avila rather than the 
party (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1998o). 
Figure 2.2 clearly shows that the nomination of Olvera Acevedo as the PRI 
candidate (January 30) as well as the subsequent defection of Monreal Avila from the 
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PRI (February 5) and his nomination as the PRD’s candidate (February 15) constituted 
critical moments that shifted the preferences of voters against the PRI and in favor of the 
PRD. Furthermore, in line with different pre-electoral polls conducted at the time (e.g., 
Pérez and Giménez 1998; Pérez and Romero 1998), Figure 2.2 also shows that during his 
campaign, the PRD nominee Monreal Avila was able to forge a solid lead, which 
propelled him to victory. On election day (July 6), the PRD obtained 44.25 percent of the 
vote versus 38.11 percent for the PRI (IEEZ 1998). 
Figure 2.2. Vote Intentions in Zacatecas, 1997-1998. 
 
Source: Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1997d, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998i, 
1998o, 1998a, 1998l, 1998j, 1998m, 1998f, 1998g, 1998n, 1998h, 1998e; IEEZ 1998. 
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After the election, the main members of the PRI national committee admitted that 
nominating Olvera Acevedo and pressuring Monreal Avila to leave the party was a 
“mistake” (Sotelo 1998a). In this case, Monreal Avila’s faction took an important risk in 
leaving and confronting the PRI, given the traditional strength of this party, but this risk 
paid off, leading to the defeat of the PRI. 
In summary, the cases of Michoacán and Zacatecas clearly illustrate the 
importance of internal factions for the electoral fate of dominant parties. The cases also 
show that the behavior of party factions cannot be automatically predicted by electoral 
context as extant theories suggest. Far from being endogenous to the level of electoral 
competitiveness, the actions of party factions are in fact capable of shaping electoral 
context in significant ways. As the case of Michoacán shows, where factions remain in 
the party, they provide fundamental help to it in hard times. Moreover, as the case of 
Zacatecas indicates, factions can also be instrumental in defeating dominant parties even 
where electoral conditions favor them. 
 
THE ORIGINS OF FACTIONALISM 
In this dissertation I advance the argument that factions matter for dominant 
parties to continue winning elections and that their effects on the fortunes of their host 
parties are independent from other factors, such as the level of electoral competitiveness. 
The previous two sections provide empirical support to both claims. I also posit that 
factions that were more independent from to the center in the authoritarian period (1929-
1994) were more likely to remain united in the democratic age (from 1995 onward). 
Conversely, factions that were more subordinated to the center in the autocratic era were 
more prone to engage in intra-party conflicts during the democratic stage. Although the 
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next two chapters are devoted to exploring these arguments in depth, this section presents 
a preliminary test of them that focuses on the cases presented in the previous section: 
Michoacán and Zacatecas. I complement this test by comparing the means of all cases of 
collaborative factionalism (Michoacán, Estado de México, and Coahuila) as well as of 
antagonistic factionalism (Zacatecas, Morelos, and Nuevo León) on specific indicators of 
autonomy/subordination that I discuss below. 
In line with scholars who have evaluated the level of influence of state leaders 
vis-à-vis the center (Diaz 2005; Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Langston 2011), I measure the 
degree of local autonomy by coding the background of the governors of Michoacán and 
Zacatecas from 1929 to 1994.46 I examine their prior experience in national posts, federal 
legislative posts, and state posts. National posts comprise positions at the federal 
government and the PRI’s CEN, legislative posts refer to positions in the federal congress 
(i.e., senators and federal deputies), and state posts indicate positions in state and 
municipal government, the state-level PRI, and the congress of the corresponding state. 
Having governors who had only held national posts indicates a strong degree of 
subordination to the center because their nomination or appointment was typically a sign 
of intervention from the center. Having governors who had previously held legislative 
positions but no state experience denotes moderate subordination because the center 
typically sent them to the legislature as a previous step to becoming governors. 
Governors with local posts mean less subordinated factions because these politicians tend 
to be more closely linked to the interests of local groups. 
During the 1929-1994 period, Michoacán had 19 governors who spent at least six 
months in office. As Table 2.7 shows, before becoming governors 73.7 percent of these 
                                                
46 During this period all of the governors of Michoacán and Zacatecas as well as of the other four states 
that are examined in this dissertation (i.e., Estado de México, Coahuila, Morelos, and Nuevo León) were 
PRI members. 
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politicians (14) had held local positions, 52.6 percent (10) had occupied national 
positions, and 36.8 percent (7) had held legislative positions. Because the previous 
section portrays Michoacán as a case of party unity and Zacatecas as a case of party 
division in the democratic era, this implies that the factions of Michoacán should have 
been more autonomous than the ones of Zacatecas in the authoritarian period. To assess 
this claim using the indicators presented in Table 2.7, we should expect that in 
Michoacán the percentages of governors with only national posts and governors with 
only national and/or legislative posts would be lower than in Zacatecas, Morelos, and 
Nuevo León, the other two cases of party division that I explore in this dissertation. In 
addition, we should expect that the percentage of governors with local positions would be 
larger in the case of Michoacán than in the cases of Zacatecas, Morelos, and Nuevo León. 
The results conform to the expectations. The percentage of governors with only 
national posts is lower in Michoacán (15.8 percent) than in Zacatecas (28.6 percent), 
Morelos (23.1 percent), and Nuevo Leon (23.5 percent). Similarly, the percentage of 
governors with national and/or legislative posts but no state experience is lower in 
Michoacán (26.3 percent) than in Zacatecas (64.3 percent), Morelos (38.5 percent), and 
Nuevo León (47.1 percent). Furthermore, the percentage of governors with local posts is 
higher in Michoacán (73.7 percent) than in Zacatecas (35.7 percent), Morelos (61.5 
percent), and Nuevo León (52.9 percent). 
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Table 2.7. Political Background of Governors of Michoacán, 1929-1994. 







1 Lázaro Cárdenas del Río 1928-1932 Constitutional     1 
2 Benigno Serrato 1932-1934 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
3 Rafael Sánchez Tapia 1934-1935 Interim 
  
1 
4 Rafael Ordorica Villamar 1935-1936 Provisional 
  
1 
5 Gildardo Magaña Cerda 1936-1939 Constitutional 1 1 1 
6 Conrado Magaña Cerda 1939-1940 Interim 
  
1 
7 Félix Ireta Viveros 1940-1944 Constitutional 
  
1 
8 José María Mendoza Pardo 1944-1949 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
9 Daniel Rentería 1949-1950 Constitutional 
  
1 
10 Dámaso Cárdenas del Río 1950-1956 Constitutional 1 1 1 
11 David Franco Rodríguez 1956-1962 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
12 Agustín Arriaga Rivera 1962-1968 Constitutional 1 1 
 13 Carlos Gálvez Betancourt 1968-1970 Constitutional 1 
  14 Servando Chávez Hernández 1970-1974 Interim 
 
1 1 
15 Carlos Torres Manzo 1974-1980 Constitutional 1 
  16 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano 1980-1986 Constitutional 1 1 
 17 Luis Martínez Villicaña 1986-1988 Constitutional 1 
  18 Genovevo Figueroa Zamudio 1988-1992 Interim 
 
1 1 
19 Ausencio Chávez Hernández 1992-1996 Interim 1   1 
TOTAL     10 7 14 
%     52.6 36.8 73.7 
Source: Camp 1991, 2011a; Guerra Manzo 2008; Oikión Solano 2004; Estado de Michoacán 2012. 
Note: The table includes only governors who spent at least six months in office. 
 
By contrast, from 1929 to 1994, Zacatecas had 14 governors who spent at least six 
months in office. Table 2.8 shows the background of these politicians: 64.3 percent of 
them (9) had legislative positions, 57.1 percent (8) had national positions, and 35.7 
percent (5) had local positions. As a case of antagonistic factionalism, we should expect 
that the percentages of governors with only national positions as well as of governors 
with national and/or legislative positions but no state experience to be higher in Zacatecas 
in comparison with the cases of collaborative factionalism presented in this dissertation: 
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Michoacán, Estado de México, and Coahuila. Accordingly, we should also expect that the 
percentage of governors with local positions to be lower in Zacatecas than in those states. 
The results correspond to expectations. The percentage of governors with only 
national posts is higher in Zacatecas (28.6 percent) than in Michoacán (15.8 percent), 
Estado de México (11.8 percent), and Coahuila (6.7 percent). Similarly, the percentage of 
governors with national and/or legislative positions but no state experience is higher in 
Zacatecas (64.3 percent) than in Michoacán (26.3 percent), Estado de México (17.6 
percent), and Coahuila (26.7 percent). Also as expected, the percentage of governors with 
local positions is lower in Zacatecas (35.7 percent) than in Michoacán (73.7 percent), 
Estado de México (82.4 percent), and Coahuila (73.7 percent). 
Table 2.8. Political Background of Governors of Zacatecas, 1929-1994. 







1 Luis R. Reyes 1930-1932 Constitutional 1     
2 Leobardo C. Ruiz 1932 Interim 1 
  3 Matías Ramos Santos 1932-1936 Constitutional 1 1 
 4 Félix Bañuelos 1936-1940 Interim 1 
  5 Pánfilo Natera García 1940-1944 Constitutional 1 
  6 Leobardo Reynoso 1944-1950 Constitutional 
 
1 
 7 José Minero Roque 1950-1956 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
8 Francisco E. García Estrada 1956-1962 Constitutional 
  
1 
9 José Isabel Rodríguez Elías 1962-1968 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
10 Pedro Ruiz González 1968-1974 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
11 Fernando Pámanes Escobedo 1974-1980 Constitutional 1 1 
 12 José Cervantes Corona 1980-1986 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
13 Genaro Borrego Estrada 1986-1992 Constitutional 1 1 
 14 Arturo Romo Gutiérrez 1992-1998 Constitutional 1 1   
TOTAL     8 9 5 
%     57.1 64.3 35.7 
Source: Camp 1991, 2011a; Rodríguez Valadez 2010. 
Note: The table includes only governors who spent at least six months in office. 
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To complement this test, I compare the means of the cases of the collaborative 
group with those of the antagonistic group. As Figure 2.3 shows, the antagonistic states 
tend to have a higher percentage of governors who have only held national positions 
(25.1 percent) or who have held national and/or legislative posts (49.9 percent) than do 
the collaborative states (11.4 and 23.5 percent, respectively). By contrast, the 
collaborative states tend to have a higher percentage of governors who have held local 
positions (76.5 percent) than do the antagonistic states (50.1 percent). All these 
differences support my claim that the collaborative states in democratic times were 




Figure 2.3. Means of Percentages of Indicators of Governors’ Political Background. 
 
Note: Collaborative States: Michoacán, Estado de México, and Coahuila. Antagonistic 
States: Zacatecas, Morelos, and Nuevo León. 
 
To assess the likelihood of having observed such discrepancies by chance and not 
because there are true and systematic divergences between both groups, I perform a 
statistical comparison of their corresponding means. The calculations are based on the 
data presented in Table 2.9. The results of the two-tailed tests I conduct are statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence interval in the three indicators. The results are 
particularly relevant, considering the very limited degrees of freedom (only four) 
available for these tests. Therefore, the results offer solid evidence about the link between 
the factions’ level of autonomy/subordination in the authoritarian period and the 
likelihood that those factions will unite or divide in democratic times. 
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Table 2.9. Percentages of Indicators of Governors' Political Background. 
    
Only National 
Posts 




Collaborative States       
 
Michoacán 15.8 26.3 73.7 
 
Estado de México 11.8 17.6 82.4 
 
Coahuila 6.7 26.7 73.3 
Antagonistic States 
   
 
Zacatecas 28.6 64.3 35.7 
 
Morelos 23.1 38.5 61.5 
  Nuevo León 23.5 47.1 52.9 
 
In sum, the results of the previous tests indicate that factions’ level of political 
autonomy or subordination vis-à-vis the center in the authoritarian period is associated 
with their prospects to cooperate with or confront each other under democracy. Factions 
that were more autonomous during the autocratic era tend to successfully negotiate with 
each other, preserving party unity in the democratic age, whereas factions that were less 
autonomous in the authoritarian stage are more likely to confront with each other, thereby 
dividing the party. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter shows that factional unity can help dominant parties remain in power 
at the subnational level, even when other conditions are unfavorable. In states where the 
PRI is already dominant, factional cohesion helps the incumbent party win even highly 
contested elections. If inter-factional conflicts arise, however, they can have devastating 
effects on the likelihood of dominant parties remaining in office even under apparently 
favorable conditions. 
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In examining the role of factions, scholars should look at the critical moments 
when the distribution of power takes place inside dominant parties, namely during the 
nomination process. Factions face contradictory goals in this process. They have to 
struggle for candidacies and other positions for their members, but they also have to keep 
united for their party’s sake as well. The way factions manage these conflicting 
incentives has important consequences for their parties’ electoral prospects. Inter-
factional engagement in negotiating the distribution of power preserves party unity and 
thus fuels electoral success, whereas party conflict results when the dispute for positions 
is out of control, hurting the host party severely. Although the internal dynamics of 
negotiation and conflict are important to any party, they are more relevant for dominant 
parties. Because internal competition tends to be considerably more intense in these 
parties,47 the challenge to preserve internal cohesion is all the more daunting. 
This chapter also provides empirical support for the claim I advance in this 
dissertation that factions’ level of autonomy vis-à-vis the center during the authoritarian 
period shapes the prospects that those factions will remain united in the democratic era. 
Factions that were more autonomous from the center to decide on the governorships of 
their corresponding states in the autocratic age are the ones that are more likely to 
preserve party cohesion under democracy. By contrast, the more subordinated factions in 
the autocratic period are the ones that are more prone to confront each other and thus 
divide the party after the transition to democracy. 
 
  
                                                
47 Given their success, dominant parties tend to attract the bulk of careerist politicians, and winning the 
internal competition usually means winning the general election (Bogaards and Boucek 2010; Key 1984). 
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Chapter 3: Collaborative Factionalism in Estado de México and 
Coahuila 
Lack of internal unity is costly for the PRI. Conflicts among its factions usually 
lead to losses in gubernatorial elections. During the authoritarian period (from 1929 to 
1994, see Chapter 1), PRI national leaders imposed unity among this party’s national 
subnational factions by rewarding obedient groups and punishing dissidents and 
controversial politicians using authoritarian tools (Hernández Rodríguez 2003). But as 
the regime democratized and hence lost its authoritarian toolkit, the center’s capacity to 
enforce party unity at the subnational level waned. Mexico’s democratization also 
indirectly gave more leverage to PRI subnational factions vis-à-vis the center by 
increasing the opposition parties’ competitiveness and thus their viability as an exit 
options for PRI disgruntled politicians. Empowered by the center’s diminished capacity 
to enforce party discipline and the presence of exit options, local factions came to the fore 
to openly confront with each other over the distribution of political positions. Yet 
although democratization helps account for the increase in internal struggles that led the 
PRI to become less cohesive overall, it cannot explain variation in the incidence of intra-
party strife at the subnational level. We are still left without an explanation for why the 
PRI suffered conflicts among its factions in some states but not in others. 
This chapter shows that in states where PRI factions were more independent from 
(or less subordinated to) the center’s decisions during the autocratic era, factions engaged 
in self-reinforcing patterns of cooperation after the center ceased to enforce internal 
unity. This argument proceeds in two steps. I use the cases of Estado de México and 
Coahuila to show that preexisting relative autonomy enabled PRI factions to interact each 
other to advance their political projects during the authoritarian period. This pattern of 
collaboration and cooperation is by no means the norm in Mexico, and in the following 
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chapter I focus on states where factions failed to unite against the center and created 
antagonistic relationships among themselves in the democratic period. 
 
PREEXISTING AUTONOMY AS PRECURSOR OF INTER-FACTIONAL COOPERATION 
To demonstrate that they follow patterns that correspond to the theoretical 
argument advanced in this dissertation, this chapter discusses the cases of Estado de 
México and Coahuila according to three main analytical dimensions: 1) the level of 
autonomy and political interaction of their local factions during the authoritarian period 
(1929-1994), and the expansion of the previous collaboration of these groups to 2) 
political negotiations among them as a means to preserve party unity and to 3) the 
protection of high-ranking politicians facing major scandals in the subsequent democratic 
times (from 1995 onward). According to the argument presented in Chapter 1, we should 
observe the following implications regarding those dimensions. First, during the 
autocratic age, the local factions of these states should have been more autonomous from 
the center than the ones of Morelos, Nuevo León, and Zacatecas (see Chapters 2 and 4), 
and these groups should have interacted politically to advance their interests. Second, in 
the incoming democratic stage, these factions should have relied on political negotiations 
to preserve party in electoral times. Third, these factions should have protected high-
ranking politicians facing significant scandals in the subsequent democratic period. 
The organization of this chapter follows these analytical dimensions. It starts by 
assessing quantitatively and qualitatively the level of autonomy of local factions vis-à-vis 
the center in the nomination of the PRI candidates for gubernatorial elections in Estado 
de México and Coahuila during the authoritarian period (1929-1994). Along with other 
scholars who have examined the influence of subnational groups vis-à-vis the center over 
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the PRI gubernatorial nominations (e.g., Diaz 2005; Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Langston 2011), 
I measure the level of factions’ autonomy by coding the political background of the 
governors during this period.48 I identify three types of previous political experience. 
National posts correspond to positions in the federal government and the PRI’s CEN; 
legislative posts refer to politicians who were senators and/or federal deputies before 
obtaining the gubernatorial nomination; and local posts include positions in the state 
government, the state level PRI, and the state legislatures. Governors who had 
exclusively held national posts constitute the most extreme cases of subordination to the 
center, because they typically obtained the nomination through intervention by the center 
(Diaz-Cayeros 2006, 99-103; Langston 2011, 150-154). Governors who had previously 
held positions in the federal legislature but no state experience represent moderate 
subordination, because the center sent them to represent the state in the federal legislature 
in order to begin to establish ties with local factions as a means to pave the road for their 
subsequent gubernatorial nominations. Governors with previous local posts are an 
indication of more autonomous factions, because they mainly represent the interests of 
the local factions. 
In assessing the factions’ level of autonomy from the center in both states, I also 
use historical evidence to examine qualitatively the gubernatorial nominations during this 
period. I pay particular attention to the 1993 gubernatorial elections in both cases as these 
were the last ones occurring during the autocratic era. Both elections took place under the 
administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) who, as the ultimate 
leader of the PRI, had broad authoritarian tools at his disposal. Salinas de Gortari exerted 
a decisive influence over subnational politics. He was one of the presidents who removed 
                                                
48 During this period all governors in these states belonged to the PRI. 
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the most state governors (12) in a presidential term during the authoritarian period, and 
he was even able to grant governorships and other elected positions directly to opposition 
parties, which those parties did not officially win (Hernández Rodríguez 2003; Eisenstadt 
2004). Despite Salinas de Gortari’s power, however, the local factions of Estado de 
México and, to a less extent, of Coahuila had influence over the gubernatorial 
nominations, as I show in this chapter. These cases show that some states, even important 
ones,49 could develop independence from the center, even during the authoritarian era. 
Then, I show that factional autonomy during the autocratic period in Estado de 
México and Coahuila resulted in collaborative factionalism, leading to party unity, in the 
democratic era (from 1995 onward). This internal unity has enabled the PRI to continue 
ruling these states. This pattern contrasts dramatically with the situation prevailing in the 
states of Morelos and Nuevo León (see Chapter 4), which transited from factional 
subordination in the authoritarian period to factional antagonism in the democratic era. 
First, I use historical evidence to examine in detail the 1999 gubernatorial 
elections in Estado de México and Coahuila since these were the first ones in which the 
capacity of the center to enforce party unity waned due to democratization. The 
gubernatorial nominations in both cases were decided through open primaries, and party 
unity resulted in both cases because of the local party’s history of autonomy. Therefore, 
these elections constituted the first opportunity for the PRI factions to demonstrate 
cooperative behavior without intervention from the center. I also analyze gubernatorial 
elections in the two states in 2005 and 2011, which occurred practically without influence 
from the PRI central leadership. In each of these cases the nominations took place under 
conditions of internal unity, enabling the PRI to retain the governorships. Consequently, 
                                                
49 Estado de México was the state with the second largest contribution to the national GDP (10.3 percent in 
1993) and was the most populated state in 1995, comprising 12.8 percent of the national population (INEGI 
2000, 1995). 
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these elections demonstrate three points. First, the steady decline in the center’s influence 
on local politics. Second, the initial cooperation among factions was sustained. Third, the 
collaborative factionalism observed in1999 in both cases did not occur by chance but 
responded to a systematic pattern that was replicated in the elections of 2005 and 2011. 
Additionally, I employ available survey and electoral data to demonstrate that inter-
factional cooperation was the key to the PRI’s ability to retain the governorships in 1999, 
2005, and 2011 in both states. 
Then, I demonstrate that the level of cooperation among factions in Estado de 
México and Coahuila extended to the protection of high-ranking politicians facing major 
politically costly scandals, such as the ones involving former governors Arturo Montiel 
Rojas in Estado de México in 2005 and Humberto Moreira Valdés in Coahuila in 2011. 
 
FACTIONAL AUTONOMY UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM: ESTADO DE MÉXICO AND 
COAHUILA 
This section demonstrates that during the authoritarian era PRI factions in Estado 
de México and Coahuila were more independent from the center than those in Morelos, 
Nuevo León, and Zacatecas. Independence encouraged factions to negotiate over key 
issues such as the distribution of political positions. As I show below, it became common 
practice for the faction that won the governorship to grant other factions political 
positions and promote their members’ careers. 
 
Political Background of PRI Governors in Estado de México, 1929-1994 
During the authoritarian period, the factions of Estado de México were more 
autonomous than other states from the center in deciding the party’s nominees for the 
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governorship. From 1929 to 1994 Estado de México had 17 governors who were at least 
six months in office. Table 3.1 shows that most of them (82.4 percent) had previous 
experience in local politics before obtaining the main state office.  
The second most important source of political experience for Estado de México’s 
governors was national positions because 71 percent of nominees held these positions, 
whereas 53 percent of them had served as members of the federal congress. These 
numbers suggests that participation in state politics was a slightly more common 
antecedent for politicians to become governors in Estado de México during the autocratic 
period than were national positions. Moreover, a closer look at Table 3.1 indicates that 
only two governors (11.8 percent) had experience at the national level exclusively and 
only three governors (17.6 percent) had national and/or legislative positions but no 
previous local posts. 
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Table 3.1. Political Background of Governors of Estado de México, 1929-1994. 







1 Filiberto Gómez Díaz 1929-1933 Constitutional   1 1 
2 José Luis Solórzano 1933-1936 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
3 Eucario López Contreras 1936-1937 Interim 
 
1 1 
4 Wenceslao Labra García 1937-1941 Constitutional 1 1 1 
5 Alfredo Zárate Albarrán 1941-1942 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
6 Isidro Fabela Alfaro 1942-1945 Substitute 1 1 
 7 Alfredo del Mazo Vélez 1945-1951 Constitutional 
  
1 
8 Salvador Sánchez Colín 1951-1957 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
9 Gustavo Baz Prada 1957-1963 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
10 Juan Fernández Albarrán 1963-1969 Constitutional 1 1 1 
11 Carlos Hank González 1969-1975 Constitutional 1 1 1 
12 Jorge Jiménez Cantú 1975-1981 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
13 Alfredo del Mazo González 1981-1986 Constitutional 1 
  14 Alfredo Baranda García 1986-1987 Substitute 1 
 
1 
15 Mario Ramón Beteta 1987-1989 Constitutional 1 
  16 Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza 1989-1993 Substitute 1 1 1 
17 Emilio Chuayffet Chemor 1993-1995 Constitutional 1   1 
TOTAL     12 9 14 
%     70.6 52.9 82.4 
Source: Arreola Ayala 1995; Camp 1991, 2011a; Estado de México 2012. 
Note: The table includes only governors who spent at least six months in office. 
 
If the factions of Estado de México were in fact more autonomous from the center 
in comparison with the states of Morelos, Nuevo León, and Zacatecas, which this 
dissertation categorizes as more subordinated states, we would expect that the Estado de 
México’s percentages of governors with only national posts and national and/or 
legislative posts would be lower than those states, whereas its percentage of governors 
with local posts would be higher. The results are in line with these expectations. The 
percentage of governors with only previous national posts is lower in Estado de México 
(11.8 percent) than in Morelos (23.1 percent), Nuevo León (23.5 percent), and Zacatecas 
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(28.6 percent). Similarly, the percentage of governors with previous national and/or 
legislative posts but no state posts is lower in Estado de México (17.6 percent) than in 
Morelos (38.5 percent), Nuevo León (47.1 percent), and Zacatecas (64.3 percent). By 
contrast, the percentage of governors with previous local posts is higher in Estado de 
México (82.4 percent) than in Morelos (61.5 percent), Nuevo León (52.9 percent), and 
Zacatecas (35.7 percent). These differences are all statistically significant (see Chapter 2). 
In sum, the PRI’s factions in Estado de México were more autonomous from or less 
subordinated to the center than in the other three states. 
In the following pages, I detail the historical variation in the correlation of forces 
state factions vis-à-vis the center and their struggles to define the governors of Estado de 
México during the authoritarian era. This historical analysis first describes the inception 
of the PRI’s local factions as well as the initial development of their autonomy from the 
center during the period1920-1942. 
 
Inception and Initial Predominance of the PRI Factions in Estado de México: From 
1920 to 1942 
In the authoritarian era, the correlation of forces between the PRI local factions 
and the center was not constant but varied across time, depending on the presence of 
critical events that altered it in favor of one side or the other. Periods of relative 
autonomy fostered an incipient collaboration among local groups based on the 
distribution of political positions for their respective members. The case of Estado de 
México followed this pattern of political inclusion. 
The origins of the PRI factions in Estado de México date to the 1920s when 
Mexico was still experiencing political instability and even violence derived from the 
aftermath of its revolution. The emergent factions took rapid and effective command of 
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this state’s politics; thus they were able to gain relatively high levels of autonomy from 
the center to control the governorship for 22 years. After succeeding in his revolt against 
President Venustiano Carranza in one of the concluding episodes of the Mexican 
revolution, President Alvaro Obregón promoted the designation of general Abundio 
Gómez Díaz as provisional governor of Estado de México on August 5, 1920. Estado de 
México had been a resilient Carranza’s stronghold, thus taking political and military 
control of this state through Abundio Gómez was key for Obregón to consolidate his 
presidency. Abundio Gómez’s appointment as provisional governor brought lasting 
consequences for the Estado de México’s factions linked to the PRI for the following 22 
years (until 1942), in which all governors emerged from one predominant faction or 
factions allied to it, and for the period that started in 1942 and continues nowadays, in 
which most Estado de México’s factions have remained united and cooperating with each 
other to preserve the state’s governorship. What follows is the story of this initial period. 
In 1920, Abundio Gómez started a 22-year period known as the gomismo (i.e., the 
Gómez era) in which all Estado de México’s governors came from his faction or factions 
allied to him with limited, if any, intervention from the political center (Arreola Ayala 
1995, 103-201; Jarquín Ortega and Herrejón Peredo 1995, 129-153). Once he took office, 
Abundio Gómez called for the election of an interim governor to finish the 1917-1921 
constitutional term. With Obregón’s support, his purpose was to be free to compete for a 
complete four-year gubernatorial term in the next election (Arreola Ayala 1995, 103-
104). Abundio Gómez’s plan succeeded, because his close friend Manuel Campos Mena 
won the election by a two-to-one margin over the runner-up and became governor in 
1921 for seven months (Arreola Ayala 1995, 108). Right after leaving office, Abundio 
Gómez’s received the gubernatorial nomination from the pro-Obregón Partido 
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Cooperatista50 and Partido Laborista51 for the 1921-1925 term. He retook the 
governorship on September 16, 1921 after winning the election by a three-to-one margin 
over his closest competitor (Arreola Ayala 1995, 120). 
To consolidate the gomismo, in 1925 Abundio Gómez’s brother colonel Filiberto 
Gómez Díaz joined with Abundio Gómez’s main allies and supporters to create the 
Partido Socialista del Trabajo52 (PST). The aim was to incorporate the Estado de 
México’s main political leaders and organizations as well as labor unions into the PST in 
order to concentrate most political participation in one, unified organization.53 As one of 
its first tasks, the nascent PST nominated Carlos Riva Palacio Carrillo, federal deputy and 
the Gómez brothers’ ally, for the gubernatorial term 1925-1929. Riva Palacio Carrillo 
won the election by a two-to-one margin over the runner-up (Arreola Ayala 1995, 127). 
Gomismo’s undisputed predominance was even more evident in the next three 
elections, in which the PST acted as the PNR’s54 state chapter. For the 1929-1933 term, 
PST nominee Filiberto Gómez (then senator) was the only candidate for the 
governorship. Similarly, for terms 1933-1937 and 1937-1941, the PST nominated José 
Luis Solórzano, the Gómez brothers’ ally, and Wenceslao Labra García, senator and 
Filiberto Gomez’s son-in-law, respectively, who practically faced no opposition to 
become governors (Arreola Ayala 1995, 133-158).55 
                                                
50 Cooperative Party. 
51 Laborist Party. 
52 Socialist Labor Party. 
53 In this sense, the PST constitutes the most proximate subnational antecedent of the PRI (Morales Gómez 
2006, 208). 
54 The National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR) was the first PRI’s previous 
name from 1929 to 1938. 
55 Solórzano did not finish his term, because he faced opposition inside the Gomez’s faction, thus he was 
replaced by Eucario López Contreras (Arreola Ayala 1995, 146-148). 
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Similarly, senator Alfredo Zárate Albarrán, head of a faction allied to the 
gomismo, faced practically no opposition when he became governor in September 
16,1941 as the PRM56 nominee. Nevertheless, he was spent a few months in office, 
because he died on March 8, 1942 after being shot several times by Fernando Ortiz 
Rubio, the head of the state congress and chief of state police, in a banquet that Zárate 
Albarrán offered to the justices of the National Supreme Court in Toluca, the Estado de 
México’s capital (Arreola Ayala 2003, 169-176; Cruz and Montiel 2009, 17-27; Jarquín 
Ortega and Herrejón Peredo 1995, 153). The episode marked the end of the gomismo and 
opened a new era where new factions assured the leadership of Estado de México’s 
leadership, preserving the unity and cooperation among them that had characterized the 
Gómez’s period. 
The magnicide generated diverse questions that illustrate the leverage of the 
Estado de México’s factions represented by Zárate Albarrán. Two main circumstances 
surrounding Zárate Albarrán’s murder fed suspicions about the possible involvement of 
the federal government behind this crime. First and foremost, Zárate Albarrán led a group 
of governors who had criticized President Manuel Avila Camacho’s foreign and domestic 
policies in a meeting celebrated 15 days before the magnicide (Cruz and Montiel 2009, 
29-30). Although Avila Camacho’s administration considered the governors’ criticism as 
an act of insubordination and demanded that they stop their meetings, the governors 
continued their project and announced they would meet again on March 17 and June 18 
(Arreola Ayala 1995, 170-172; Cruz and Montiel 2009, 30-32). After Zárate Albarrán’s 
assassination, however, the meetings were cancelled and all the remaining governors quit 
the bloc and expressed publicly their loyalty to Avila Camacho (Arreola Ayala 1995, 
                                                
56 Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, PRM) was the PRI’s second 
previous name from 1938 to 1946. 
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171; Cruz and Montiel 2009, 33). Second, in highly controversial resolutions, the 
National Supreme Court, controlled by Avila Camacho, reversed decisiones by a state 
judge and the Estado de México’s Superior Tribunal that condemned Ortiz Rubio to 
prison for 15 years (Arreola Ayala 1995, 175-176; Cruz and Montiel 2009, 26-27). As a 
result, Ortiz Rubio was liberated a few months after killing Zárate Albarrán. 
In any case, the magnicide broke a period of 22 years of continuous domination of 
state politics by local factions. As a result, Zárate Albarrán’s murder put at risk the 
political preponderance of local factions and thus provided an opportunity for the center 
to gain control of Estado de México at their expense. 
 
A New Era of Factional Autonomy: From 1942 to 1987 
The center’s ability to intervene in subnational politics depended on the capacity 
of factions to contest such incursions. As a result, critical events weakening the factions’ 
strength gave the center the possibility to expand its influence over local politics. 
Nevertheless, the extension and duration of the center’s advances was constrained by the 
factions’ capabilities to reorganize and respond. In this case, the governor’s murder 
enabled the center to extend its political control over the state, but its actions were 
countered by the local factions, which regrouped and regained political preponderance for 
a new and even longer period. 
After Zárate Albarrán’s assassination, the center did in fact intervene decisively in 
the Estado de México’s politics, displacing the main existing factions and promoting the 
emergence of new ones. But, as this subsection describes, the emergent factions and the 
existing ones managed to adapt to the new political context, which enabled them to 
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recover the high levels of autonomy that they had enjoyed during the gomismo. The new 
period of autonomy lasted until 1987. 
Either as a part of a plot carefully orchestrated by the federal government, or as an 
unfortunate and unexpected dramatic episode, Zárate Albarrán’s murder represented for 
Avila Camacho not only the elimination of his most salient political adversary at the time 
but also the opportunity to remove gomismo from power in the Estado de México as a 
means to prevent further opposition to his administration from other gomistas as well as 
to discourage potential adversaries from other states. Refusing to replace Zárate Albarrán 
with another gomista,57 Avila Camacho took advantage of the situation and maneuvered 
to designate Isidro Fabela Alfaro first as interim governor and then as substitute governor 
to finish Zárate Albarrán’s term (Arreola Ayala 1995, 179-201; Hernández Rodríguez 
1998, 59-67). Fabela Alfaro was a prestigious politician and diplomat unlinked to 
gomismo who had represented the Estado de México as a federal deputy in the early 
twenties (Camp 2011a, 307). 
Following Avila Camacho’s advice, Fabela Alfaro created his own faction as a 
means to get full political leadership of the state (Arreola Ayala 1995, 199). But he also 
opened his administration to the participation of other groups, including the gomistas 
(Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 68). Although this transition created resistance from a 
minor portion of gomistas, who even attempted to regain the governorship in the next 
election, it did not prevent the Fabela Alfaro’s administration from promoting the 
incorporation of a new generation of politicians into the state government as well as the 
professionalization and participation in the federal government of local politicians. In 
sum, the new governor started a new era in which the unity and incipient cooperation 
                                                
57 The main gomistas’ cards were Toluca’s mayor Juan Fernández Albarrán, state secretary of government 
Jose Luis Gutiérrez, and state legislature’s speaker Encarnación Fuentes (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 59-
60). 
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among the PRI factions as well as their incursion in national politics that had been 
successful during the gomismo was not only preserved but also stimulated. At the same 
time he helped professionalize local politicians. These features generated enduring 
legacies that still characterize the politics of Estado de México (Hernández Rodríguez 
1998, 11-51). 
During the Fabela Alfaro’s administration, the PRI local factions concluded that 
being united and cooperating with each other was their best strategy to advance their 
political interests, because otherwise the powerful centralized national government could 
take full control of local politics, as happened in other states. They also realized that their 
members must participate in national politics in order to get the necessary consent from 
the center to rule the state. In addition, the professionalization of their members became 
increasingly important because evolving political and socioeconomic conditions 
demanded more talented and well-prepared politicians. These elements, which were 
apparent since the gomismo’s early days, were made deliberately explicit as a more 
general and transcendent project starting with Fabela Alfaro (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 
19-51; 1999, 466-467; Morales Gómez 2006, 209-210). Under this arrangement, the 
PRI’s local groups recognized the sitting governor as the ultimate arbiter to solve 
disputes, impose discipline, and distribute power among the factions. The governor 
would not only decide state level positions but also positions in the federal government 
and the PRI’s National Executive Committee (CEN) (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 19-51). 
Moreover, the governor’s leadership has been institutionalized to the point that even 
sometimes the outgoing governors symbolically transmit their leadership role to the 
incoming governors in the presence of the local PRI’s political class (Corzo and García 
2011). 
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In this context, Fabela Alfaro integrated into his administration young politicians 
mainly coming from the small municipality of Atlacomulco, his hometown, as a means to 
constitute his own political faction (Arreola Ayala 1995, 199-201; Jarquín Ortega and 
Herrejón Peredo 1995, 155). Two of these new politicians were Fabela Alfaro’s distant 
relative, Alfredo del Mazo Vélez, who was appointed first state Treasurer and then 
Secretary of Government, and Adolfo López Mateos, who was appointed as rector of the 
Scientific and Literature Institute of Toluca (the precursor of the Estado de México’s 
Autonomous University). But he also included in his government more experienced 
politicians coming from other factions (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 70) and even 
promoted Juan Fernández Albarrán, Toluca’s mayor and leader of the gomista group, first 
as federal deputy and then as state Secretary of Government (Camp 2011a, 312; Arreola 
Ayala 1995, 200). 
During the next term (1945-1951),58 the Fabela Alfaro’s faction consolidated its 
predominance through the PRI’s nomination of Del Mazo Vélez for the governorship 
with the approval of President Avila Camacho (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 85-86). Del 
Mazo Vélez easily won the election by obtaining 157,162 votes versus the 3,417 votes 
received by Antonio Romero, an independent candidate supported by a small section of 
gomistas (Arreola Ayala 1995, 205-234). In addition, in 1946 López Mateos became 
senator, extending his career into national politics, which eventually enabled him to win 
the presidency in 1958. Like Fabela Alfaro, Del Mazo Vélez included in his 
administration politicians linked to Fabela Alfaro and himself but also politicians from 
other factions. He also promoted the participation of new, younger politicians as a means 
                                                
58 During his term (1940-1946), president Manuel Avila Camacho enacted a constitutional amendment that 
extended the governors’ term from four to six years. 
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to preserve the unity and cooperation among the PRI groups as well as to invigorate the 
local priísta class (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 87-102). 
Salvador Sánchez Colín, another politician born in the small town of 
Atlacomulco, became the PRI nominee and governor for the next term (1951-1957). 
Sánchez Colín had been López Mateos’ alternate senator, a member of Del Mazo Vélez’s 
administration, and a state legislator before obtaining the nomination with the support of 
President Miguel Alemán Valdés as well as Fabela Alfaro and Del Mazo Vélez (Arreola 
Ayala 1995, 241-244; Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 102-116). After winning the election 
unopposed (Arreola Ayala 1995, 249-252), Sánchez Colín incorporated into his 
administration politicians identified with him and granted positions to politicians from 
other factions, especially those of Fabela Alfaro and Del Mazo Velez (Hernández 
Rodríguez 1998, 104-113). In particular, he promoted the nomination of Del Mazo Vélez 
and Juan Fernández Albarrán, gomista and a former state Secretary of Government, for 
the senate for the 1952-1958 legislative period. He also promoted the fabelista and PRI 
gubernatorial prospect Mario Colín Sánchez as federal deputy, and he continued 
sponsoring the ascending political career of young Fabela Alfaro’s protégé Carlos Hank 
González, who became Toluca’s mayor in 1955 (Arreola Ayala 1995, 255-256). 
For the 1957-1963 term, the PRI nominated Gustavo Baz Prada with President 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines’ support. Although he had occupied important political and 
academic positions at the national level, such as the federal Secretary of Health and 
Public Health under president Avila Camacho and the rectorate of the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), this prestigious physician had started his 
political career in Estado de México where he was provisional governor in 1914, at the 
age of 20, thanks to the support of revolutionary leader Emiliano Zapata. In addition, Baz 
Prada had kept close ties to his home state while continuing his career in Mexico City. As 
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a result, since 1929 he had been considered a strong contender for the governorship 
(Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 121; Arreola Ayala 1995, 260). As an illustration of his 
links with the Estado de México, Baz Prada was one of physicians who tried to save 
governor Zárate Albarrán’s life after he was shot by Ortiz Rubio in 1942 (Cruz and 
Montiel 2009, 22).  
After winning the election unopposed, Baz Prada promoted and integrated into his 
administration politicians from other factions, such as the fabelismo’s rising star Carlos 
Hank González, who became state director of government and then federal deputy. He 
did this in order to preserve the PRI’s internal unity. Baz Prada also included in his 
government young politicians belonging to his group, such as Jorge Jiménez Cantú, who 
was appointed state Secretary of Government (Arreola Ayala 1995, 263-264; Hernández 
Rodríguez 1998, 123-128). In addition, the fabelista Abel Huitrón Aguado and 
Maximiliano Ruiz Castañeda, who belonged to another faction, were compensated with 
senatorial positions (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 129). The year following Baz Prada’s 
election (1958) the Estado de México’s former senator Adolfo López Mateos became 
president, which represented more positions for the local factions in the federal arena. 
Under López Mateos, former governor Del Mazo Vélez was appointed federal Secretary 
of Hydraulic Resources, former senator Fernández Albarrán became General Secretary of 
the PRI’s CEN, and Hank González was designated Assistant Director of Sales of the 
National Company for Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO). 
The predominance of the local groups continued in the next term (1963-1969) 
when President López Mateos approved the gubernatorial nomination Juan Fernández 
Albarrán, the candidate with the highest level of support from the state’s factions. He was 
chosen over David Romero Castañeda, who was federal Undersecretary of the Treasury, 
and Arturo García Torres, who was the General Secretary of the Department of the 
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Federal District (Mexico City). Both were close to López Mateos but had weak links to 
the Estado de México’s groups (Arreola Ayala 1995, 264-265). Like Sánchez Colín and 
Baz Prada, Fernández Albarrán ran with no competitors, and also as his predecessors, he 
included in his administration politicians from his own group as well as from other 
factions (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 144-159). 
In 1964, President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz promoted Hank González as General 
Director of CONASUPO, setting the stage for his gubernatorial nomination for the 1969-
1975 term. Although he faced the resistance from a minor faction led by former federal 
deputy Enedino Macedo, Hank González had no trouble to win the election in which he 
ran practically as the only candidate (Arreola Ayala 1995, 271-273; Hernández 
Rodríguez 1998, 178-179). Like his predecessors, Hank González included politicians of 
his faction in his administration, but he allowed even more participation by new 
politicians and members of other factions, such as Baz Prada’s disciple Jorge Jiménez 
Cantú (employed by Hank González in CONASUPO since 1964), who was appointed 
Secretary of Government (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 179-200). 
In 1970, President Luis Echeverría Alvarez appointed Jiménez Cantú as federal 
Secretary of Health and Welfare, which set the stage for the PRI to nominate the former 
Estado de México’s Secretary of Government under Baz Prada and Hank González for 
the 1975-1981 term. Jiménez Cantú’s nomination confirmed the requirement for local 
politicians to participate in national politics in order obtain the necessary approval from 
the center to rule the state (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 208-210). Although he faced 
competition from the PAN and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the PRI nominee won 
the election by a six-to-one margin over his closest competitor (Arreola Ayala 1995, 
291). Jiménez Cantú’s administration continued Hank González’s policy of including 
members of different factions and promoting new politicians to preserve the unity among 
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the local factions and reinvigorate the local political class (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 
210-229). The following year after leaving the governorship, Hank González was 
appointed head of the Department of the Federal District (DDF) by President José López 
Portillo. Hank González used this post to grant positions for local factions and rising 
politicians. 
United behind Hank González, the local factions became so powerful during 
López Portillo’s administration (1976-1982) that even President López Portillo and 
presidential prospect Miguel de la Madrid were afraid that those groups could exert a 
decisive influence in the 1982 presidential nomination (Arreola Ayala 1995, 299; Monge 
1997).59 To limit their power, López Portillo accepted De la Madrid’s demand of 
nominating for the next gubernatorial term (1981-1987) a politician who De la Madrid 
trusted and who had no strong links with Hank González. At the same time, however, the 
nominee had to be acceptable to the Estado de México’s factions to prevent a potential 
conflict with them (Arreola Ayala 1995, 299; Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 232-234). The 
only person who fulfilled this profile was Alfredo del Mazo González, who was the 
General Director of the Banco Obrero,60 De la Madrid’s close friend, and son of the 
former governor Del Mazo Vélez. 
Certainly, his links to the Estado de México’s politics through his father gave Del 
Mazo González leverage over the state’s PRI groups (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 243-
244). Nevertheless, other conditions were required in order to gain the approval of local 
factions for Del Mazo González’s nomination. First, in an unusual practice for a PRI 
president, López Portillo himself negotiated with Hank González and Jiménez Cantú to 
                                                
59 In fact, a constitutional requirement that both parents be born in Mexico prevented Hank González from 
becoming a presidential pre-candidate (his father was born in Germany). This provision was eliminated by 
the 2000 elections; thus Vicente Fox Quesada, whose father was born in USA, could become president that 
year. 
60 Worker’s Bank. 
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gain their support for Del Mazo González’s candidacy (López Portillo 1988, 1031-1033). 
Second, this negotiation involved the removal of Gustavo Carvajal Moreno as President 
of the PRI’s CEN (an achievement that perhaps no other local factions have obtained in 
the PRI’s history), because Hank González and Jiménez Cantú were displeased with the 
way Carvajal Moreno had handled the nomination process in Estado de México 
(Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 244-245; López Portillo 1988, 1031-1033, 1043). Third, 
Del Mazo González incorporated into his administration and promoted politically a 
number of politicians linked to local factions and mainly to Hank González and Jiménez 
Cantú, including Leopoldo Velasco who became Secretary of Government; Humberto 
Lira Mora, Attorney General; Emilio Chuayffet Chemor, Secretary of Education; José 
Merino Mañón, Secretary of Labor; and Arturo Martínez Legorreta, President of the 
PRI’s State Directive Committee (CDE) (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 245-248). As a 
result, Del Mazo González received the local factions’ support to obtain the nomination. 
He won the election by a ten-to-one margin over the PAN candidate, his closest 
competitor (Arreola Ayala 1995, 302-303). 
Del Mazo González left the governorship 17 months before the end of his six-year 
term when president De la Madrid appointed him federal Secretary of Energy, Mines, and 
Government Industries (SEMIP), which controlled over 1,100 state-owned enterprises, 
including all Mexican banks, Mexican Petroleum (PEMEX), and Mexican Telephone 
(TELMEX) (Chong and López-de-Silanes 2004). Del Mazo González promoted Alfredo 
Baranda García, who was state Secretary of Finance, as interim governor to finish his 
term. The appointment displeased the local factions, because Baranda García had no 
previous links with Estado de México (Arreola Ayala 1995, 308; Hernández Rodríguez 
1998, 256-257). Nevertheless, they accepted the new governor, because Baranda García 
preserved the positions that the local groups had obtained under Del Mazo González. 
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They also understood that his appointment as head of the powerful SEMIP made Del 
Mazo González a strong contender for the PRI presidential nomination in 1988, which 
represented potential important benefits for the state’s factions in national politics. In 
addition, because Baranda García was mainly identified with president De la Madrid, his 
appointment was interpreted in line with the already known De la Madrid’s purpose to 
constrain the influence of Hank González, the “moral” leader of most local factions. As a 
result, the local group assumed Del Mazo González made this concession to President De 
la Madrid in order to compete for the presidential nomination (Hernández Rodríguez 
1998, 256-257). 
In short, from 1942 to 1987 local factions prevailed in state politics. They handled 
the intervention of President Avila Camacho in 1942 without losing the autonomy they 
had acquired since the 1920s. They learned to adapt and to incorporate new leaders and 
factions while preserving their strength vis-à-vis the center. 
 
The 1987-1989 Interlude and the Return of Local Factions in 1993 
During the authoritarian period, there were deliberate attempts to control local 
politics from the center that curtailed the autonomy of subnational factions. But even in 
these cases, the factions’ response capacity shaped the sustainability of the center’s 
advances. During his term (1982-1988), for example, President De la Madrid adopted the 
policy of promoting outsider politicians who had weak or no links with the local factions 
as the PRI nominees for the governorships (Madrid Hurtado 2004, 369). As a result, a 
new challenge for the factions of Estado de México emerged in 1987 when De la Madrid 
imposed a notorious outsider as the PRI nominee for the governorship. As this subsection 
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describes, however, the local factions offered a strategic and effective response to this 
attack, which enabled them to regain their political autonomy only two years later. 
De la Madrid’s efforts to subjugate local factions deepened with the 1987 
gubernatorial nomination of Mario Ramón Beteta, the General Director of PEMEX and a 
former federal Secretary of the Treasury. De la Madrid’s idea of constraining the local 
groups had its antecedents in his 1982 presidential nomination when, according to De la 
Madrid, Hank González supported the then general director of PEMEX Jorge Díaz 
Serrano, another of the three finalists for the candidacy and De la Madrid’s rival (Madrid 
Hurtado 2004, 23-25).61 Additionally, De la Madrid believed that Hank González was the 
only politician with enough potential to destabilize his presidential administration 
(Madrid Hurtado 2004, 146-149). As a result, De la Madrid decided to nominate an 
outsider for governor in Estado de México as a means to limit Hank González’s power. 
Arsenio Farell Cubillas, the federal Secretary of Labor, and Francisco Rojas 
Gutiérrez, the federal Controller General, were other external politicians who De la 
Madrid considered for the nomination (Arreola Ayala 1995, 311). But what paradoxically 
favored Beteta over them was the expectation that he could obtain the approval of local 
factions through his friendship with Hank González (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 279). 
Thus, De la Madrid had to take Hank González’s power into account even in his efforts 
to undermine him. 
Beteta’s nomination, however, irritated the PRI local groups to the point that José 
Merino Mañón quit as state Secretary of Finance as a way of protest, and even Beteta’s 
own friend and former close collaborator in PEMEX, Humberto Lira Mora, who had 
strongly criticized outsiders, refused Beteta’s invitation to participate in his 
                                                
61 President of the PRI’s CEN Javier García Paniagua was the third finalist, according to De la Madrid 
(Madrid Hurtado 2004, 24-27). 
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administration (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 287). Although his friendship with Hank 
González (who in fact assisted Beteta to fulfill the constitutional requirement of local 
residence) was helpful (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 279), two additional conditions made 
the local groups tolerate Beteta’s candidacy. One was the possibility that Del Mazo 
would become the PRI presidential nominee, which would open opportunities not only 
for the state’s factions to increase their participation in national politics but also to even 
dismiss Beteta. The other was Beteta’s commitment to promote local politicians in his 
administration in exchange for the local factions’ support (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 
279-280). With their acquiescence, Beteta won the governorship by a six-to-one margin 
over the PAN candidate (Arreola Ayala 1995, 315). 
A few months after the election, however, the factions’ expectations failed to 
materialize. Although Del Mazo González was one of the six formal PRI pre-candidates 
for the presidency, De la Madrid chose federal Secretary of Programming and Budget 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari to be the nominee in September 1987. Moreover, with the 
exception of the position of state Secretary of Government, which he conferred to Emilio 
Chuayffet Chemor (who had served under former governors Hank González, Jiménez 
Cantú, and Del Mazo González), Beteta did not grant significant positions to the local 
groups but to other external politicians (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 282). Aggravated by 
the new governor’s exclusionary policy, the local groups responded by withdrawing all 
support for Beteta in the 1988 federal election (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 288-289). 
Under these conditions, PRI presidential nominee Salinas de Gortari lost the election in 
Estado de México by a two-to-one margin against Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano, 
candidate of the National Democratic Front (FDN). This was the worst result the PRI had 
ever obtained in any election in Estado de México. 
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To reconstitute the PRI’s electoral strength in Estado de México, and after 
consulting different local leading politicians, President Salinas de Gortari replaced Beteta 
ten months after taking office.62 Salinas de Gortari put in his place Ignacio Pichardo 
Pagaza, a former two-time federal deputy from Estado de México, who had served as 
state Secretary of Government under Hank González as well as Attorney Federal for the 
Consumer (PROFECO) (Arreola Ayala 1995, 322-323; Hernández Rodríguez 1994, 209; 
1998, 288-294; Jarquín Ortega and Herrejón Peredo 1995, 190). In other words, Salinas 
de Gortari gave the governorship back to the local factions after the brief Beteta 
interlude. In his administration, Pichardo Pagaza not only brought in politicians coming 
the main local groups and promoted rising stars in the party but also deliberately avoided 
hiring any politician not linked to the state (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 294-300). As a 
result, he was able to reunify the local political class and prepare the PRI for the 1993 
election (Arreola Ayala 1995, 324-325; Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 294-309), the last 
election in which the president acted as the main nominator of the PRI gubernatorial 
candidates in Estado de México (Morales Gómez 2006). 
As opposed to the previous election, the three main competitors for the 
gubernatorial nomination in 1993 local politicians who were clearly linked to local 
factions: Emilio Chuayffet Chemor, the general director of the Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE); Humberto Lira Mora, the state Secretary of Government; and senator Mauricio 
Valdés Rodríguez. Among them, only Chuayffet Chemor had been involved in national 
politics, but he also had strong to ties local politicians (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 318-
319). He had progressed in local politics under the promotion of diverse leading 
politicians, such as former governors Hank González, Jiménez Cantú, Del Mazo 
                                                
62 Formally, Beteta accepted the presidential invitation to become general director of the state-owned bank 
Comermex, a considerably less relevant position than the Estado de México’s governorship. 
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González, and even Beteta.63 Right after leaving the Estado de México’s government as a 
consequence of Beteta’s resignation, Chuayffet Chemor received support from Hank 
González, then federal Secretary of Tourism under president Salinas de Gortari. At Hank 
González’s request, Salinas de Gortari appointed Chuayffet Chemor as Attorney Federal 
for the Consumer (PROFECO) in 1989 (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 316-318). Then in 
the following year Salinas de Gortari appointed him General Director of IFE. Given his 
youth (he was 41 years old), Chuayffet Chemor attracted more support from the local 
factions than his competitors, because the local groups believed that the governorship 
could propel his ascending career into national politics, opening more political 
opportunities for the state’s factions (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 318-319; Monge 1997). 
His position as the head of the IFE set the stage for Chuayffet Chemor to obtain his 
expected gubernatorial nomination in 1993, which he finally obtained. With the support 
of all factions, he won the election by a seven-to-one margin over PRD candidate 
Alejandro Encinas Rodríguez, his closest competitor (Arreola Ayala 1995, 331). 
Like his immediate predecessor Pichardo Pagaza and most former governors, 
Chuayffet Chemor included in his administration politicians belonging to different local 
factions and with local roots as a means to preserve the characteristic unity among the 
Estado of México’s political class (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 319). Moreover, he put 
particular emphasis on promoting young politicians to consolidate his own political 
faction (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 318-319). His protégés included César Camacho 
Quiroz, a former mayor of Metepec mayor who became state Secretary of Government at 
the age of 34. Chuayffet Chemor did not end his term, because in 1995 President Ernesto 
                                                
63 Chuayffet Chemor was sub-delegate and delegate of the Mexico City’s Benito Juárez delegation under 
Hank González as head of DDF; president of the PRI’s municipal committee in Toluca under governor 
Jiménez Cantú; mayor of Toluca and state secretary of education, culture, and social welfare under 
governor Del Mazo González, and state secretary of government under governor Beteta. 
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Zedillo appointed him as federal Secretary of Government (SEGOB) to replace Zedillo’s 
protégé Esteban Moctezuma Barragán. With Zedillo’s support, Chuayffet Chemor 
maneuvered to designate Camacho Quiroz as substitute governor for the remaining four 
years of his term (Hernández Rodríguez 1998, 321). 
In sum, from 1987 to 1993, the local factions not only opposed Beteta’s 
governorship but also were able to get him ousted prematurely. They demonstrated that 
their political support was important for the center. As a result, the center opted to restore 
their preexisting influence over the governorship by replacing Beteta in 1989 with 
Pichardo Pagaza, a prominent member of the local factions and by nominating Chuayffet 
Chemor, another leading local politician, in 1993. 
 
Political Background of PRI Governors in Coahuila, 1929-1994 
During the authoritarian era, the factions of Coahuila, like those in Estado de 
México, were more independent from the center in deciding the governorship, the main 
political position at the state level. From1929-1994, Coahuila had 15 governors who 
spent at least six months in office. As in Estado de México, participating in state politics 
was the main source of previous political experience for Coahuila’s governors, given that 
almost 75 percent of them held local positions before ruling the state (see Table 3.2). 
Coahuila’s governors were less likely to have held national (53.3 percent) and legislative 
posts (46.7 percent). Moreover, as Table 3.2 shows, just one governor (6.7 percent) had 
only national positions as previous experience, and only four governors (26.7 percent) 
had held legislative and/or national posts but not positions in state politics. 
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Table 3.2. Political Background of Governors of Coahuila, 1929-1994. 







1 Nazario Ortiz Garza 1929-1933 Constitutional 
  
1 
2 Jesús Valdés Sánchez 1933-1937 Constitutional 
  
1 
3 Pedro Rodríguez Triana 1937-1941 Constitutional 1 
  4 Benecio López Padilla 1941-1945 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
5 Ignacio Cepeda Davila 1945-1947 Constitutional 
  
1 
6 Ricardo Ainslie Rivera 1947-1948 Interim 
 
1 1 
7 Raúl López Sánchez 1948-1951 Substitute 1 1 
 8 Román Cepeda Flores 1951-1957 Constitutional 
  
1 
9 Raúl Madero González 1957-1963 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
10 Braulio Fernández Aguirre 1963-1969 Constitutional 
  
1 
11 Eulalio Gutiérrez Treviño 1969-1975 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
12 Oscar Flores Tapia 1975-1981 Constitutional 1 1 1 
13 José de las Fuentes Rodríguez 1981-1987 Constitutional 1 1 1 
14 Eliseo Mendoza Berrueto 1987-1993 Constitutional 1 1 
 15 Rogelio Montemayor Seguy 1993-1999 Constitutional 1 1 
 TOTAL     8 7 11 
%     53.3 46.7 73.3 
Source: Camp 1991, 2011a; Estado de Coahuila 2012. 
Note: The table includes only governors who spent at least six months in office. 
 
As in the case of Estado de México, the background of Coahuila’s governors 
suggests that the factions in this state were more autonomous than the ones of Morelos, 
Nuevo León, and Zacatecas. The proportion of governors who had only held national 
posts is lower in Coahuila (6.7 percent) than in Morelos (23.1 percent), Nuevo León (23.5 
percent), and Zacatecas (28.6 percent). Also, the percentage of governors whose 
background includes national and/or legislative posts but not local positions is lower in 
Coahuila (26.7 percent) than in Morelos (38.5 percent), Nuevo León (47.1 percent), and 
Zacatecas (64.3 percent). Furthermore, the percentage of governors who had previously 
occupied local positions is larger in Coahuila (73.3 percent) than in Morelos (61.5 
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percent), Nuevo León (52.9 percent), and Zacatecas (35.7 percent). The differences in all 
these indicators are statistically significant (see Chapter 2). In short, the three indicators 
suggest that the PRI factions’ level of autonomy vis-à-vis the center during the 
authoritarian period was greater in Coahuila than in the other three states. 
The following subsections detail the historical variation in the level of autonomy 
of the local factions with respect to the center in that era. The analysis begins with the 
period that runs from 1920 to 1942. 
 
Beginning and Evolution of PRI Factions in Coahuila: From the 1920s to 1957 
The influence of the center over subnational politics was intermittent in the 
authoritarian period, depending on the local factions’ capacity to resist the center’s 
control. This subsection shows how from the 1920s to 1957 the correlation of forces 
between the local factions and the center varied in Coahuila varied over time. Local 
factions started this period prevailing in Coahuila’s politics. Then a short interlude of 
intervention from the center took placed, followed by another stage in which local 
factions regained autonomy. The period ended with renewed factional subordination to 
the center. 
After Alvaro Obregón overthrew Venustiano Carranza and replaced him as 
Mexico’s president in 1920, Coahuila continued experiencing political and even armed 
struggles between carrancista and obregonista groups to control the state. Coahuila was 
the main stronghold of the carrancismo.64 Thus it was crucial for Obregón to gain control 
of this state in order to consolidate his presidency. In 1920, Obregón took brief command 
of Coahuila through the promotion of general Luis Gutiérrez Ortiz as substitute governor, 
                                                
64 In fact, Carranza was Coahuila’s governor when in 1913 he joined the revolutionary movement that led 
him to become president from 1917 until 1920 when the Obregón’s army killed him. 
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but the next year the carrancista colonel Arnulfo González Medina obtained the 
governorship back after winning the corresponding election (Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 227-
228). However, González Medina could not finish his term (1921-1925), because in 1923 
the federal government removed him after the outbreak of various armed rebellions and 
an open confrontation with the state congress (Estado de Coahuila 2012). Substitute 
governor Carlos Garza Castro allowed Obregón to regain military control of the state for 
the next two years to suffocate former President Adolfo de la Huerta’s rebellion against 
the imminent promotion of general Plutarlo Elías Calles to the presidency (Castro 2005, 
71; Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 230-231). During the 1925-1929 term, obregonismo regained 
full command of Coahuila through the election of general Manuel Pérez Treviño, who 
had been federal Secretary of Industry and Commerce under Obregón. 
Pérez Treviño conciliated interests with most local groups, including the 
carrancistas, which enabled him to consolidate the control of his faction during his term 
and for the following two terms (Cepeda 2000, 324-325). As a result, he was able to 
leave former carrancista Bruno Neira González as interim governor in 1929 when Pérez 
Treviño returned to national politics to become first president of the nascent PNR and 
then federal Secretary of Agriculture under president Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Nazario Ortiz 
Garza, a former mayor of Torreón and of Saltillo, Coahuila’s capital, as well as a former 
state legislator was elected governor for the 1929-1933 term, under Pérez Treviño’s 
support (Estado de Coahuila 2012). The predominance of Pérez Treviño’s group 
continued through the term of Jesús Valdés Sánchez, a prestigious local physician, who 
became the PNR nominee and governor for the 1933-1937 term (Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 
236). 
However, President Lázaro Cárdenas displaced the local factions from the 
governorship for the 1937-1941 term when he imposed general Pedro Rodríguez Triana 
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as the PRM nominee, generating opposition from the local political class (Cepeda 2000, 
326; Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 237-239). Local groups regained relevance in the next term 
(1941-1945) when general Benecio López Padilla, a former local revolutionary and 
mining leader, won the governorship as the PRM candidate against Rodríguez Triana’s 
will (Cepeda 2000, 326; Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 239; Estado de Coahuila 2012). The 
preponderance of local factions was even more salient in the next election (1945) with the 
PRM nomination and electoral victory of Ignacio Cepeda Avila, an eminent local 
politician who had been state legislator as well as mayor of Arteaga and of Saltillo 
(Estado de Coahuila 2012). Cepeda Avila could not finish his six-year term. In 1947 he 
committed suicide in the wake of a major confrontation he had with President Miguel 
Alemán Valdés (Cepeda 2000, 326; Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 242; Estado de Coahuila 2012). 
Subsequently, Ricardo Ainslie Rivera and Paz Faz Risa, two politicians linked to Cepeda 
Avila, briefly became interim governors. Then President Alemán Valdés maneuvered to 
appoint his ally senator Raúl López Sánchez as substitute governor to end Cepeda Avila’s 
term from 1948 to 1951 (Cepeda 2000, 326-327; Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 242-244). With 
President Alemán Valdés’ support, López Sánchez’s faction retained the governorship 
during the next term (1951-1957) when the PRI nominee was Ramón Cepeda Flores, the 
mayor of Torreón and former manager of a President Alemán Valdés’ ranch (Cepeda 
2000, 327; Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 244-245). 
Thus, from the 1920s to 1957, Coahuila’s factions experienced varying levels of 
autonomy. Between 1948 and 1957, there was a great deal of subordination to the center. 
Nevertheless, the episodes of intervention from the center that the local factions faced 
encouraged them to successfully challenge it. As a result, they were able to obtain more 
autonomy in the years that followed. 
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Factions Regained Relevance: From 1957 to 1993 
Although the authoritarian nature of the regime enabled the center to intervene in 
subnational politics, coordinated actions from state factions had the potential to block 
those advances and even drive the center to grant more decision-making capacity to local 
groups. Periods of relative independence opened opportunities for factions to interact 
with each other as a means to achieve their political goals, creating the seeds of 
cooperation that flourished when they were fully empowered under democracy. This 
cooperation was apparent in Coahuila in 1957 when the local factions successfully 
challenged the center’s authority. This victory paved the factions’ way to expand their 
influence over the gubernatorial nominations for the subsequent 36 years (until 1993) and 
thus to promote their mutual interactions. 
The story of this period starts in 1957 when the center had to rely on the local 
factions who promoted general Raúl Madero González, brother of the former President 
and revolutionary hero Francisco I. Madero. Most political groups were highly displeased 
with the corrupt and incompetent administrations of López Sánchez and Cepeda Flores, 
thus they joined forces to combat another possible imposition from the center by 
supporting Madero González (Cepeda 2000, 327; Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 245-247). As a 
result, the only way for the center to reconcile with the local factions was through the 
nomination of Madero González, who won the election and became governor for the 
1957-1963 term. 
Similarly, in the next four gubernatorial elections the PRI nominated politicians 
who had strong support among local groups and whose careers had deep local roots. 
Moreover, all nominees made alliances with the local groups to preserve party unity 
(Cepeda 2000, 327-328; Cuéllar Valdés 1979, 247-252; Estado de Coahuila 2012). For 
the 1963-1969 term, the PRI nominated federal deputy Braulio Fernández Aguirre, 
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former two-times mayor of Torreón (1945-1948 and 1958-1960) and former alternate 
federal deputy (1949-1952). The PRI candidate for the 1969-1975 term was senator 
Eulalio Gutiérrez Treviño, former mayor of Saltillo (1957-1959) and son of Coahuila’s 
eminent revolutionary general Eulalio Gutiérrez Ortiz. 
Before obtaining the PRI nomination for the 1975-1981 term, senator Oscar 
Flores Tapia had a long career in local politics. He was governor Sánchez López’s private 
secretary, a former state Director of Public Relations, a former state Director of Historical 
Archives, a founder of the Saltillo’s association of writers and journalists, and a former 
two-time president of the PRI’s CDE. In addition, his links with President Luis 
Echeverría Alvarez, whom he promoted for the presidency through his political 
organization Culture and Political Science helped Flores Tapia to obtain the nomination 
(Cepeda 2000, 328).65 José de las Fuentes Rodríguez, the general secretary of the PRI’s 
CEN, also had an extensive local political career when he obtained the PRI candidacy for 
the 1981-1987 term. De la Fuentes Rodríguez was former governor Ortiz Garza’s 
disciple, a former state legislator, a former two-time federal deputy, a former state 
Attorney General, a former rector of the University of Coahuila, and a former president 
of the PRI’s CDE. Similarly, his personal ties with president López Portillo, his classmate 
at the UNAM’s National School of Law, helped De las Fuentes Rodríguez to receive the 
PRI nomination (Camp 2011a, 248; Cepeda 2000, 328). 
The next two governors after De las Fuentes Rodríguez belonged to local political 
groups and had strong political ties with the center as well (Cepeda 2000, 328-329). The 
PRI nominee for the 1987-1993 term was federal deputy Eliseo Mendoza Berrueto. 
                                                
65 Flores Tapia resigned from the governorship three months before the end of his term as a consequence of 
a political conflict he had with president José López Portillo (Cepeda 2000, 328; Camp 2011a, 325-326). 
Federal deputy and former governor Madero González’s son, Francisco José Madero González, was 
appointed substitute governor to finish the term. 
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Among other positions, Mendoza Berrueto was a former senator (1976-1978), a former 
federal Undersecretary of Commerce (1970-1976) under President Echeverría Alvarez, a 
former federal Undersecretary of Higher Education, Science, and Technology (1978-
1982) under President López Portillo, and a former federal Undersecretary of Mines and 
Energy (1982-1985) under President Miguel de la Madrid, who decided his gubernatorial 
nomination (Camp 2011a, 629-630). 
 
Accommodation Between Local Factions and the Center: The 1993 Election 
The last gubernatorial nomination in Coahuila under the authoritarian period 
occurred in 1993. Certainly, the center prevailed in this nomination, but it did so not by 
blatantly sending an outsider who merely responded to the center’s interests as happened 
in the case of Morelos in 1994 (see Chapter 4). Instead, it promoted a politician who 
previously had the opportunity to establish ties with local factions. Moreover, the 1993 
nomination included a negotiation with the local factions to grant to them the next 
nomination (in 1999), as in fact occurred. In this sense, the 1993 Coahuila’s nomination 
differs from the 1991 Nuevo León’s nomination, which also included an agreement to 
grant the 1997 nomination to the local factions but that the center failed to fulfill (see 
Chapter 4). 
The main competitors for the gubernatorial nomination in 1993 were two 
coahuilenses with different profiles: senator Rogelio Montemayor Seguy and former 
federal deputy Enrique Martínez y Martínez. Montemayor Seguy, who had a PhD in 
Economics from the University of Pennsylvania, had spent most of his career in the 
federal government where he was Undersecretary of Programming of the Secretary of 
Programming and Budget (1982-1985) and president of the National Institute of 
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Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (INEGI, 1985-1988) before representing Coahuila 
as federal deputy (1988-1991) and then as senator since 1991. By contrast, Martínez y 
Martínez’s career was mainly local. He was state Director of Income (1971-1975) under 
Governor Gutiérrez Treviño, state Director of Expenditures (1975-1978) and mayor of 
Saltillo (1979-1981) under Governor Flores Tapia, state Secretary of Government (1981-
1987) under Governor De las Fuentes Rodríguez, and federal deputy (1988-1991) under 
Governor Mendoza Berrueto. 
Although the center ultimately prevailed and the PRI nominated Montemayor 
Seguy, his nomination was preceded by intensive negotiations with Montemayor Seguy 
to gain political positions for local factions, including support for the nomination of 
Martínez y Martínez in the following term (Medina 1999b). As a result of these 
negotiations, Montemayor Seguy received the endorsement of the local factions. This 
helped Montemayor Seguy win the election by a vote margin of 36.7 percentage points 
(62.5 versus 25.8 percent) over the PAN candidate and former mayor of Saltillo Rosendo 
Villarreal Dávila, his closest competitor (CIDAC 2011). Montemayor Seguy fulfilled his 
commitment and granted positions for different political groups in his administration. 
Moreover, he helped Martínez y Martínez to obtain a necessary political platform to 
compete for the next PRI gubernatorial nomination by becoming federal deputy in 1997. 
 
COLLABORATIVE FACTIONALISM UNDER DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONS 
This section examines the patterns of collaboration of the PRI factions in Estado 
de México and Coahuila in the democratic aftermath (from 1995 onward). It shows that, 
in the subsequent democratic times, these factions not only preserved but also extended 
the cooperation that they had cultivated in the authoritarian period. They negotiated 
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positions and other benefits in exchange for political support. The resulting collaborative 
factionalism enabled the PRI to reach internal unity as a fundamental asset for the party 
to keep winning the governorship in these states despite facing more competitive 
elections. The analysis focuses on the gubernatorial elections of 1999, 2005, and 2011 in 
both states. 
 
A New Era of Cooperation in Estado de México: The 1999 Election 
In president Zedillo’s term (1994-2000), the center’s influence over PRI 
gubernatorial nominations waned. This change enabled the Estado de México’s local 
factions to fully control the nomination process beginning in 1999. As this subsection 
shows, the local factions responded to this fundamental shift by expanding their 
cooperation through the negotiation of political positions and other goods. In line with the 
theoretical expectations of the dissertation, this subsection also demonstrates that internal 
unity helps parties in electoral times to convey professionalism, competency, and strength 
in their campaigns, favoring their prospects to remain in power. Of course, as Chapter 4 
shows, the withdrawal of the center did not always generate factional unity in the states. 
The gubernatorial election for the 1999-2005 term was expected to be challenging 
for the PRI, because in the most recent elections for municipalities and local congress in 
1996 this party had obtained only seven percentage points more than the PAN, its closest 
competitor, and in the 1997 election for the federal congress the differential was even 
slimmer: 1.06 percentage points over the PRD (IEEM 1996a, 1996b; IFE 1997). In 
addition, by December 1998, President Ernesto Zedillo’s and Governor Camacho 
Quiroz’s approval rates were just 55 and 60 percent, respectively (Presidencia de la 
República Mexicana 1998k). In this context, Chuayffet Chemor and Camacho Quiroz 
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started preparing the PRI nomination by promoting Arturo Montiel Rojas (Granados 
Chapa 1998a, 1999b), a local politician linked to different factions.66 Under Governor 
Chuayffet Chemor, Montiel Rojas was state Secretary of Economic Development from 
1993 to 1995. Then in SEGOB, Chuayffet Chemor appointed Montiel Rojas first as 
General Director of Civil Protection and then as General Director of Talleres Gráficos de 
México. Then in February 1997 Governor Camacho Quiroz promoted Montiel Rojas to 
be President of the PRI’s CDE.  
To prevent costly defections, like those that happened in Tlaxcala and Zacatecas 
in 1998, and to present more competitive candidates, the PRI’s CEN decided that all the 
PRI nominations for the ten gubernatorial elections that took place from 1999 to 2000,67 
with the exception of Nayarit,68 would be defined through open primaries (Dyer 2005, 
156-162; Poiré Romero 2002, 107-139). Additionally, an agreement among the main 
local factions reinforced the application of this method as a way to prevent the president 
from interfering in the nomination process (Dyer 2005, 158-159). Choosing primaries 
automatically made Montiel Rojas the leading contender for the nomination in 1999, 
because as the President of the PRI’s CDE he had the support of most party leaders and 
cadres as well as from the strongest local factions represented by Chuayffet Chemor, 
Camacho Quiroz, and even former governor Hank González (Meraz 2011, 72-77, 83-87). 
In addition to Montiel Rojas, Humberto Lira Mora, the Corporate Director of 
PEMEX and former state Secretary of Government (under Governor Pichardo Pagaza); 
                                                
66 Montiel Rojas was Del Mazo González’s friend of youth, Governor Jiménez Cantú’s private secretary, 
and President of the PRI’s CDE and federal deputy under Governor Pichardo Pagaza, and his family was 
linked to former governors Fabela Alfaro and Del Mazo Vélez (Camp 2011a, 652-653; Meraz 2011, 19-
23). 
67 These states are Baja California Sur, Chiapas, Coahuila, Estado de México, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Morelos, 
Quintana Roo, and Tabasco. 
68 In this state, the opposition coalesced around a PRI splitter who defeated his former party. 
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senator Héctor Ximénez González; Heberto Barrera Velázquez, former President of the 
PRI’s CDE; and Jaime Vázquez Castillo, the state Secretary of Government, started early 
informal campaigns for the nomination in preparation for the primary (Dyer 2005, 158-
159). The strategy paid off because in November 1998 most potential voters identified 
them as the most viable politicians to obtain the PRI nomination (Giménez 1998). 
Senator Manuel Cadena Morales, José Merino Mañón, former state Secretary of Finance; 
former senator Yolanda Sentíes Echeverría; and Alejandro Nieto Enríquez, the state 
Secretary of Urban Development and Public Works, were other local politicians who also 
expressed their intention to compete for the nomination. From them, however, Nieto 
Enríquez and Vázquez Castillo, who replaced Montiel Rojas as the head of the PRI’s 
CDE, decided not to participate in the process, which was interpreted as a part of 
Governor Camacho Quiroz’s strategy to strengthen Montiel Rojas (Durán 1998; 
Rodríguez 1998). Moreover, right after having registered as formal pre-candidates, 
Cadena Morales and Barrera Velázquez declined in favor of Montiel Rojas (González 
1998; Rodríguez 1999a). Merino Mañón, the weakest contender (Granados Chapa 
1998b), also withdrew his pre-candidacy. 
The primary campaign started on December 16, 1998, when the pre-candidacies 
were formalized and the primary took place on January 31, 1999. The winner was 
Montiel Rojas who obtained 52.2 percent of the vote, followed by Ximénez González, 
20.1 percent; Lira Mora, 17.4 percent, and Sentíes Echeverría, 10.1 percent ("Dan 
constancia a Montiel"  1999). After briefly questioning the process (Granados Chapa 
1999a), Lira Mora tacitly accepted the results by leaving the political scene right after the 
primary to reappear two months later when president Zedillo appointed him federal 
Undersecretary of Religious Affairs in SEGOB ("Atenderá Lira Mora Asuntos 
Religiosos"  1999). Ximénez González also accepted the results, while Sentíes Echeverría 
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not only validated the Montiel Rojas’ election but also joined his campaign team for the 
governorship (Rodríguez 1999b). Also participating in Montiel Rojas’ campaign were the 
other competitors who declined in his favor as well as members of other local factions 
(Gómez 1999; Rodríguez 1999b). As a result, on March 28, the PRI nominee started his 
campaign under conditions of party unity (Romano 1999). 
Over the course of the campaign, support for the PRI increased slightly with small 
boosts before and after the PRI’s primary, indicating that the primary, which resulted in 
party unity, helped the PRI’s electoral prospects. More precisely, Figure 3.1 shows that 
during the primary campaign the voting preferences for the PRI increased from 31 
percent on November 10, 1998, to 36.4 percent on January 25, 1999 (six days before the 
primary). After the primary and during the whole general campaign, they fluctuated 
around 36 percent to finally allow Montiel Rojas to win by a seven-point margin (42.44 
versus 35.46 percent) over the PAN candidate, the runner-up. In brief, these trends 
indicate that the fact that the internal factions remained united enabled the PRI nominee 
to preserve his advantage in the voting preferences, leading this party to win the election. 
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Figure 3.1. Vote Intentions in Estado de México, 1998-1999. 
 
Source: Giménez 1998; Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1998k, 1999i, 1999k, 
1999l, 1999j; Juárez 1999; Moreno 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; IEEM 1999. 
 
Survey information indicates that internal unity helped the PRI and its candidate 
to launch an effective campaign and convey the message of their strength, competency, 
and reliability to most voters. Surveys conducted before the primary (January 25), after 
the primary and before the start of the general campaign (March 1), and right before the 
election (June 29) show that across the recognition of the PRI candidate increased from 
32.5 to 96.6 percent (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1999i, 1999k, 1999h). 
Similarly, the percentage of potential voters having a positive opinion of Montiel Rojas 
rose from 35.6 in January 25 to 63.6 in June 29. Moreover, the PRI and its nominee 
 126 
always preserved and even increased their advantage in relevant dimensions for voters, 
such popularity, capacity to solve public problems, and closeness to people. 
In exchange for their cooperation with Montiel Rojas’ candidacy, most PRI 
factions were compensated with positions in the Montiel Rojas administration. Montiel 
Rojas appointed Cadena Morales state Secretary of Government, Sentíes Echeverría state 
Secretary of Ecology, and Barrera Velázquez state Secretary of Agricultural and 
Livestock Development, while Vázquez Castillo became general coordinator of the 
Montiel Rojas’ campaign and then federal deputy in 2000, and Nieto Enríquez 
participated in the PRI’s CDE. Although Ximénez González could not continue his 
political career because he died in 2000 (Torres, Lázaro, and Hidalgo 2000), Montiel 
Rojas granted a public notary position/license69 to his son Salvador Ximénez Esparza 
(Ortiz 2006). Moreover, Montiel Rojas supported former governor Camacho Quiroz, his 
main promoter, to become senator in 2006 (Cruz and Montiel 2009, 188). 
In addition to incorporating members of different factions into his administration 
(such as former governor Pichardo Pagaza’s son Ignacio Pichardo Lechuga, who was 
appointed as state Assistant Attorney for the Environmental Protection), Montiel Rojas 
promoted a new generation of politicians identified with him, headed by Enrique Peña 
Nieto, a 33-year old politician who was Montiel Rojas’ private secretary in the state 
Secretary of Economic Development under Governor Chuayffet Chemor. Peña Nieto had 
a salient political profile not only because he was born in Atlacomulco, the hometown of 
                                                
69 Public notaries’ legal functions and income are considerably higher in Mexico than in the United States 
(see Pikoff and Crimmins 2012; Notary Public in Mexico and Elsewhere  2012; Testimonios: El notariado 
del Distrito Federal  2012). For example, while in USA public notaries only certify the identity of signers, 
in Mexico they are responsible for the legality of the documents they certify. In addition, public notaries’ 
fees in USA are a few dollars, whereas in Mexico they reach thousands of dollars in many cases, because 
they are based on a percentage of the cost of the transaction. Moreover, in Mexico public notaries are 
required to intervene in many transactions and their availability is limited, which makes them very valuable 
positions for governors to grant. 
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Montiel Rojas and former governors Fabela Alfaro, Del Mazo Vélez, Del Mazo 
González, and Sánchez Colín, but also because he had family links with all of them (Cruz 
and Montiel 2009). Montiel Rojas appointed Peña Nieto state Undersecretary of 
Government in 1999, state Secretary of Administration in 2000, and promoted him as 
local legislator and head of the PRI in the state congress in 2003. From this position and 
given the support he had from Montiel Rojas and his political roots, Peña Nieto became 
the strongest contender for the PRI gubernatorial nomination in 2005 (Tello Díaz 2012). 
 
Reinforcing Collaborative Factionalism: The 2005 Election 
Factions that engage in tit for tat cooperation are more likely to preserve this type 
of collaboration in their future interactions. This feature has been observed in Estado de 
México. The pattern of party unity based on cooperation among factions that led the PRI 
to win the 1999 election was present in the 2005 election as well. As this subsection 
shows, the PRI remained united based on mutual collaboration among local groups. This 
cooperation relied on the distribution of political positions that the main different factions 
received in the context of the nomination process. As happened in the previous election, 
internal cohesion helped the PRI to retain the governorship in 2005. This subsection also 
presents further evidence indicating that internal unity enhances parties’ prospects to 
retain power by helping parties to campaign more effectively in electoral times. 
Initially, the PRI nomination for the 2005-2011 appeared to be complicated 
because, in addition to Peña Nieto by October 2004 twelve more politicians had 
expressed their intention to compete for it: Eduardo Bernal Martínez, a Undersecretary of 
the PRI’s CEN; Manuel Cadena Morales; the state Secretary of Government; local 
legislator Gustavo Cárdenas Monroy; Fernando García Cuevas, the head of the Estado de 
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México’s federal deputies; Cuauhtémoc García Ortega, state Undersecretary of Economic 
Development; Guillermo González Martínez, state Assistant Attorney General; Carlos 
Hank Rhon, son of former governor Hank González’s; Enrique Jacob Rocha, the state 
Secretary of Social Development; Héctor Luna de la Vega, former state Secretary of 
Finance and Planning; Alfonso Navarrete Prida, the state Attorney General; Isidro Pastor 
Medrano, the President of the PRI’s CDE; and former federal deputy Jaime Vázquez 
Castillo. Nevertheless, the list soon reduced to seven hopefuls, because five competitors 
quit the raced. Hank Rhon, sponsored by Roberto Madrazo Pintado, the President of the 
PRI’s CEN (Guerrero and Merlos 2004), and Navarrete Prida left the competition early 
because they had no previous elective offices, nor party positions that the local PRI, 
under Montiel Rojas’s control, required to be nominated (Hernández 2004). Similarly, 
Bernal Martínez, García Ortega, and González Martínez withdrew their participation after 
either realizing that their possibilities to obtain the nomination were too limited, or failing 
to fulfill the basic requirements to take part in the process.70 In addition, Cadena Morales 
remained as state Secretary of Government as a way to express his loyalty to Montiel 
Rojas (Espinosa 2005). 
In December 2004, Montiel Rojas himself started negotiating with the remaining 
contenders the nomination of a unity candidate, assisted by Manuel Garza González, who 
was temporarily in charge of the PRI’s CDE (Guerrero and Merlos 2004).71 His purpose 
was twofold: preventing an open primary under the assumption that it could damage the 
PRI’s electoral prospects for the general election (Espinosa 2005) and to promote Peña 
Nieto to be the unity nominee (Guerrero and Merlos 2004). Finally, after a four-hour 
                                                
70 For example, the PRI state electoral commission required for contenders not to hold any partisan, 
legislative, or governmental position, and García Ortega did not leave his office in the state government 
(Davila 2004). 
71 Pastor Medrano had left the presidency of the PRI’s CDE in October 2004 to compete for the 
gubernatorial nomination (Gómez 2004b). 
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negotiation meeting in the governor’s official mansion, on January 12, 2005, Cárdenas 
Monroy, García Cuevas, Jacob Rocha, Luna de la Vega, and Vázquez Castillo agreed to 
support Peña Nieto as the unity candidate (Gómez 2005c). Their endorsement as well as 
Peña Nieto’s nomination were formalized two days later (Gómez 2005a). After 
expressing his pride in the political agreement among most contenders, which created the 
necessary internal unity to face the gubernatorial election (Samaniego 2005), on February 
12, 1999, Peña Nieto formally received the PRI nomination, endorsed by most 
competitors and former governors as well as by Governor Montiel Rojas ("Rinde protesta 
el candidato del PRI a la gubernatura del Estado de México"  2005). 
Pastor Medrano was the only contender who did not participate in the agreement. 
On December 10, 1998, his followers violently tried to boycott a session of the PRI State 
Political Council (CPE), which was in charge of the nomination process, in order to 
prevent the displacement of Pastor Medrano’s supporters from the CPE (Espinosa 2004; 
Granados Chapa 2004). As a result of this incident, the CPE initiated a process to expel 
Pastor Medrano from the party, which led the PRI State Electoral Commission to cancel 
his pre-candidacy four days later (Gómez 2004a). Pastor Medrano tried to challenge the 
resolution before the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Branch (TEPJF), but the 
TEPJF validated the PRI’s decision to cancel Pastor Medrano’s pre-candidacy (Irizar 
2005). The PAN and PRD leaders tried to enlist Pastor Medrano to support their 
gubernatorial candidates (Gómez and Guerrero 2005). But after a brief flirtation with the 
PAN nominee (Cuenca 2005),72 Pastor Medrano returned to the PRI after negotiating 
                                                
72 Pastor Medrano’s support for the PAN nominee was so tepid that some scholars who analyzed this 
election believed that his temporary expulsion from the PRI was just a charade (e.g., Santillán Buelna 2007, 
240). Moreover, Pastor Medrano himself said that he acted as a Trojan horse in the PAN campaign 
(Pastrana 2005). 
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political positions for him and members of his group in exchange for his support for Peña 
Nieto and Montiel Rojas (Cárdenas Cruz 2005; Cortés 2005a, 2005b; Montaño 2006). 
The Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM) joined the PRI in nominating Peña 
Nieto. The PAN and PRD also received the support of other minor parties to compete in 
this election. The Convergence Party (Convergencia) allied to the PAN to nominee 
Ruben Mendoza Ayala, whereas the Workers’ Party (PT) coalesced behind the PRD’s 
candidate Yeidckol Polevsky. Figure 3.2 shows that right after being nominated and 
obtaining internal unity (the end of February) and before the start of the gubernatorial 
campaigns (early April), Peña Nieto and the PAN-Convergencia candidate were tied with 
around 30 percent of the voting intentions. As soon as the general campaign started, Peña 
Nieto obtained a 14 percentage-point advantage over his contenders that increased in the 
rest of the campaign to almost 23 percentage points on election day, in which Pena Nieto 
obtained 47.6 percent of the valid vote versus 24.7 percent of the PAN-Convergencia 
nominee, his closest competitor. 
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Figure 3.2. Vote Intentions in Estado de México, 2005. 
 
Source: Moreno 2005b, 2005a; "Aventaja PRI en el Estado de México"  2005; Moreno 
and Méndez 2005b, 2005a; IEEM 2005. 
 
At the core of Peña Nieto’s victory were the conditions of party unity that enabled 
him to campaign more effectively than his competitors. Fifty days before the campaign’s 
start date, Peña Nieto and the PAN-Convergencia nominee were tied with +15 points in 
the differential of voters’ favorable/unfavorable opinions (Moreno 2005b). Nevertheless, 
by June 19 Peña Nieto’s differential increased to +25, whereas the PAN-Convergencia 
candidate’s plummeted to +2 (Moreno and Méndez 2005a). Similarly, a survey reported 
that on April 25 Peña Nieto had an advantage of 20 percentage points over both the PAN-
Convergencia and PRD-PT nominees regarding voters’ perceptions of the candidates’ 
honesty, knowledge of the state’s problems, and capacity to rule the state, among other 
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dimensions ("Aventaja PRI en el Estado de México"  2005). Moreover, 14 days before 
the election, 62 percent of the interviewees of a representative sample declared that Peña 
Nieto conducted a better campaign than the other candidates against 12 and 7 percent 
who favored the PAN-Convergencia and PRD-PT nominees, respectively (Moreno and 
Méndez 2005a). 
Like Pastor Medrano, most competitors were rewarded with positions Peña 
Nieto’s administration in exchange for their support. Cárdenas Monroy became general 
coordinator of Peña Nieto’s campaign, federal deputy in 2006, and state Secretary of 
Environment in 2009; García Cuevas was appointed state Undersecretary of Government; 
Jacob Rocha served as Secretary of Economic Development before becoming state 
legislator in 2009, and Vázquez Castillo, who was coordinator of Peña Nieto’s campaign 
in the Mexico’s Valley region, received a public notary position from governor Peña 
Nieto just nineteen days after taking office (Ortiz and Gómez 2006), and was the PRI 
nominee for the senate in 2006. Likewise, Navarrete Prida remained as state Attorney 
General, received a public notary in 2006, was appointed state Secretary of Metropolitan 
Development in 2008, and became federal deputy in 2009. González Martínez was 
compensated through his wife Azucena Olivares Villágomez, who was named state 
Attorney for Environmental Protection in 2005. Then she became state legislator in 2006 
and mayor of Naucalpan in 2009. Cadena Morales not only became federal deputy in 
2009 but also he was rewarded through his son Carlos Cadena Ortiz de Montellano, who 
became state legislator in 2006 and then state Secretary of Economic Development and 
state Secretary of Metropolitan Development in Peña Nieto’s administration. Similarly, 
Hank Rhon was remunerated through his insurance company, which obtained contracts 
from the Estado de México’s government for about two million dollars in 2006 alone 
(Montaño 2007). Furthermore, a prominent member of his father’s faction, Humberto 
 133 
Benítez Treviño, was appointed Secretary of Government in 2005 and then promoted as 
federal deputy in 2009 (Granados Chapa 2009). As a result, the Hank clan expressed its 
total support for Peña Nieto’s administration (Alonso 2009). 
The 2005 election confirmed that the party unity observed in 1999 was not an 
isolated phenomenon. Again, the local factions were able to maintain intra-party cohesion 
based on the distribution of political positions in which the winning faction as well as the 
losing ones took part. The resulting internal unity paved the way for the PRI to keep the 
governorship for another term. 
 
No PRI Splitters for Opposition Parties: The 2011 Election 
Once developed, patterns of cooperation among factions are self-reinforcing and 
resilient enough to even resist additional pressures to break their cohesion (e.g., 
deliberate efforts from opposition parties to promote leaders of those factions as their 
own nominees). The 2011 election in Estado de México provides evidence that supports 
this claim. As in the two previous elections in which the PRI local groups had full control 
of the nomination process, in 2011 the state factions used mutual collaboration based on 
the distribution of political positions to preserve party unity when defining the 
gubernatorial candidate. This subsection shows that the cohesion that factions reached 
enabled the resulting nominee to easily win the election. In addition, this section presents 
data indicating that internal unity provides solid ground for nominees to launch effective 
electoral campaigns, increasing the odds that incumbent parties will remain in office. 
As he closed the scandal involving former Governor Montiel Rojas (see below), 
Peña Nieto gave political direction to his administration. Like his predecessors, in 
addition to providing positions and benefits to different PRI groups to preserve internal 
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unity, Peña Nieto promoted a new generation of politicians linked to him and to other 
local factions. Moreover, the main five contenders for the PRI nomination for the 2011-
2017 term emerged from those rising leaders: Ricardo Aguilar Castillo, the President of 
the PRI’s CDE; Eruviel Avila Villegas, the Mayor of Ecatepec; Alfredo del Mazo Maza, 
the Mayor of Huixquilucan; Ernesto Nemer Alvarez, the head of the PRI legislators in the 
State Congress; and Luis Videgaray Caso, federal deputy and president of the federal low 
chamber’s Commission on Public Budget and Public Accounts. 
Peña Nieto supported the political careers of the five politicians to prepare them 
to compete for the PRI gubernatorial nomination in 2011. Some of these politicians had 
links not only with Peña Nieto but also with other former governors. Aguilar Castillo, 
Peña Nieto’s former fellow state legislator and former mayor of Jilotepec (2000-2003) 
under governor Montiel Rojas, was appointed state Secretary of Labor in 2005 before 
assuming the presidency of the PRI’s CDE in 2006. Avila Villegas, a former state 
legislator (1997-2000) under Governor Camacho Quiroz, obtained the PRI nomination 
for the federal low chamber in 2000 but lost the election. However, Governor Montiel 
Rojas rescued him politically by appointing him Undersecretary of Government for the 
Region of Nezahualcóyotl in 2001 and then promoted him to become Mayor of Ecatepec 
in 2003 after winning the election as the PRI nominee (Granados Chapa 2011a). Avila 
Villegas’ career continued under Governor Peña Nieto’s sponsorship. Under Peña Nieto, 
Avilla Villegas became President of the PRI’s CDE in 2006 and then head of the PRI 
state legislators from 2006 to 2009 when he again contended for and won the mayorship 
of Ecatepec as the PRI nominee. 
Del Mazo Maza, who is Peña Nieto’s third cousin (Cruz and Montiel 2009), 
former governor Del Mazo González’s son, and former governor Del Mazo Vélez’s 
grandson, launched a meteoric career under Peña Nieto’s support. In 2005, he was 
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appointed state General Director of Promotion of Microenterprises and Small Business, 
which was elevated into the Estado de México’s Institute of Entrepreneurship.73 In 2008, 
he was promoted state Secretary of Tourism before winning the mayorship of 
Huixquilucan as the PRI nominee. Under Governor Peña Nieto, Nemer Alvarez was state 
Secretary of Social Development in 2005 before becoming head of the PRI state 
legislators in 2009. He was strongly linked to former governor Chuayffet Chemor with 
whom he worked as private secretary for 16 years.74 In addition, he had family ties with 
the Del Mazo clan and Peña Nieto himself, because his wife Carolina Monroy del Mazo, 
then state Secretary of Economic Development, is Del Mazo Maza’s cousin and Peña 
Nieto’s third cousin (Cruz and Montiel 2009; Pacheco 2011a). Videgaray Caso, who had 
a PhD in economy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), was associate 
consultant specializing in public finance at the former federal Secretary of the Treasury 
Pedro Aspe Armella’s consulting firm, Protego Asesores, S. de R.L., when governor Peña 
Nieto hired him as state Secretary of Finance, Planning, and Administration in 2005 and 
then promoted him as federal deputy in 2009 (Sánchez 2011). 
The five politicians were considered the main contenders for the PRI nomination 
by the end of Peña Nieto’s term, given that other two competitors, Manuel Cadena 
Morales, federal deputy and former state Secretary of Government, and Azucena Olivares 
Villágomez, the Mayor of Naucalpan abandoned their attempts to participate in the race 
(Acevedo 2010; "Rompen pacto en el PRI"  2011; "Peña Nieto niega tener favorito para 
sucederlo"  2011; García 2011a). Peña Nieto directly oversaw the nomination process, 
                                                
73 Instituto Mexiquense del Emprendedor. 
74 Since Chuayffet Chemor was state Secretary Education, Culture, and Social Welfare in 1982 until he 
was dismissed as federal Secretary of Government in 1998 (Pacheco 2011a). 
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providing political support for the five contenders75 and controlling their political 
activism at the same time (Gómez 2011a).76 
Formally, the nomination process started on January 17, 2011, when the PRI State 
Political Council (CPE) decided to select the candidate through a party convention, which 
implied choosing a unity nominee ("PRI-Edomex elegirá candidato por convención de 
delegados"  2011; García 2011b). The process culminated on March 26 with the 
formalization of the unity candidate. Before and during the process, all opposition parties, 
starting with the PAN and PRD, were expecting a split in the PRI and hoped to recruit a 
losing nominee as the candidate of a united opposition front (Gómez 2010; Reséndiz 
2011; "Dimos un paso adelante con precandidatura de Eruviel: Díaz Salazar"  2011; 
Granados Chapa 2011a). Nonetheless, the expected split never happened. 
By contrast, during the whole process the five contenders not only expressed their 
loyalty to the PRI and more directly to Peña Nieto as the ultimate PRI leader but also sent 
the message to the opposition that the PRI’s internal unity was “unbreakable” (Velasco 
2011b; Pacheco 2011b; Velasco 2011a; Pacheco 2011a; Sánchez 2011; "Llama Eruviel 
Avila a evitar las descalificaciones"  2011; "Llama Eruviel Avila a la unidad política"  
2010; Espinosa 2010; "'Inquebrantable' la unidad de priístas en Estado de México: Avila"  
2011). Moreover, the contenders maintained permanent negotiations with each other as 
well as with Cadena Morales and Olivares Villagómez to preserve party unity and 
prevent internal conflicts (García 2011d; "Peña Nieto y PRI pactan candidatura de 
unidad"  2011). Regarding the electoral strength of the competitors, a survey conducted 
between March 19 and 20 indicated that Del Mazo Maza led the voting preferences 
                                                
75 Peña Nieto participated in public events that denoted his political support for each competitor (García 
2011c). 
76 Some contenders, e.g., Avila Villegas, stopped their campaigns after Peña Nieto asked them to await the 
PRI formal process to select the nominee ("Llaman a priístas de Edomex a esperar tiempos para 
candidaturas"  2011; "No voy a moverme, dice Eruviel Avila"  2011). 
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among both general population and PRI followers with 21 and 26 percent, respectively, 
followed by Avilla Villegas with 18 and 21 percent, Aguilar Castillo with 10 and 17 
percent, Nemer Alvarez with 6 and 7 percent, and Videgaray Caso with 4 and 5 percent 
(Moreno and León 2011). 
Under these conditions, Peña Nieto conducted the final negotiations with the five 
competitors to define the unity nominee ("Peña Nieto y PRI pactan candidatura de 
unidad"  2011). After having separate meetings with Peña Nieto, Nemer Alvarez and 
Videgaray Caso exited the competition on March 24, while Aguilar Castillo tacitly 
abandoned the contest by remaining in the PRI’s CDE (Fernández 2011). Likewise, on 
March 26 and despite leading the voting preferences, Del Mazo Maza announced that he 
was leaving the race to support Avila Villegas. Furthermore, that day Peña Nieto had a 
final meeting with the five competitors plus Olivares Villegómez in which all of them 
agreed to endorse Avila Villegas as the unity nominee (Acevedo and García 2011; 
Fernández 2011). As a result, the next day Avila Villegas registered as the PRI unity 
candidate, endorsed by all competitors (García 2011e). In the following days, minor 
parties PVEM and New Alliance Party (PANAL)77 agreed to endorse the PRI nominee, 
whose registration was formalized at the Electoral Institute of Estado de México on April 
15 (González 2011a). 
In the general election, Avila Villegas faced Alejandro Encinas Rodríguez, the 
candidate of the PRD, PT, and Convergence Party, as well as Luis Felipe Bravo Mena, 
the PAN candidate, both well-known experienced politicians who in fact had already 
competed for the governorship in the 1993 election as the PRD and PAN nominees.78 
                                                
77 Partido Nueva Alianza. 
78 When he obtained the nomination, Encinas Rodríguez was head of the PRD legislators in the federal low 
chamber. After being federal deputy before (1991-1994), he was former Mexico City’s Substitute Mayor 
(2005-2006), Secretary of Government (2005), Undersecretary of Government (2003-2005), Secretary of 
Economic Development (2002-2003), and Secretary of Environment (1997-2000). Bravo Mena was former 
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Nevertheless, during the whole process, Avila Villegas maintained an important 
advantage in the voting intentions over his opponents, which enable him to win the 
election easily. Figure 3.3 shows that right after the nomination the voting preferences for 
the PRI increased from 41 percent (March 20) to 48 percent (April 17), indicating that the 
PRI benefited from selecting its candidate under conditions of internal unity. With minor 
variations before and at the start of the general campaign (May 16), the PRI nominee was 
able to even increase his advantage to win the election on July 3 with a vote margin of 41 
percentage points (61.97 versus 20.96 percent) over the PRD-PT-Convergence candidate, 
his closest competitor. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
Private Secretary of President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2008-2011), Mexico’s ambassador to the Vatican 
(2005-2008), national President of the PAN (1999-2005), senator (1994-2000), and federal deputy (1991-
1994). 
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Figure 3.3. Vote Intentions in Estado de México, 2011. 
 
Source: Moreno and León 2011; "Eruviel Avila, a la cabeza en el Edomex: 47.7%"  
2011; "Eruviel Avila mantiene ventaja en el Edomex"  2011; "Día 1: Resultados encuesta 
de seguimiento Elecciones Edomex"  2011; Moreno 2011a; "Día 17: Bravo Mena está 
estacionado"  2011; "Día 32: Bravo Mena regresa al punto más bajo de la campaña en las 
preferencias"  2011, 2011b; "Día 39: Baja Encinas en preferencias electorales; Bravo 
Mena y Eruviel suben"  2011; IEEM 2011. 
 
The three-to-one vote ratio that Avila Villegas obtained over his closest 
competitor was facilitated by the highly appealing campaign that he launched under 
conditions of internal unity. Surveys conducted at different moments of the campaign 
indicate that the PRI nominee was able to present a much more attractive image to the 
voters than his competitors. For example, by May 22 his favorable/unfavorable 
differential was +26, whereas the one of his closest competitor was only +2 (Moreno 
2011a). Similarly, by June 19 he obtained an advantage of 30 percentage points over his 
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closest competitor on candidate attributes that voters considered central, such as capacity 
to rule, closeness to people, intelligence, and honesty (Avila mantiene ventaja; PRD 
avanza y PAN cae  2011). Furthermore, he was the candidate that most voters attracted 
outside his partisan base. He became the most preferred nominee of independents (48 
percent) as well as of the youngest, new voters (62 percent) (Moreno 2011b). 
As usual, most PRI competitors as well as members of their factions and other 
groups were rewarded for their support of Avila Villegas. Right after Avila Villegas’ 
nomination, Videgaray Caso became general coordinator of Avila Villegas’ campaign 
and President of the PRI’s CDE, while Peña Nieto’s close ally and President of the PRI’s 
CEN Humberto Moreira Valdés promoted Aguilar Castillo as Secretary of Organization 
of the PRI’s CEN. Upon taking office, Avila Villegas kept former governor and Del 
Mazo Maza’s father Alfredo del Mazo González as President of the Estado de México 
Council for Infrastructure and appointed Nemer Alvarez as state Secretary of 
Government. Moreover, Nemer Alvarez’s wife Carolina Monroy del Mazo became 
Secretary of Program of Action and Social Management of the PRI’s CDE before 
winning the mayorship of Metepec as the PRI nominee in 2012 ("Nombramientos en el 
PRI del Estado de México"  2012; Chavarría 2012). Similarly, Cadena Morales’ son 
Carlos Cadena Ortiz de Montellano, who had left his position as state Secretary of 
Metropolitan Development under Peña Nieto to participate in the campaign team of Avila 
Villegas, was appointed state Secretary of the Environment in the new administration, 
while Olivares Villagómez’s daughter Irazema González Olivares became federal deputy 
from the PRI in 2012 (Islas 2011). Avila Villegas also granted positions to politicians 
identified with Peña Nieto as well as to members of other factions, such as former 
governor César Camacho Quiroz, who was appointed to represent the PRI at the Electoral 
Institute of Estado de México; former contenders for the PRI gubernatorial nomination 
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Fernando García Cuevas and Eduardo Martínez Bernal who became state Secretary of 
Metropolitan Development and Secretary of Government and Legislative Affairs of the 
PRI’s CDE, respectively; and Jaime Barrera Velázquez, brother of former competitor for 
the PRI gubernatorial nomination Heberto Barrera Velázquez, who was appointed state 
Secretary of Transportation. 
As a way to preserve the governorship as the center of the PRI political leadership 
in Estado de México, two days before leaving office, Peña Nieto had a private meeting 
with federal and state legislators as representatives of the local PRI class. At the meeting, 
in addition to officially announce his intention to compete for the PRI presidential 
nomination,79 Peña Nieto symbolically transmitted the state leadership to Avila Villegas. 
Performed each time a new governor takes office, this ritual is a sort of covenant through 
which all factions accept that the incoming governor will act as the ultimate arbiter to 
distribute positions and solve disputes among factions (Corzo and García 2011). As a 
golden rule of this arrangement, all former governors must support the sitting governor, 
who should take into consideration their opinion regarding important issues involving not 
only the Estado de México but also national politics (Hidalgo 2000). As a result, it is a 
common practice that the sitting governor meets frequently with former governors to 
discuss political affairs and even assigns them diverse political tasks (Meraz 2011, 93). 
As a part of this practice, for example, at least five former governors (Del Mazo 
González, Pichardo Pagaza, Chuayffet Chemor, Camacho Quiroz, and Montiel Rojas) 
actively supported the Peña Nieto’s efforts to win the presidential nomination. They 
helped Peña Nieto by linking him with key politicians and groups from other states as 
well as obtaining funds for his campaign (Villamil 2012; Gil Olmos 2012). 
                                                
79 In fact, the PRI’s resounding electoral victory in Estado de México helped propell Peña Nieto to become 
the PRI nominee and win the presidential election in 2012 (Gómez 2011b). 
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Since the beginning of gomismo in the 1920s and more saliently after Fabela 
Alfaro became governor in 1942, the PRI groups of Estado de México have remained 
unified, which has enabled this party to preserve the governorship. The resilience of this 
unity has led some politicians and journalists to assume that in this state there is only one 
faction known as the Atlacomulco’ Group, based on the fact that a number of governors 
were born or had relatives in this municipality (e.g., Cruz and Montiel 2009; Gil Olmos 
2012). Nevertheless, empirical evidence80 and more systematic scholarly works have 
demonstrated that in Estado de México there is not a monolithic group but diverse 
political factions competing for positions for their members, as happens in any other state 
(Hernández Rodríguez 1997, 1998, 1999; Morales Gómez 2006). 
But what distinguishes the Estado de México’s PRI groups from those of other 
states is the winning factions’ tendency to share the power with other factions as well as 
all factions’ inclination to cooperate with each other as a means to accomplish their 
political projects. For the Estado de México’s PRI factions, internal unity has an intrinsic 
and superior value that has allowed them to effectively counteract the powerful influence 
of the center during the authoritarian period as well as to successfully prevail over an 
increasingly competitive opposition in more recent times (Hernández Rodríguez 1997, 
1998, 1999). Some local politicians believed that the Estado de México’s proximity to 
Mexico City, where the headquarters of the encompassing PRI regime were established, 
forced them to unify as well as to fight for and obtain more autonomy vis-à-vis the center 
(Hernández Rodríguez 1998). Nonetheless, as I show with the case of Morelos, proximity 
to the center is not a factor that helps explain subnational unity. In fact, like Estado de 
                                                
80 Under the Atlacomulco’s Group theory, in 2011 the PRI should have nominated Del Mazo Maza not 
Avila Villegas, a politician coming from a poor family, with no ancestry in local politics, and born in the 
Estado de México’s valley, a region whose politicians have historically antagonized with those from the 
Toluca’s valley and especially those from Atlacomulco (Granados Chapa 2011a). In brief, the 2011 
nomination is a critical case that this theory failed to pass. 
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México, Morelos borders Mexico City, but its PRI factions exhibited a high level of 
subordination to the center in the autocratic era (see Chapter 4). 
 
Factional Collaboration in Coahuila: The 1999 Election 
In 1999 the local factions obtained full control of the gubernatorial nomination in 
Coahuila. The PRI candidate resulted from a competitive open primary that took place in 
the midst of intense pressures from the main opposition parties to create a split in the PRI 
in order to recruit the losing candidate as the nominee of a multi-party front including the 
PAN and PRD. Despite these challenging conditions, the PRI remained united and its 
candidate launched a campaign that enabled him to win the election by a two-to-one 
margin over the opposition’s nominee. As in Estado de México, cohesion among factions 
in Coahuila was based in the negotiation of positions in exchange for political support. 
What follows is the story of this election. 
Although the PRI’s electoral prospects in 1999 initially seemed promising,81 this 
party’s gubernatorial nomination for the 1999-2005 term took place under complex 
conditions. The election was expected to be particularly competitive due to four basic 
reasons. First, the electoral potential of the PAN, the main opposition party in Coahuila, 
had increased considerably in recent years. In the most recent election for state congress 
in 1996, the PRI defeated the PAN by only 10.2 percent of the vote (46.1 versus 35.9 
percent) (IEPCC 1996b). The margin between those parties in the municipal elections in 
the same year was even slimmer: 7.9 percentage points, which led the PRI to lose Saltillo, 
Torreón, and Monclova, the three largest municipalities of Coahuila (IEPCC 1996a). 
                                                
81 By February 2, 1999, the PRI had 65 percent of the voting intentions, while the approval rates of 
president Ernesto Zedillo and governor Montemayor Seguy were 74 and 78 percent, respectively (Pérez 
1999a). 
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Second, the PAN and the PRD along with minor parties PT and PVEM started 
negotiations to coalesce around a single candidate, diminishing the possibilities of the 
PRI to preserve the governorship. Third, the opposition coalition not only was expecting 
a split in the PRI but also tried to propitiate it by offering the candidacy to federal deputy 
Martínez y Martínez and former federal deputy and prosperous entrepreneur Jesús María 
Ramón Valdés, the main contenders for the PRI nomination (Sánchez 1998; González 
1999b; "Encuesta: Final de foto..."  1999). Fourth, the PRI’s CEN had decided that all 
nominees for gubernatorial elections in 1999 and 2000 were to be selected through open 
primaries (Dyer 2005, 156-162; Poiré Romero 2002, 107-139). The use of this method 
created major concerns among the PRI contenders about a possible intervention of 
Governor Montemayor Seguy in the process and the possibility that the losers would quit 
the party to join the opposition (Sánchez 1999d). 
The split, however, never happened. Four contenders registered for the PRI 
nomination: Martínez y Martínez; Ramón Valdés; Braulio Manuel Fernández Aguirre, a 
federal deputy and son of former Governor Fernández Aguirre; and Alejandro Gutiérrez 
Gutiérrez, a former president of the PRI’s CDE. The contenders and Governor 
Montemayor Seguy made a pact to preserve internal unity. Governor Montemayor Seguy 
agreed not to interfere in the primary, the contenders agreed to respect the results of the 
primary and endorse the resulting nominee, and all expressed their commitment to 
maintain constant communication with each other to solve any dispute that might emerge 
(Farías 1999b; Medina 1999b; Sánchez 1999a, 1999b; "Despreocupa alianza al PRI"  
1999). A few days before the primary, Gutiérrez Gutiérrez withdrew his pre-candidacy to 
endorse Martínez y Martínez and called the other competitors to keep the PRI united after 
the internal election (Medina 1999d). 
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The primary took place on March 21, 1999. The winner was Martínez y Martínez 
who obtained 53.76 percent of the vote, followed by Ramón Valdés with 32.93 percent, 
and Fernández Aguirre with 8.98 percent (González 1999a). Although he criticized the 
fairness of the election, Ramón Valdés accepted his defeat (Ramos 1999a). The PRD 
attempted to convince him to become the nominee of the opposition front (González 
1999b). Ramón Valdés, however, confirmed that he would remain in the PRI after having 
a meeting with Martínez y Martínez, Governor Montemayor Seguy, and state Secretary 
of Government Carlos Juaristi. Martínez y Martínez for his part announced he would 
support Ramón Valdés’ political career (Recio 1999c; Ramos 1999e). Ramón Valdés 
declined to participate in politics in the short run in order to focus on different industrial 
projects, but he started campaigning for Martínez y Martínez, while members of his 
factions expressed their support to Martínez y Martínez (Sánchez 1999c; Farías 1999a). 
Despite the fact that the PAN, PRD, PT, and PVEM could not nominate a PRI 
defector as they had hoped, they managed to forge a pact to compete against the PRI. 
They decided to select their candidate among their most popular and experienced 
politicians through a survey. The winner was the PAN candidate Juan Antonio García 
Villa, who obtained 54 percent of the voting intentions versus 23 percent for the PRD 
hopeful Ricardo Mejía (Pérez 1999b). García Villa had been a senator since 1997 and 
was a former three-time federal deputy (1979-1982, 1988-1991, and 1994-1997), and a 
former state legislator (1982-1985). Despite facing an experienced politician representing 
a united opposition front, Martínez y Martínez was confident of winning the election, 
arguing that the opposition coalition did not nominate the PRI defector it required to 
forge a compromise between the rightist PAN and leftist PRD as well as to attract a 
portion of the PRI vote that the coalition would need to defeat the PRI ("Asegura Enrique 
Martínez que alianzas no funcionan"  1999; Ramos 1999c). 
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Figure 3.4 shows that the primary helped boost voting intentions for the PRI, 
which increased from 55 percent on February 2 to 60 percent on March 25, four days 
after the primary. Then they oscillated around 60 percent during the general campaign, 
enabling the PRI nominee to win the election with a margin of 26.6 percentage points of 
the valid vote over the PAN-PRD-PT-PVEM candidate (61.3 versus 34.7 percent) on 
September 26. 
Figure 3.4. Vote Intentions in Coahuila, 1999. 
 
Source: Pérez 1999a; "Enrique o Jesús M. derrotarían al PAN"  1999; Presidencia de la 
República Mexicana 1999e, 1999a, 1999f, 1999d, 1999c, 1999b; "Encuesta: Aventaja el 
PRI en Coahuila"  1999; Mancillas and Pérez 1999; "Encuesta: Sigue PRI adelante"  
1999; Mancillas 1999; Ramos 1999d; IEPCC 1999. 
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Internal unity enabled the PRI candidate to conduct a campaign that attracted the 
support of most voters. He obtained a favorable/unfavorable differential that averaged 
+67 during the whole campaign (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1999f, 1999d, 
1999c, 1999b, 1999g). Moreover, by September 19 (seven days before the election), 55 
percent of voters on average considered him the best candidate on key attributes, such as 
closeness to people, honesty, trustworthiness, capacity, experience, and personality, 
among others (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1999g). His ratings on these 
indicators were six times larger than the ones of the PAN-PRD-PT-PVEM nominee, his 
closest competitor. 
In exchange for their support, the internal contenders of Martínez y Martínez were 
rewarded in his administration. Gutiérrez Gutiérrez became senator in 2000 and Ramón 
Valdés federal deputy in 2003. In addition, he integrated into his administration 
prestigious politicians linked to him as well as to other factions (González and Chacón 
1999; Medina 1999a, 1999c; Pérez 1999c; Ramos 1999b; Ramos and Medina 1999; 
Recio 1999a, 1999b). 
In sum, once local factions obtained full control of the nomination process in 
1999, they opted to cooperate with each other to advance their political interests, which 
enabled the PRI to preserve internal unity and win the election despite facing a strong 
multi-party coalition. At the core of the factions’ mutual collaboration were the 
negotiations on distribution of political positions among them. 
 
Continued Collaborative Factionalism: The 2005 and 2011 Elections 
The pattern of inter-factional cooperation based on the distribution of political 
positions, which enabled the PRI to maintain internal unity in Coahuila in 1999, was 
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reproduced in the next two elections with identical results: the preservation of the 
governorship for this party. As this subsection discusses, the 2005 and 2011 nominations 
occurred under conditions of internal unity, making it possible for the PRI not only to win 
the elections but also to do so by broad margins. 
The election for the 2005-2011 term appeared to be promising for the PRI. The 
voting intentions for this party were above 60 percent since June 2003 (Beltrán 2004). In 
early 2004, Governor Martínez y Martínez and most contenders for the candidacy agreed 
that the PRI nominee would be selected through an open primary (García, Chacón, and 
Pérez 2004). As a result, seven politicians expressed their intentions to compete for the 
nomination: Miguel Arizpe Jiménez, the president of the PRI’s CDE; Javier Guerrero 
García, the state Secretary of Finance, a former two-time federal deputy, and a former 
mayor of San Pedro de las Colonias; Alejandro Gutiérrez y Gutiérrez, a senator and a 
former contender for the PRI gubernatorial nomination; Humberto Moreira Valdés, the 
mayor of Saltillo and former state Secretary of Education; Jesús María Ramón Valdés, a 
federal deputy and a former contender for the PRI gubernatorial nomination; Heriberto 
Ramos Salas, a former mayor of Torreón; and Raúl Sifuentes Guerrero, the state 
Secretary of Government. 
Although all started campaigning right after they agreed on the primary, from the 
beginning Moreira Valdés appeared to be the strongest competitor. A survey conducted 
in November 2004 indicated that the mayor of Saltillo had 31 percent of the voting 
intentions for the primary, followed by Ramón Valdés with 16 percent, Sifuentes 
Guerrero, six percent; Gutiérrez Gutiérrez, four percent; Guerrero García, three percent, 
Arizpe Jiménez, two percent, and there were no mentions for Ramos Salas ("Encuesta: 
Domina Moreira en el PRI; vive el PAN cerrada pelea"  2004). These results were 
 149 
consistent with another poll conducted for the PAN, which anticipated that Moreira 
Valdés would win the primary (Liñán 2004; Sánchez 2004). 
Three of the competitors, however, did not participate in the primary. Arizpe 
Jiménez decided to stay as president of the PRI’s CDE, whereas Sifuentes Guerrero did 
not fulfill the PRI requirement of having held a previous elective office, so he endorsed 
Gutiérrez y Gutiérrez instead (Medina and Pérez 2005). Ramon Valdés withdrew his pre-
candidacy, questioning the fairness of the process. Then, he returned to the PRI after a 
brief attempt to join to the local party, Democratic Unity of Coahuila (UDC) (Chacón 
2005; Cárdenas 2005c, 2005d). 
The primary took place on place on July 17. The winner was Moreira Valdés who 
obtained 61 percent of the vote, followed by Guerrero García with 20 percent, Gutiérrez y 
Gutiérrez, 14 percent, and Ramos Salas, one percent (Pérez 2005a). The three 
competitors accepted the results and endorsed Moreira Valdés. Arizpe Jiménez, Ramón 
Valdés, and Sifuentes Guerrero, the other three prospects who did not participate in the 
primary, also endorsed his nomination (Cardona 2005). Therefore, the PRI nominee faced 
the general election in conditions of intra-party unity. 
The main contender of Moreira Valdés in the general election was Jorge Zermeño 
Infante, a senator, a former federal deputy, and a former mayor of Torreón, who was 
nominated by the PAN and the UDC. Figure 3.5 shows that after the primary and during 
the whole general campaign Moreira Valdés had a significant advantage in the voting 
intentions, which allowed him to win the election by a vote margin of almost 20 




Figure 3.5. Vote Intentions in Coahuila, 2003-2005. 
 
Source: Beltrán 2004; "Encuesta: Lidera PRI Preferencias, aunque baja"  2004; 
"Encuesta: Arrasaría el PRI en Coahuila"  2005; "Encuesta: Aventaja Moreira en 
Coahuila"  2005; Cárdenas 2005a, 2005b; IEPCC 2005. 
 
The cohesion among the PRI factions enabled Moreira Valdés to conduct an 
effective campaign that led him to win. Through his campaign, the PRI nominee 
conveyed a more appealing message to voters than his competitors. Thirteen days before 
the election he outnumbered the PAN-PUDC candidate, his closest contender, by 20 
percentage points on average in terms of favorable attributes, such as capacity to provide 
economic growth to the state, work constructively with the state congress, and integrate a 
competent cabinet (Cárdenas 2005b). 
Moreira Valdés rewarded most of his internal competitors with government posts. 
In 2006, Guerrero García and Gutiérrez Gutiérrez became federal deputies, while Ramón 
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Valdés obtained a senatorial seat. With Governor Moreira Valdés’ support, in 2009 the 
state congress appointed Arizpe Jiménez as president of the Coahuila State Human Rights 
Commission for a five-year term (Ruiz 2009). Although he declined the PRI nomination 
for a federal deputy position in 2006, Ramos Salas continued his political career in the 
PRI’s CEN (Pérez 2006; Valdez 2010). Moreover, Moreira Valdés granted positions for 
politicians belonging to different factions, such as Héctor Fernández Aguirre, a son of 
former governor Braulio Fernández Aguirre, who first became state Secretary of 
Agriculture and then federal deputy (Pérez 2005b). 
From the beginning of his administration, Moreira Valdés started paving the road 
for his brother Rubén Moreira Valdés to become the PRI nominee for the 2011-2017 
term. In addition to having coordinated his brother’s gubernatorial campaign in 2005, 
Rubén Moreira had a long career in Coahuila’s politics. He was a former private 
secretary of the state Secretary of Government (1991-1993), a former Technical Secretary 
of the state electoral agency (1990-1995), a former Director of Legal Affairs of the state 
Secretary of Public Education (1995-1999), a former Secretary of the municipality of 
Saltillo (2000-2002), and a former Undersecretary of Planning in the state Secretary of 
Public Education (2003-2005). 
Although at the beginning of his brother’s administration Rubén Moreira became 
undersecretary of government and political development in the state secretary of 
government, he was the de facto head of the secretary (Pérez, Liñán, and Cardona 2007). 
From this position and with his brother’s support, Rubén Moreira negotiated with most 
local PRI groups his undisputed election as president of the PRI’s CDE on June 9, 2007 
(Pérez 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Cárdenas and Pérez 2007; Ramírez 2007). Also with his 
brother’s support and as president of the PRI’s CDE, Rubén Moreira was able to settle 
agreements with the main factions on the distribution of the PRI nominations for the 
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elections of municipal authorities, state legislators, and federal deputies corresponding to 
Coahuila that took place in 2008 and 2009. As a product of these arrangements, the PRI 
presented unity nominees for all positions (Cárdenas 2008, 2009; Granados Chapa 2008; 
"Van rumbo a San Lázaro"  2009). 
Internal unity allowed the PRI to win the three elections by broad margins of vote. 
In 2008, it not only obtained victories in all twenty districts for the state congress but also 
outnumbered by 3.4 times the vote for the PAN (63.4 versus 18.4 percent), its closest 
competitor (IEPCC 2008). In 2009, the PRI won 33 out of 38 municipalities, including 
the most populated ones, such as Saltillo, Matamoros, Monclova, Piedras Negras, and 
Torreón. It received 2.4 times more votes than the runner-up PAN in this election (59.9 
versus 24.8 percent) (IEPCC 2009). The same year, the PRI won the seven federal 
deputies corresponding to Coahuila by a three-to-one margin over the PAN (63.5 versus 
21.3 percent), its main opposition (IFE 2009). In this election, the PRI’s vote share in 
Coahuila was 24.9 percentage points larger than in the whole country (63.5 versus 38.9 
percent). Moreover, in this election Rubén Moreira became federal deputy from the 
district of Saltillo, winning the election by a six-to-one margin over the PAN candidate 
(76.2 versus 12.9 percent). Indeed, he was the PRI nominee who obtained the most votes 
as well as the largest vote differential vis-à-vis his closest competitor in the seven 
districts of Coahuila (IFE 2009). 
With his brother’s support, the political capital he accumulated due to the 
electoral results, and his dual political platform as president of the PRI’s CDE and federal 
deputy, Rubén Moreira started negotiating with different factions as well as gaining 
popularity in preparation for his gubernatorial nomination for the 2011-2017 term 
(Cárdenas 2010). A survey conducted in September 2010, two months before the PRI 
nomination process, reported that 81.5 percent of the population considered that Rubén 
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Moreira should be allowed to compete for the governorship despite the fact that his 
brother was the sitting governor (Mitofsky 2010). Furthermore, 83.9 percent wanted 
Rubén Moreira to be the PRI nominee, 80.6 percent affirmed that they would vote for 
him, and 54 percent declared that they would be more inclined to vote for the PRI if the 
nominee were Rubén Moreira. To make things even more favorable for Rubén Moreira, 
Humberto Moreira left the governorship to become president of the PRI’s CEN, with the 
support of the PRI’s leading figure Enrique Peña Nieto (Cárdenas, Guerrero, and 
Hernández 2011; Granados Chapa 2011b). From this position, Humberto Moreira 
provided even more political support to his brother (Granados Chapa 2011b; "Tiene 
Moreira junta secreta con estructura"  2011). 
In this context, Rubén Moreira became the PRI unity nominee on January 6, 2011. 
Later that month his nomination was also endorsed by the minor parties PVEM, PANAL, 
Social Democratic Party, and Coahuila First.82 Figure 3.6 shows that right after his 
nomination, the voting intentions for Rubén Moreira had a temporary boost to 74 percent 
(April 11). Then they oscillated around 60 percent before and during the general 
campaign. On July 3 he won the election with 61.5 percent of the vote, 25.5 percentage 
points more than Guillermo Anaya Llamas,83 a senator and the candidate of the PAN-
UDC coalition, who obtained 36 percent. Like previous governors, Rubén Moreira 
granted positions to different PRI factions that supported him in his campaign to become 
governor (Cárdenas 2011b; "Congreso de Coahuila confirma a nuevo gabinete"  2011). 
  
                                                
82 Primero Coahuila. 
83 Before becoming senator in 2006, Anaya Llamas was head of the PAN state legislators (1997-1999), 
federal deputy (2000-2002), and mayor of Torreón (2003-2005). 
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Figure 3.6. Vote Intentions in Coahuila, 2010-2011. 
 
Source: Mitofsky 2010; González 2011b; "Más de 70% con el PRI y Moreira en 
Coahuila"  2011; "El 68.2% con Rubén Moreira en Coahuila: Encuesta del GCE"  2011; 
Avalan Gestión de Humberto Moreira  2011; "El 66.2% prefiere a Moreira; y con Anaya 
el 30.3%"  2011; PRI Retendría Gobierno  2011; IEPCC 2011. 
 
The large margin of vote that the PRI candidate obtained over his closest 
contender was based on the more appealing campaign he was able to forge under 
conditions of party unity. A survey conducted seven days before the election reported that 
his favorable/unfavorable differential among voters was +13 larger than the PAN-UDC 
nominee’s, his closest competitor (PRI Retendría Gobierno  2011). The same poll 




COLLABORATIVE FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL SCANDALS 
This section analyzes the responses of the factions of Estado de México and 
Coahuila to scandals affecting high-ranking politicians during the democratic era (from 
1995 onwards). It demonstrates that the collaborative factionalism that emerged in these 
states extended to the protection of leading politicians facing major controversies. It 
examines scandals involving former governors Arturo Montiel Rojas in Estado de 
México in 2005 and Humberto Moreira Valdés in Coahuila in 2011. In both cases the 
local factions opted to protect these politicians by quickly covering the scandals despite 
having to pay the resulting political costs. 
 
The Montielazo:84 Protecting a Former Governor at All Cost 
Chapter 1 argued that collaboration among factions that were previously more 
autonomous from the center may hold up even under adverse circumstances. This claim 
is supported by developments in the Estado de México. During the first months of 
Enrique Peña Nieto’s term, the PRI local factions faced a major scandal involving former 
governor and Peña Nieto’s main sponsor, Arturo Montiel Rojas. Instead of attacking or 
abandoning Montiel Rojas, as happened in similar cases in Morelos and Nuevo León (see 
Chapter 4), the local factions opted to protect Montiel Rojas. By doing so, they 
demonstrated that party unity in more cohesive states includes inter-factional cooperation 
not only to win elections but also to provide protection to their members against external 
attacks. 
After he successfully supported Peña Nieto to become his successor (see above), 
Montiel Rojas began in 2005 to promote himself to be the PRI presidential candidate for 
                                                
84 “Montielgate.” 
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the 2006 elections. Along with Enrique Martínez y Martínez, the Governor of Coahuila; 
Manuel Angel Núñez Soto, former Governor of Hidalgo; Tomás Yarrington Ruvalcaba, 
former Governor of Tamaulipas; Enrique Jackson Ramírez, the PRI leader in the senate; 
Miguel Alemán Velasco, former Governor of Veracruz; and Genaro Borrego Estrada, 
former President of the PRI’s CEN, among other high-ranking PRI politicians, Montiel 
Rojas integrated Unidad Democrática,85 a political front informally known as TUCOM 
(Todos Unidos Contra Madrazo),86 which was devoted to blocking the PRI’s CEN leader 
Roberto Madrazo Pintado from gaining the PRI presidential nomination (Torres 2005). 
The TUCOM members decided to select among themselves a sole contender to compete 
against Madrazo Pintado through a combination of open surveys and opinion polls among 
PRI leading politicians (Meraz 2011, 159-162). The contenders to become TUCOM’s 
candidate were Jackson Ramírez, Martínez y Martínez, Núñez Soto, Yarrington 
Ruvalcaba, and Montiel Rojas. Montiel Rojas was declared the winner of the TUCOM’s 
competition on August 4, 2005 (Hernández and Guerrero 2005). 
Right after leaving office, on September 16, 2005 Montiel Rojas started his 
campaign for the PRI presidential nomination, which would be decided through an open 
primary on November 13 (Meraz 2011, 162). Montiel Rojas was becoming a serious 
threat to Madrazo Pintado, because between September and October the voting intentions 
in the primary among the PRI members for Montiel Rojas increased from 44 to 48 
percent, while those for Madrazo Pintado decreased from 45 to 38 percent. On October 
10, however, press leaks revealed numerous transactions related to the Montiel Rojas’ 
family fortune for several millions of dollars.87 The transactions significantly exceeded 
                                                
85 Democratic Unity. 
86 All United Against Madrazo. 
87 The transactions mainly involved Montiel Rojas, his sons Juan Pablo and Arturo Montiel Yáñez, his 
former wife Paula Yáñez Villegas, and his wife Maude Versini. 
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the income that he and his family could have legally obtained during his gubernatorial 
term ("Encuesta: Cuestionan priístas honestidad de Montiel"  2005; "Balconean cuentas 
de Montiel; Fox niega que se le investigue"  2005; Ibarra 2005a, 2005b; Scherer Ibarra 
2009, 46-48; "Imponen los Montiel su sello a 5 empresas"  2005; Villamil 2009, 165-171; 
Granados Chapa 2005a). The leaks caused a major scandal, which propitiated an 
immediate decline in Montiel Rojas’ prospects of obtaining the PRI nomination and led 
him to quit the race just a few days later (Cortés and Aponte 2005; "El derrumbe de un 
proyecto"  2005; Meraz 2011, 214-216). 
In the wake of this scandal, the PRD initiated legal actions under charges of 
embezzlement, illicit enrichment, and corruption, among others, against Montiel Rojas 
with the State Congress, state Secretary of the Controller, and state Attorney General 
office. In line with governor Peña Nieto’s policy of exonerating Montiel Rojas (Gómez 
and Pérez 2006; Ortiz and Ibarra 2005; Granados Chapa 2005b), however, the three 
public entities quickly dismissed the actions without any further investigation. A few 
days after the scandal, state congressional agency Supreme Audit of Estado de México 
(OSFEM)88 refused to conduct any investigation of Montiel Rojas’ administration 
(Martínez and Saúl 2005). The resolution was controversial not only because the OSFEM 
was entitled to audit the state’s public finances in cases such as this but also because the 
opposition controlled the state congress (Scherer Ibarra 2009, 57-59).89 Moreover, the 
new legislature that took over in 2006 also declined to examine the Montiel Rojas 
administration despite being controlled by the opposition as well.90 
                                                
88 Organo Superior de Fiscalización del Estado de México. 
89 Whereas there were just PRI 24 legislators in the LV state legislature (2003-2006), the opposition had 
51: PAN 23, PRD 19, PVEM 4, PT 3, and Convergencia 2 (Estado de México 2003). 
90 The composition of the LVI state legislature (2006-2009) was as follows: PRI: 21 legislators, PAN 20, 
PRD 20, PVEM 7, PT 4, and Convergencia 3 (Estado de México 2006). 
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Similarly, in December 2005, state Secretary of the Controller Eduardo Segovia, 
who had served on that position under Montiel Rojas and then was ratified by Peña Nieto, 
issued a resolution dismissing all charges against Montiel Rojas. Without including any 
supporting document or detail on any transaction in the Montiel Rojas administration, the 
resolution only indicated that Montiel Rojas’ income and the fortune he cumulated during 
his term were “consistent” (Gómez 2005b). Furthermore, governor Peña Nieto publically 
validated the resolution and announced that he would not talk about the Montielazo 
anymore (Montaño 2005). Also, state Attorney General Navarrete Prida, another high-
ranking official who Peña Nieto inherited from Montiel Rojas, dismissed all charges 
against his former boss and conducted no investigation against him, arguing that the 
plaintiff (a PRD politician) presented no proof to support his claim (Scherer Ibarra 2009, 
48-50). The argument was controversial, because investigating and collecting evidence is 
the duty of the Attorney General’s office not of the plaintiffs (Scherer Ibarra 2009, 50-
56). As a result, public pressure did not recede and led Peña Nieto to create a special 
public prosecutor office at the attorney general’s office to investigate the Montielazo on 
February 23, 2006 (Gómez 2006). Nevertheless, a few months later the special prosecutor 
dismissed all charges against Montiel Rojas, his family, and all other persons involved in 
the Montielazo (Gómez and Ortiz 2006). 
In sum, the Montielgate ended up being a case of “ominous impunity,” according 
to a legal specialist who examined the Montielazo (Scherer Ibarra 2009, 64-65). Although 
there were political costs involved, the exoneration of Montiel Rojas enabled Peña Nieto 
to preserve the cohesion of the PRI factions in Estado de México, which has been 
historically based on mutual loyalty, reciprocity, and protection.91 
                                                
91 Confidential interview. 
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The Moreirazo:92 The Story of a Covered Scandal 
A major scandal involving the Humberto Moreira Valdés administration emerged 
in August 2011, right after the election of his brother Rubén Moreira Valdés (see above). 
In the Humberto Moreira administration, Coahuila’s debt increased 9,800 percent, rising 
from 323 million pesos (around 23.2 million dollars) in 2005 to 32 billion pesos (around 
2.46 billion dollars) in 2011 ("Chairman of Mexico's PRI party resigns amid scandal"  
2011). Coahuila’s government used false information to acquire most of the loans and the 
true amount of the debt was deliberately kept hidden from the public and other authorities 
involved in the borrowing, such as the state congress. There were also strong suspicions 
of corruption involved in the loans (Cárdenas 2011c, 2011a). The scandal, popularly 
known as the Moreirazo, escalated in subsequent months, leading Humberto Moreira to 
quit the presidency of the PRI’s CEN on December 2, after PRI presidential nominee 
Enrique Peña Nieto asked him for his resignation in order to face the accusations related 
to the Moreirazo (Estrop and Guerrero 2011). 
The debt represented an important burden for Coahuila’s finances. To start paying 
down the debt, the state government fired more than two thousand bureaucrats, reduced 
the salaries and benefits of most public employees, and cut significantly the budget for 
public works and services as well as for social programs (Cárdenas 2012d, 2012h, 
2012c). The Moreirazo motivated diverse protests and demonstrations from bureaucrats, 
businessmen, and opposition parties (Cárdenas 2012h; Sánchez 2012; Cárdenas 2012j). 
Furthermore, because the scandal occurred in the middle of the 2012 presidential 
campaign, it attracted the attention of the main presidential nominees, including PRI 
                                                
92 “Moreiragate.” 
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candidate Enrique Peña Nieto, who demanded an official inquiry of the case and 
punishment for the lawbreakers ("Pide Peña castigar 'moreirazo'"  2012). PRD-PT-MC 
nominee Andrés Manuel López Obrador announced that he would ensure that justice 
were done if he were elected (Cárdenas 2012i), while PAN candidate Josefina Vázquez 
Mota went even further by promising to imprison Humberto Moreira after declaring that 
the Moreirazo was a clear example of the corruption that the PRI represented (Arteta 
2012). 
Despite the political and economic costs associated with the Moreirazo, however, 
the local factions opted to quickly close the case and protect Humberto Moreira, as 
happened in Estado de México with former governor Montiel Rojas. When taking office, 
incoming governor Rubén Moreira announced an austerity plan to deal with the debt that 
did not include prosecuting any public official linked to the Moreirazo (Cárdenas 2011b). 
Moreover, PRI officials deliberately managed to avoid any formal investigation of 
Humberto Moreira. Instead, the investigation focused on the head of Coahuila’s Revenue 
Service,93 Javier Villarreal Hernández, the main person responsible for contracting the 
loans, and a few of Villarreal Hernández’s collaborators (Salazar 2012). 
Villarreal Hernández was initially imprisoned under the charges of fraud and 
falsifying documents, but he was released on bail only a few hours later ("Chairman of 
Mexico's PRI party resigns amid scandal"  2011; Estrop and Guerrero 2011). During the 
investigation it was documented that Villarreal Hernández’s family invested more than 
75 million pesos (around six million dollars) in United States during the period that 
Villarreal Hernández worked for Coahuila’s government. The transactions significantly 
exceeded the fortune that Villarreal Hernández and his family could have legally earned 
                                                
93 Servicio de Administración Tributaria. 
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in that period (Salazar 2012; Hernández 2011; "Inician 'éxito' con modesto restaurante"  
2011). Nevertheless, the only sanction that the state government applied to him and one 
of his closest collaborators was a legal prohibition on working for Coahuila’s government 
for ten years (Cárdenas 2012b, 2012g). In addition, the state government hid information 
related to the debt from the public. The partial information available through Internet 
about the loans was quickly removed from the web (Cárdenas 2012e). Moreover, the 
state congressional agency Supreme Audit of Coahuila classified all information related 
to the Moreirazo until 2019 and has fought all attempts from the press to disclose it 
(Cárdenas 2011d, 2012f). As the scandal receded, Humberto Moreira reappeared publicly 
to declare that he might return to politics by competing for the PRI nomination for the 
mayorship of Saltillo in the next election (Cárdenas 2012a). 
In sum, as the Moreirazo illustrates, the collaborative factionalism that emerged 
in Coahuila after the authoritarian period extended to providing protection to their 
members in the presence of major scandals. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The PRI factions of Estado de México and Coahuila preserved relatively high 
levels of autonomy vis-à-vis the center to influence local politics in the authoritarian 
period. Although the final decisions regarding gubernatorial nominations came from 
Mexico City during this era, they were conditioned by the local factions’ strength. As a 
result, most gubernatorial nominees needed the approval of local factions rather than just 
responding to the center’s will. The constant interaction of local factions during this 
period created lasting cooperation among them. Consequently, when the center’s capacity 
to enforce party unity waned due to the democratization process, these factions remained 
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united by reproducing the collaborative and inclusionary practices they had started 
cultivating during the autocratic era. 
The relationship between the autonomy of local factions vis-à-vis the center in the 
authoritarian period and their tendency to cooperate after the transition to democracy is 
clearly observed in both cases. The collaborative path they have followed in the 
democratic era is in line with the expectations derived from prevailing theories of 
cooperation, which have consistently shown that collaboration among multiple 
participants is self-reinforcing once it has been established (see, for example, Axelrod 
1984, 1997b, 2000, 2012; Bicchieri 1997; Caporael et al. 1989; Cheeseman and Tendi 
2010; Ostrom 1990; Stern et al. 2002). 
Given their cooperative history, the PRI factions of Estado de México and 
Coahuila responded with continued collaboration and inclusion once the center fully 
empowered them to decide the gubernatorial nominations beginning in the late 1990s. 
Despite facing primaries entailing risks of internal division (Poiré Romero 2002) and 
persistent attempts by the opposition to create splits in the PRI, the factions have 
remained united and have continued cooperating with each other. Instead of confronting 
and excluding the losing groups, the winning factions shared the spoils of the government 
with them. The resulting internal unity has enabled the PRI to keep winning the 
governorships of those states even in a more challenging context. 
In addition, cooperation among factions in both states has extended to the point of 
protecting their leaders even in cases of major scandals which incurred high political 
costs, as happened with the Montielazo in 2005 and the Moreirazo in 2011. Not 
surprisingly, Estado de México, which was the more autonomous case in authoritarian 
era, is also the one that shows more collaboration among factions since the transition to 
democracy. The rationale of cooperation and inclusion is so deeply embedded in its local 
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factions that they have attached an intrinsic value to it and it has even become a source of 





Chapter 4: Antagonistic Factionalism in Morelos and Nuevo León 
Chapter 3 points out that although democratization accounts for the increase in the 
difficulties facing the PRI at the subnational level, it does not explain why intra-party 
conflicts have occurred in some states but not in others. Whereas Chapter 3 explains why 
the PRI factions are more likely to collaborate with each other and remain united in 
certain cases, this chapter examines why the PRI’s groups are more prone to fight in 
some states than in others. This chapter shows that in states where the factions were more 
subordinated to the center’s decisions during the authoritarian era, widespread intra-party 
conflicts emerged once the center ceased to enforce internal unity under democratic 
conditions. Given their subordinated condition, the factions in these cases barely 
interacted with each other during authoritarian times. They opted to negotiate with and 
wait for orders from the center instead. When the center ceased to enforce party unity and 
these groups obtained more leeway to act, they had no experience with cooperation. They 
therefore chose to confront each other to obtain short-term benefits (Axelrod 1984). 
These conflicts led the PRI to lose the gubernatorial elections in these cases. 
Following the theoretical argument advanced in this dissertation, this chapter 
depicts Morelos and Nuevo León as cases of antagonistic factionalism. According to the 
argument presented in Chapter 1, we should observe three main implications in these 
states. First, during the authoritarian period, the factions of these states should have been 
less autonomous from the center than the ones of Estado de México, Coahuila, and 
Michoacán (see Chapters 2 and 3), and these groups should have had a limited or no 
political interaction at all. Second, in the subsequent democratic era, these factions should 
have engaged in intra-party disputes, leading the PRI to lose the corresponding elections. 
Third, also in the incoming democratic phase, the antagonism of these factions should 
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have extended to defect from and even attack high-ranking politicians facing political 
scandals. 
The organization of the chapter follows these theoretical implications. First, it 
assesses quantitatively the level of subordination of local factions vis-à-vis the center in 
the nomination of the PRI candidates for gubernatorial elections in Morelos and Nuevo 
León in the authoritarian period (1929-1994), using indicators based on the political 
background of the nominees. Second, to complement this analysis, I use historical 
evidence to evaluate qualitatively the correlation of forces between the local factions and 
the center in these nominations. I give particular attention to the elections of 1994 in 
Morelos and 1991 in Nuevo León as the last ones that occurred under the autocratic era. 
Then, I demonstrate that factional subordination during the authoritarian period in 
Morelos and Nuevo León produced antagonistic factionalism, conducing to party 
divisions, in the democratic era (from 1995 onward). The resulting internal conflicts led 
the PRI to lose the governorships of these states. I employ historical data to explore the 
Morelos 2000 and Nuevo León 1997 elections as the first ones that took place in the new 
democratic context. In Morelos, factions were fully empowered to decide the 
gubernatorial nomination through an open primary. They reacted by excluding and 
confronting each other, which cost the party the important advantage it had at the polls 
and ultimately the election. In Nuevo León, the center’s attempt to impose a nominee 
provoked an adverse reaction from the traditionally submissive factions, whose margin of 
maneuver was considerably expanded due to the emergent democratic conditions. As in 
Morelos, the resulting antagonistic factionalism prevented the PRI from retaining the 
governorship. 
Finally, I show that the level of antagonism among the factions in Morelos and 
Nuevo León included their defection from and even attack against high-ranking 
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politicians facing political scandals, such as the ones affecting governors Jorge Carillo 
Olea in Morelos in 1998 and Sócrates Rizzo García in Nuevo León in 1996. 
 
FACTIONAL SUBORDINATION UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM: MORELOS AND NUEVO 
LEÓN 
This section demonstrates that PRI factions in Morelos and Nuevo León were 
more subordinated to the center than those in Estado de México, Coahuila, and 
Michoacán during the authoritarian period. As I show below, their subordination 
prevented these factions from interacting politically to advance their projects. Instead, 
they pursue their political interests by individually negotiating benefits with the center in 
exchange for their obedience to the center’s decisions. 
 
Political Background of PRI Governors in Morelos, 1929-1994 
In the authoritarian period the factions of Morelos were primarily subordinated to 
the center with regard to nominations for governor, the most important position at the 
subnational level. Morelos had 13 governors who spent at least six months in office 
during the autocratic era (1929-1994). Morelos’ governors were just as likely to have 
experience in national posts as local posts with 61.5 percent of the governors (eight 
politicians) in each category, while 46.2 percent of them (six) held seats in the federal 
congress before ruling the state. Table 4.1 shows that three of them (23.1 percent) had 
national experience but not local or federal legislative experience, whereas five of them 
(38.5 percent) had national and/or federal legislative experience but no experience in 
local politics.  
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Table 4.1. Political Background of Governors of Morelos, 1929-1994. 







1 Vicente Estrada Cajigal 1930-1934 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
2 José Refugio Bustamente 1934-1938 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
3 Elpidio Perdomo García 1938-1942 Constitutional 1 1 1 
4 Jesús Castillo López 1942-1946 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
5 Ernesto Escobar Muñoz 1946-1952 Constitutional 
  
1 
6 Rodolfo López de Nava 1952-1958 Constitutional 1 
 
1 
7 Norberto López Avelar 1958-1964 Constitutional 1 1 
 8 Emilio Riva Palacio Morales 1964-1970 Constitutional 1 
  9 Felipe Rivera Crespo 1970-1976 Constitutional 
  
1 
10 Armando León Bejarano 1976-1982 Constitutional 1 
  11 Lauro Ortega Martínez 1982-1988 Constitutional 1 1 
 12 Antonio Riva Palacio López 1988-1994 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
13 Jorge Carrillo Olea 1994-1998 Constitutional 1     
TOTAL     8 6 8 
%     61.5 46.2 61.5 
Source: Camp 1991, 2011a; López González 2002b. 
Note: The table includes only governors who spent at least six months in office. 
 
Let us recall state factions tend to be more subordinated to the center where 
governors lack experience in local politics. Given that Morelos is coded as a subordinated 
state, we should expect that it should have a higher percentage of governors with 
exclusively national and/or federal legislative experience than the autonomous states 
presented in this dissertation: Estado de México, Coahuila, and Michoacán. Conversely, 
we should expect that it should have a lower percentage of governors with local 
experience than the autonomous states. The results conform to the expectations. The 
percentage of governors with only national background is higher in Morelos (23.1 
percent) than in Estado de México (11.8 percent), Coahuila (6.7 percent), and Michoacán 
(15.8 percent). Similarly, the percentage of governors with national and/or legislative 
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background but no experience in local politics is higher in Morelos (38.5 percent) than in 
Estado de México (17.6 percent), Coahuila (26.7 percent), and Michoacán (26.3 percent). 
Also as expected, the percentage of governors whose antecedents included state level 
positions is lower in Morelos (61.5 percent) than in Estado de México (82.4 percent), 
Coahuila (73.3 percent), and Michoacán (73.7 percent). The differences in all these 
indicators are statistically significant (see Chapter 2). In brief, these results indicate that 
the PRI factions in Morelos during the autocratic period were more subordinated to or 
less autonomous from center than the factions of the other three cases. 
The following pages will examine the historical variation in the correlation of 
forces between state factions and the center in the struggle to define the governors of 
Morelos during the authoritarian era. The analysis starts by describing the inception of 
the PRI local factions and their initial autonomy from the center. Between 1930 and 
1958, local factions had relative high levels of autonomy to decide on gubernatorial 
nominations, but as we shall see this autonomy did not last. 
 
Revolution and Antecedents of the PRI Factions in Morelos 
The balance of power between the center and local factions varied across time 
during the authoritarian era. This variation is mainly explained by the occurrence of 
events that gave more leverage to one side at the expense of the other. As happened in 
Estado de México and Coahuila (see Chapter 3), factions in Morelos emerged under 
conditions of relative autonomy to control the governorship for 28 years since 1930. This 
subsection summarizes the historical conditions under which this initial stage took place. 
After the national revolution ended and once Mexico started to pacify and 
stabilize politically in the 1920s, Morelos was the last state to reestablish its 
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constitutional order, that is, to call for elections for governor and state legislature and to 
create its constitution. The constitutional order had been broken in 1913 as a result of 
general Victoriano Huerta’s coup d’état. Huerta imposed general Juvencio Robles as 
Morelos’ governor and military commander after putting in jail all the members of the 
state legislature as well as interim governor Benito Tajonar (López González 2002a). 
Morelos had been ruled by numerous military chiefs, provisional governors appointed by 
the Senate, and even de facto governors for 17 years until provisional governor Ambrosio 
Puente finally called for constitutional elections for governor and state legislature in 
1930. The winner of the governorship was colonel Vicente Estrada Cajigal, candidate of 
the Partido Socialista Revolucionario de Morelos,94 the state chapter of the PNR.95 
From 1930 to 1952, governors were not externally imposed, but rather came to 
office through their local ties. The rise of Estrada Cajigal, who was born in Cuernavaca, 
the Morelos’ capital, and was one of the founders of the PNR (López González 2002b, 4-
6), opened an era where factions with local roots and linked to the revolutionary ideology 
defined the state’s main political authorities. Moreover, the selection of four of the five 
elected governors after Estrada Cajigal is mainly explained as a natural upward step in 
their local careers without any significant influence from the political center. This was the 
case with José Refugio Bustamante Aragón who was the former mayor of Cuautla, the 
Morelos’ second most important city, where he was born, a member of the Morelos 
Constituent legislature in 1930, and served as a federal deputy before becoming 
gubernatorial candidate for the 1934-1938 term. These were also the cases with colonel 
Elpidio Perdomo García, from Tlaquiltenango, Morelos, who started his military career 
                                                
94 Socialist Revolutionary Party of Morelos. 
95 The National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR) was the first PRI’s previous 
name, from 1929 to 1938. 
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as a Zapatista revolutionary and was elected alternate senator before competing for the 
governorship for the 1938-1942 term; Jesús Castillo López, from Cuernavaca, the 
Morelos’ capital, who was general secretary of government in Perdomo García’s 
administration and senator before becoming governor for the 1942-1946 term; and 
Ernesto Escobar Muñoz, from Cuernavaca, who was state legislator and general secretary 
of government under Castillo López before winning the governorship for the 1946-1952 
term96 (López González 2002b, 9-34). 
In addition, three of these governors (Perdomo García, Castillo López, and 
Escobar Muñoz) belonged to the Frente Zapatista, the main local faction at the time. And 
four of them were clearly linked to Emiliano Zapata, the main revolutionary figure of 
Morelos: Perdomo García, Castillo López, and Escobar Muñoz belonged to the same 
Zapatista group, while general Rodolfo López de Nava (term: 1952-1958), like Perdomo 
García, was a prominent member of the Zapatista army. 
In brief, from 1930 to 1958 state factions prevailed in Morelos’ politics. They 
were able to effectively promote local politicians mainly identified with Zapatismo to the 
governorship. Nevertheless, 1958 marked the start of a new and long era of subordination 
that produced lasting legacies that have even shaped the behavior of local factions in 
contemporary times. 
 
From Autonomy to Subordination: The 1958 Controversial Nomination 
During the authoritarian age, deliberate incursions from the center had the 
potential to decrease the factions’ margin of maneuver in subnational politics. 
                                                
96 During his term (1940-1946), President Manuel Avila Camacho enacted a constitutional amendment that 
extended the governors’ term from four to six years. In Morelos, Escobar Muñoz was the first governor 
elected for six years. 
 171 
Nevertheless, the factions’ response capacity influenced the extension and durability of 
the center’s advances. As a result, strong factions could undermine the impact of those 
interventions by subsuming them into new inter-factional arrangements (e.g., Estado de 
México in 1942), pressuring the center to nominate local candidates (e.g., Coahuila in 
1957), negotiating the distribution of positions and more decision-making capacity (e.g., 
Coahuila in 1993), and forcing the center to restore their preexisting autonomy through 
electoral boycotts (e.g., Estado de México in 1988).97 
By contrast, when factions failed to counter the center’s incursions, they tended to 
engage in lasting patterns of subordination to the center. Subordinated factions were 
characterized not only by their lack of interaction (i.e., joint efforts) to advance their 
interests but also by the fights they would engage in to gain the benefits that the center 
granted to them at discretion. This subsection discusses how Morelos started a lasting 
stage of subordination in 1958 when an unprecedented imposition from the center broke 
almost 30 years of relative autonomy for the local factions. The incursion initiated a 36-
year period of factional subordination in which the nomination of the PRI gubernatorial 
candidates was fundamentally dependent on the center’s interests. This subsection also 
details episodes illustrating the lack of interaction among factions as well as their 
disputes to obtain the support of the center. 
As the PRI consolidated its domination at the national level (Molinar 1991), the 
center exerted increasing influence over Morelos’ politics. Regarding gubernatorial 
elections, a dramatic turning point occurred in 1958 when the PRI nominated lieutenant 
colonel Norberto López Avelar. Despite being from Morelos like his predecessors, López 
Avelar had no political links to Morelos and had served most of his political career on 
                                                
97 All the examples in parentheses are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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under the protection of general Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada, president of the PRI’s 
National Executive Committee (CEN) from 1946 to 1952. 
As governor of the territory of Baja California from 1937-1944, Sánchez Taboada 
appointed Lopez Avelar first as de facto mayor (delegate of the state government) of the 
cities of Ensenada and Tijuana and then as administrative manager (oficial mayor) of the 
state government (Camp 2011a, 543). Then, as president of the PRI’s CEN, Sánchez 
Taboada nominated López Avelar to represent Morelos first as federal deputy in 1949 
and then as senator in 1952. Finally, as one of the most influential Mexican politicians at 
the time, Sánchez Taboada paved López Avelar’s way to Morelos’ governorship with the 
consent of President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, who ultimately decided the nomination for 
the 1958-1964 term. 
López Avelar’s nomination was highly controversial not only for Morelos’ PRI 
factions but also because of Morelos’ history itself, given that López Avelar and his 
mentor Sánchez Taboada had fought the Zapatistas in Morelos under colonel Jesús 
Guajardo. Moreover, there was a strong suspicion that López Avelar participated in 
Zapata’s assassination as one of the officials and soldiers who opened fire against Zapata 
at Guajardo’s order in 1919. In fact, López Avelar appears as a young soldier beside 
Zapata’s massacred corpse in official photographs taken by President Venustiano 
Carranza’s government to announce the assassination of the revolutionary icon 
(Castellanos 2007, 54). Moreover, even Zapata’s son Nicolás believed that López Avelar 
delivered the coup de grâce to his father (Brunk 2008, 126). 
Zapata was a revered figure in Morelos. For 38 years most governors in Morelos 
had been linked to Zapata or his allies and no governor had belonged to any anti-
Zapatista group. As a result, the nomination of a paradigmatic anti-Zapatista such as 
López Avelar was highly insulting for most political and social sectors of Morelos. In 
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fact, President Ruiz Cortines received numerous letters protesting López Avelar’s 
candidacy. One of them asked, “how is it possible that someone who collaborated in the 
despicable assassination of General Emiliano Zapata now governs the cradle of the 
southern revolution?” (Padilla 2008, 184). To ameliorate the protests, Ruiz Cortines 
granted a seat in the 1958-1961 federal legislature to Emiliano Zapata’s daughter Ana 
María Zapata Portillo in exchange for her endorsement of López Avelar’s nomination 
(Scott 1964, 235). 
López Avelar’s highly controversial candidacy opened a 56-year period (from 
1958 to 1994) for Morelos’ politics in which PRI gubernatorial candidates were imposed 
according to the center’s interests and, only rarely, when the center had no clear prospects 
to send to the state, emerged from local factions. Most of the candidates that each 
president, as the PRI ultimate leader, handpicked, had no previous political links to the 
state and in some cases they were not even born in Morelos, violating the state 
constitution that required governors to be born in Morelos. The strongest opposition from 
Morelos’ factions to an external nominee occurred against López Avelar. After the the 
1958 election, the factions’ protests were exceptional and timid. From 1958 to 1994, 
factions accepted any viceroy98 that was sent to the state with the hope of receiving some 
compensation for their obedience from the center or from the incoming governor, as 
happened with Ana María Zapata. In no case did they interact with each other to conform 
a common front to pressure and negotiate with the center or with the center’s nominee.99 
The PRI nominee and then governor for the next term, 1964-1970, was Emilio 
Riva Palacio Morales, from Jojutla, Morelos, who left the state when he was six years old 
                                                
98 PRI governors’ lacking ties with the states they rule and acting mainly as presidential delegates resemble 
more viceroys than elected officials, as some scholars have pointed out (e.g., Ward and Rodríguez 1999, 
675). 
99 All high-ranking PRI politicians I interviewed in Morelos agreed on this point. 
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(López González 2002b, 46-48). With a college degree in economics, Riva Palacio 
Morales had a bureaucratic career in the federal government totally unlinked to Morelos, 
reaching the Direction of Administration of the Presidency in 1958. He was in this 
position when his sponsor President Adolfo López Mateos nominated him for the 
governorship of Morelos in 1964 (Téllez Cuevas 2011). 
In 1970, there were no salient politicians to be sent to Morelos from the center. 
Thus Felipe Rivera Crespo was nominated with the approval of President Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz. Rivera Crespo’s political career was exclusively local. He had held numerous 
governmental, electoral, and partisan positions at the state level, including the mayorship 
of Cuernavaca, which he was in charge of for the second time when the PRI nominated 
him for the governorship (López González 2002b, 49-53). There was no question that this 
time the nomination would be for a local politician, because the only other main 
contender was senator Diódoro Rivera Uribe, Felipe’s half-brother (Vences 2011, 28-38). 
In the following election, however, the center imposed another outsider as 
gubernatorial nominee with the local factions’ compliance and lack of interaction with 
each other to advance their interests. In 1976, there were two prominent competitors for 
the PRI nomination representing local factions. One was Marcos Manuel Suárez Ruiz 
who earned a law degree from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) 
and an engineering degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His 
career included serving as a state legislator from 1967 to 1970 and majority leader of the 
federal low chamber to which he was elected for the 1970-1973 term (Camp 2011a, 933). 
The other main contender was Angel Ventura Valle, a young politician who was state 
Secretary of Economic Promotion, sponsored by Governor Rivera Crespo. Both Suárez 
Ruiz and Ventura Valle were from Cuernavaca. 
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Behind them was Antonio Riva Palacio López, another local politician who had 
no political ties to his distant relative and the former governor Emilio Riva Palacio 
Morales.100 In fact, Riva Palacio López’s political career was connected with former 
governor Norberto López Avelar under whom Riva Palacio López served as president of 
the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration from 1958 to 1960 and as General 
Secretary of Government from 1960 to 1964. Riva Palacio López was the head of the 
Morelos Unido (United Morelos) group, whose main demand was that the PRI 
gubernatorial candidates have local origins and careers. In other words, Morelos Unido 
was against the out-of-state politicians that the center typically sent to the state. 
Unexpectedly, however, President Luis Echeverría Alvarez decided to nominate 
Armando León Bejarano Valadez as the PRI candidate. Not only is it still unclear if 
Bejarano Valadez’s is from Cuautla101 or Yecapixtla,102 both Morelos’ localities, but the 
suspicion also persists that he was not even born in Morelos.103 In any case, Bejarano 
Valadez was a surgeon specialized in orthopedics whose career in the public health sector 
was not linked to Morelos. At the time of his nomination, he was director of Regulation 
of Food, Drink, and Medicines of the federal Secretary of Health. Thus for the PRI local 
factions it was bad enough that the president promoted a bureaucrat totally unrelated with 
Morelos; what made it worse was that he was a low-ranking bureaucrat (fourth level in 
the federal bureaucratic scale).104 The then president of the PRI’s CEN, Porfirio Muñoz 
Ledo, met Suárez Ruiz and Ventura Valle to inform them of Bejarano Valadez’s 
nomination. Both could barely believe the announcement. Suárez Ruiz reacted protesting 
                                                
100 See Téllez Cuevas 2011 for a detailed genealogy of the Riva Palacio’s family. 
101 See Camp 2011, 527. 
102 See López González 2002b, 54-55. 
103 Confidential interview. 
104 Confidential interview. 
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the decision and furiously insulting Muñoz Ledo before leaving Muñoz Ledo’s office. 
But aside from this incident, Bejarano Valadez’s candidacy was processed without 
further objections. 
Ventura Valle was informed directly by the CEN that he would be nominated for 
one of the two senatorial seats corresponding to Morelos in exchange for his 
“discipline.”105 Similarly, in a private meeting, President Echeverría Alvarez himself told 
Riva Palacio López that the gubernatorial nomination had been decided but offered him 
the nomination for a seat in the federal low chamber.106 Furthermore, Echeverría Alvarez 
suggested that Riva Palacio López would have his chance for the governorship in the 
future. Riva Palacio López accepted the deal and set aside his group’s main cause that 
governors of Morelos should have local political roots. 
But as the center rewarded the obedient groups, it punished the dissident factions 
as well. As opposed to the compensation from the center that Ventura Valle and Riva 
Palacio López received in exchange for their acquiescence to Bejarano Valadez’s 
nomination, Suárez Ruiz’s protest was costly for him. He did not receive the senatorial 
seat that the PRI’s CEN had planned for him. Instead, the senatorial nominee was Javier 
Rondero Zubieta, a UNAM scholar unsurprisingly unconnected to Morelos.  
Moreover, Riva Palacio’s candidacy as federal deputy illustrates the strong 
dependency of the local factions on the center as well as the limited political interaction, 
if any, these factions had with each other. Whereas Echeverría Alvarez negotiated with 
the Riva Palacio’s faction separately, a competing faction tried to obtain support from 
other actors in the center in order to snatch the nomination from Riva Palacio López. 
Muñoz Ledo had previously offered that legislative seat to state leader of the PRI’s 
                                                
105 Confidential interview. 
106 Confidential interview. 
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popular sector,107 Juan Salgado Brito, who was sponsored by exiting governor Rivera 
Crespo, Salgado Brito’s political mentor, and David Gustavo Gutiérrez Ruiz, the national 
leader of the PRI’s popular sector and thus Salgado Brito’s boss. Because the 
formalization of candidacies required at least one of the PRI sectors (usually the one the 
corresponding politician belonged to) to register the nominees, the delegate of the PRI’s 
CEN in Morelos, Javier Hernández Cervantes, instructed Salgado Brito to endorse Riva 
Palacio López on behalf of the PRI’s local popular sector. Furious not only at losing the 
candidacy but also at having to endorse the winning competitor, Salgado Brito asked for 
and obtained Gutiérrez Ruiz’s support not to register Riva Palacio López. However, 
Salgado Brito’s reaction was politically inconsequential, because the state chapter of the 
PRI peasant sector endorsed Riva Palacio López and Salgado Brito obtained no 
candidacy.108 
In the next election, the center once again nominated an out-of-state politician and 
local factions again failed to band together to resist it. The existence of four main local 
PRI competitors for the 1982 gubernatorial candidacy (senator Ventura Valle, former 
federal deputy Riva Palacio López, federal deputy David Jiménez González, and José 
Castillo Pombo, the mayor of Cuernavaca and Governor Bejarano Valadez’s protégé) did 
not prevent President José López Portillo from selecting Lauro Ortega Martínez, another 
outsider, as the PRI nominee. Ortega Martínez’s nomination was highly controversial 
because it openly violated the state’s constitution since he was not from Morelos. 
Moreover, Ortega Martínez did most of his career outside Morelos, and his nomination 
responded to political interests unrelated to the state. None of the local factions, however, 
questioned his candidacy and the only timid sign of protest came from a brochure 
                                                
107 The PRI membership is mainly organized through three sectors: popular, peasant, and labor. 
108 Salgado Brito describes his involvement in these events in Vences 2011, 46-48. 
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published by a Riva Palacio López supporter alerting that having a governor not from 
Morelos would be a major constitutional transgression (Sánchez Beltrán 1999). 
To prevent a major protest from the group of Riva Palacio López, his main 
competitor, Ortega Martínez visited Riva Palacio López at his home to ask for his 
support. But what really persuaded Riva Palacio López to accept Ortega Martínez’s 
nomination was the offer he received directly from the PRI’s CEN to be nominated for 
the Senate in exchange for his acquiescence to Ortega Martínez’s candidacy.109 To gain 
support for his nomination, Ortega Martínez also recruited other competitors, e.g., 
Jiménez González and Castillo Pombo, and prominent politicians, e.g., Suárez Ruiz, to 
his cause. Ventura Valle was the only one who did not accept the offer, given that Ortega 
Martínez demanded “humiliating levels of submissiveness from his collaborators.”110 As 
in the previous election, in 1982 the local factions remained submissive to the center’s 
decision and did not interact with each other to receive the compensations that each of 
them separately negotiated with either the center or the external nominee. 
Ortega Martínez had started taking political control of Morelos since 1979 when 
his friend President López Portillo made him federal deputy under Morelos’ political 
jurisdiction. By making public demonstrations that all delegates of federal offices in the 
state obey his command, he convinced and obtained the subordination of most important 
local politicians and groups (Vences 2011, 54-57; Sánchez Beltrán 1999, 3). 
Furthermore, to prepare his own gubernatorial nomination, Ortega Martínez was even 
able to impose Salgado Brito, his alternate federal deputy, as president of the PRI’s State 
Directive Committee (CDE) in Morelos against exiting governor Bejarano Valadez’s will 
(Vences 2011, 59-61). 
                                                
109 Confidential interview. 
110 Confidential interview. 
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Right after taking office and as a means to pave the way for future outsiders, 
Ortega Martínez managed to eliminate the constitutional requirement that governors be 
born in Morelos (Sánchez Beltrán 1999). He then broached two main candidates for the 
next gubernatorial election in 1988: one local and one from the center. Federal deputy 
and former competitor for the PRI gubernatorial nomination, David Jiménez González, 
who continued now under Ortega Martínez’s sponsorship a political career that he started 
with Governor Riva Palacio Morales, represented the local candidate. The center’s 
candidate was Eduardo Pesqueira Olea, the federal Secretary of Agriculture and 
Hydraulic Resources, from Mexico City, whose political and professional career was 
totally unrelated to Morelos. Secondarily, Ortega Martínez also supported senator 
Gonzalo Pastrana Castro, the leader of the PRI’s labor sector in Morelos, to prevent the 
nomination of his enemy and then-senator Riva Palacio López.111 
In 1988, however, to prevent a possible extension of Ortega Martínez’s influence 
on local politics beyond his term, the center discarded his favorites. The main prospects 
President Miguel de la Madrid considered for the PRI nomination were Riva Palacio 
López, whom De la Madrid had promoted as leader of the Senate, and Jorge Carrillo 
Olea, a federal Undersecretary of Government and De la Madrid’s friend. Certainly, 
Carrillo Olea was from Jojutla, Morelos, but his political and professional career was 
totally unconnected with the state. As a result, Riva Palacio López and Carrillo Olea were 
the local and center cards, respectively, for De la Madrid, who chose the former. 
In addition to his closeness to De la Madrid and his prominent political role at the 
national level as leader of the Senate, yet another factor favored Riva Palacio López’s 
nomination that was eminently related to the center’s interests. Some Morelos’ politicians 
                                                
111 Confidential interview. 
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argued that Carrillo Olea was not nominated in 1988, because De la Madrid knew that 
then-presidential PRI candidate and De la Madrid’s protégé, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, 
had more relevant plans for Carrillo Olea than ruling Morelos.112 This version is 
supported by three facts. First, Salinas’s nomination occurred on October 4, 1987, 44 
days before Riva Palacio López’s (November 17); thus De la Madrid was reasonably 
familiarized with Salinas de Gortari’s plans when he nominated Riva Palacio Lopez. 
Second, Carrillo Olea did in fact play a prominent role in Salinas de Gortari’s 
administration. Under President Salinas de Gortari, he created and was the first chief of 
the National Security and Research Center (CISEN, the Mexico’s equivalent to the USA 
CIA), then he became Mexico’s drug czar, and as such created another two agencies also 
related to national security: the Planning Center to Combat Drugs (CENDRO) and the 
National Institute to Control Drugs (INDRO). Third, Carrillo Olea ended up being 
nominated for the Morelos’ governorship in the next election (1994). Given these 
elements, as one local politician concludes, Carrillo Olea’s nomination did not happen in 
1988 because it was deferred to 1994 because of the center’s interests.113 
In any case, in 1988 local politicians and observers perceived Riva Palacio 
López’s nomination as a vindication of Morelos’ political groups after more than 30 
years (with the exception of Rivera Crespo’s term) of being led by politicians without 
links to Morelos. This perception, however, was quickly dissipated when the PRI’s CEN 
nominated two complete outsiders to represent Morelos in the Senate. One was Jesús 
Rodríguez y Rodríguez, an economist from Mexico City where he had made his career in 
the public sector under the sponsorship of Antonio Ortiz Mena, the powerful federal 
Secretary of the Treasury from 1958 to 1970. The other was Hugo Domenzain Guzmán, 
                                                
112 Confidential interviews. 
113 Confidential interview. 
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from Mexico City, the leader of the Federation of Government Employees’ Unions 
(FSTSE).114 
In line with their submissive position to the center, all PRI local groups remained 
silent in the case of the surprising nomination of Rodríguez y Rodríguez and Domenzain 
Guzmán, including outgoing governor Ortega Martínez and incoming governor Riva 
Palacio López, who were the ultimate leaders of the PRI local class. Furthermore, former 
PRI gubernatorial pre-candidate Marcos Manuel Suárez Ruiz and Rubén Román 
Sánchez, who were the main local candidates for the Senate, accepted to be alternate 
candidates of Rodríguez y Rodríguez and Domenzain Guzmán, respectively. Their 
acceptance to be alternate candidates was considered highly humiliating for the two local 
politicians and for the whole Morelos’ priísta class, which had not only to endorse the 
imposition of the out-of-state nominees but also to provide the means for them to win in 
the historically competitive federal elections of 1988.115 
Once in office, Governor Riva Palacio López started his own political project, 
based on supporting his allies and protégés while excluding other competing factions. 
Riva Palacio López promoted two politicians as his potential successors: former PRI 
gubernatorial contender Angel Ventura Valle and Rodolfo Becerril Straffon. With Riva 
Palacio López’s support, Ventura Valle was appointed state Secretary of Budget and 
Finance in 1988 and became senator again in 1991, while Becerril Straffon was appointed 
state Secretary of Economic Development in 1988 and became federal deputy in 1994. In 
addition, around twelve PRI groups with distinctive labels declared publically their 
participation in Morelos’ political activity and their support for Riva Palacio López. 
Because most members of these groups held electoral, partisan, and bureaucratic 
                                                
114 Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado. 
115 All high-ranking PRI politicians I interviewed in Morelos agreed on this point. 
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positions he granted, Riva Palacio López attempted to convey the perception that his 
government included and unified all PRI factions and thus he was the ultimate leader of 
all PRI groups. The reality is that Riva Palacio Lopez’s collaborators deliberately created 
these labels to simulate a widespread and diverse support for Riva Palacio López, 
because the leading politicians of most competing factions were excluded from 
participating in local politics (e.g., Juan Salgado Brito and other protégés of former 
governor Lauro Ortega Martínez as well as former PRI gubernatorial contenders José 
Castillo Pombo, David Jiménez González, and Marcos Manuel Suárez Ruiz). 
To constrain the nomination of outsiders in the future, Riva Palacio López 
amended the state constitution to reinstate the requirement that governors be born in 
Morelos, which Ortega Martínez had eliminated. This provision, however, did not 
impede the promotion of external politicians for the nomination in the next election in 
1994, such as, President’s adviser Jorge Carrillo Olea; Salvador Giordano Gómez, the 
Undersecretary B of the Federal Controller General; Gustavo Petricioli Iturbide, the 
General Director of Federal Highways and Auxiliary Roads and former federal Secretary 
of the Treasury; and senator Jesús Rodríguez y Rodríguez. Of all of them only Carrillo 
Olea was from Morelos. In addition to these politicians, the list of the PRI gubernatorial 
pre-candidates included Riva Palacio López’s ally Ventura Valle and Riva Palacio 
López’s protégé Becerril Straffon as well as four local prominent politicians outside the 
Riva Palacio López’s circle: Castillo Pombo, Jiménez González, Salgado Brito, and 
Suárez Ruiz. 
The promotion of politicians linked to Riva Palacio López and other factions to 
obtain the nomination in 1994 failed. As had happened since 1958, the center had the 
definitive word on the PRI candidacy. And as had happened since 1958, the factions 
submissively accepted the decision. 
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The Center’s Last Candidate: The 1994 Nomination 
The expectation that local factions would play a major role in Morelos’ politics in 
1994 evaporated on November 23, 1993, when a local newspaper published a leak 
announcing the gubernatorial nomination of Jorge Carrillo Olea (Pérez Durán 1993). 
Carrillo Olea had had an outstanding career as an expert on intelligence and national 
security in the Mexican military where he obtained a degree in military administration 
and from which he retired with the rank of general in 1988. As chief of the Intelligence 
Section of the Presidential Guard, Carrillo Olea saved President Echeverría Alvarez from 
a violent demonstration at UNAM in 1975. In compensation, Echeverría Alvarez 
appointed him Undersecretary of Tax Investigation in the Secretary of the Treasury in 
1976. In this position, Carrillo Olea made close ties with his colleague Undersecretary of 
Treasury Miguel de la Madrid and De la Madrid’s collaborator Carlos Salinas de Gortari. 
Then he was in charge of the public company Unified Dry Docks, under President López 
Portillo, before becoming prominent collaborator of presidents De la Madrid and Salinas 
de Gortari. In sum, Carrillo Olea’s career was strongly linked to the center but not to 
Morelos. 
Carrillo Olea’s candidacy was officially confirmed on November 26 and 
formalized by President of PRI’s CEN Fernando Ortiz Arana on November 30 through a 
rally in which several thousands of partisans participated, as was the PRI’s tradition 
(Pérez Durán 1993; Sánchez 1993b, 1993a, 1993c). Before and during the rally, all 
competitors representing local factions endorsed the nominee whom most of them had 
barely met or had no previous contact with at all ("Jiménez González, de acuerdo con la 
determinación priísta"  1993; Limón 1993). Carrillo Olea won the election by obtaining 
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67.3 percent of the valid vote, 45.6 percentage points more than the PRD candidate, his 
closest competitor (Sánchez 1994; Toledo Patiño 1998, 218). 
In sum, after Morelos stabilized politically in 1930, the local factions had a broad 
margin of maneuver to decide on the PRI gubernatorial candidacies for almost 30 years. 
In 1958, however, a new age of subservience to the center started with the nomination of 
a politician that antagonized supporters of the famous Mexican revolutionary Emiliano 
Zapata, whose symbol provided the fundamental source of identity for the main state 
factions. From that year until 1994, the factions submissively accepted the center’s 
decisions in exchange for the compensatory positions that the center and its nominees 
gave to them at their discretion. Under the center’s command, the factions directly and 
separately negotiated their positions with the center and its emissaries. In contrast to the 
case of Estado de México and Coahuila (see Chapter 3), the factions in Morelos did not 
interact with each other to advance their political interests. In fact, during the research I 
found neither historical records, nor data from interviews to suggest they interacted or 
cooperated. By contrast, they were more likely to sabotage each other in their search for 
political gains, as is illustrated by Juan Salgado Brito’s attempt to block Antonio Riva 
Palacio López’s nomination for the federal congress. 
 
Political Background of PRI Governors in Nuevo León, 1929-1994 
As happened in Morelos, in the authoritarian era the factions of Nuevo León 
mainly played a subordinated role to the center with respect to the control of the 
governorship. During this period (1929-1994), Nuevo León had 17 governors who spent 
at least six months in office. Table 4.2 indicates that during this timeframe national 
positions constituted the most salient source of political experience of Nuevo León’s 
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governors: 58.8 percent of them (ten) participated in national politics before assuming 
office. The governors had experience in local politics in 52.9 percent of the cases and had 
served in the federal legislature in 41.2 percent (seven) of the cases. As the table 
indicates, nearly half of them (eight) had national and/or federal legislative experience 
but no background in state politics. 
Table 4.2. Political Background of Governors of Nuevo León, 1929-1994. 







1 Aarón Sáenz Garza 1927-1931 Constitutional 1 1   
2 Francisco Cárdenas Villarreal 1931-1933 Constitutional 
  
1 
3 Pablo Quiroga Treviño 1933-1935 Interim 
  
1 
4 Gregorio Morales Sánchez 1935-1936 Provisional 1 1 
 5 Anacleto Guerrero Guajardo 1936-1939 Constitutional 1 
  6 Bonifacio Salinas Leal 1939-1943 Constitutional 1 
  7 Arturo B. De la Garza y Garza 1943-1949 Constitutional 
  
1 
8 Ignacio Morones Prieto 1949-1952 Constitutional 1 
  9 José Vivanco Lozano 1952-1955 Substitute 
 
1 1 
10 Raul Rangel Frías 1955-1961 Constitutional 
  
1 
11 Eduardo Livas Villarreal 1961-1967 Constitutional 
 
1 1 
12 Eduardo Elizondo Lozano 1967-1971 Constitutional 
  
1 
13 Luis M. Farías Martínez 1971-1973 Substitute 1 1 
 14 Pedro Zorrilla Martínez 1973-1979 Constitutional 1 
  15 Alfonso Martínez Domínguez 1979-1985 Constitutional 1 1 
 16 Jorge Treviño Martínez 1985-1991 Constitutional 1 1 1 
17 Sócrates Rizzo García 1991-1995 Constitutional 1   1 
TOTAL     10 7 9 
%     58.8 41.2 52.9 
Source: Camp 1991, 2011a; Cavazos Garza 1994; Covarrubias 1991; Gutiérrez Salazar 2007; Hernández 
Garza 1974; Saragoza 2007a, 2007b. 
Note: The table includes only governors who spent at least six months in office. 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, state factions tend to be subordinated to the center 
where the governors lack experience in local politics. By contrast, where governors have 
held local positions, the factions typically have more autonomy from the center. Hence, 
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we should expect that Nuevo León should have a higher percentage of governors who 
have held only national or federal legislative positions than in the autonomous cases: 
Estado de México, Coahuila, and Michoacán. Similarly, we should expect that Nuevo 
León have a lower percentage of governors in state politics than do the autonomous 
states. The results of the comparison are line with our expectations. The percentage of 
governors with only national positions is higher in Nuevo León (23.5 percent) than in 
Estado de México (11.8 percent), Coahuila (6.7 percent), and Michoacán (15.8 percent). 
Also, the percentage of governors with national and/or federal legislative experience but 
no local experience is higher in Nuevo León (47.1 percent) than in Estado de México 
(17.6 percent), Coahuila (26.7 percent), and Michoacán (26.3 percent). Furthermore, the 
percentage of governors with experience in state politics is lower in Nuevo León (52.9 
percent) than in Estado de México (82.4 percent), Coahuila (73.3 percent), and 
Michoacán (73.7 percent). The differences in all of these indicators are statistically 
significant (see Chapter 2). These results suggest that the PRI factions in Nuevo León in 
the authoritarian era were more subordinated to the center than the factions of the other 
three states. 
The following subsections explore the historical variation in the level of 
autonomy of the local factions vis-à-vis the center in the autocratic era. The analysis 
starts focusing on the period that goes from 1927 to 1939 in which constant disputes 
characterized the relationship between the local factions and the center. 
 
The Origins of PRI Factions in Nuevo León 
The correlation of forces between local factions and the center was intermittent 
during the authoritarian times. It varied across cases and different historical moments, as 
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the dissertation has showed. The factions of Nuevo León emerged in a context of 
subordination that extended for the first twelve years of the autocratic era. This section 
provides a brief account of this initial period. 
Under Governor Bernardo Reyes’ political and military (1884 to 1909), Nuevo 
León emerged as Mexico’s second most important economic and industrial center (just 
after Mexico City), which had one of the most powerful and politically active economic 
elite in Mexico (Morado Macías 2007). Although the revolution brought political 
instability and economic stagnation to Nuevo León, the state’s social foundations were 
barely affected by the armed struggle. As a result, after the revolution Nuevo León’s 
social structure remained practically intact, as did the power and political activism of the 
economic elite (Ortega Ridaura 2007a). The state recovered its constitutional order in 
1927 through the election as governor of General Aarón Sáenz Garza, who was 
sponsored by Mexico’s strongman Alvaro Obregón. 
Like Reyes, Sáenz Garza supported the economic elite’s plans of economic 
development and industrial expansion to the point that they campaigned for him to be the 
PNR’s presidential pre-candidate in 1929 (Saragoza 2007b). However, Sáenz Garza’s 
failure to obtain the nomination as well as the new regime’s statist and pro-labor policies 
propelled the political involvement of Nuevo León’s industrialists.116 From that moment 
and until 1997 when the PRI lost the governorship, a constant tension and even conflict 
emerged between Mexico’s political center and the local economic elite, putting the 
PRI’s local factions in the middle of both strong political poles. 
After Sáenz Garza’s term, the PNR’s local factions won out with the nomination 
of state legislator Francisco Cárdenas in 1931, but their triumph did not last long. Two 
                                                
116 In 1929, they created the Employers’ Confederation of the Mexican Republic (Confederación Patronal 
de la República Mexicana, Coparmex) to protest against the labor code that the regime promoted (Saragoza 
2007b, 230-239). 
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years later, Cárdenas was forced to resign by Monterrey’s117 mayor Plutarco Elías Calles 
Chacón, who was trying to take political control of Nuevo León with the support of his 
father and new Mexico’s strongman Plutarco Elías Calles (Saragoza 2007a, 255-256). 
The center then imposed the PNR gubernatorial candidacy of Calles Chacón in 1935. 
Because Nuevo León’s business class was openly opposed to president Calles’ statist and 
pro-labor policies, they opposed his son’s nominations and instead supported Fortunato 
Zuazua, the Nuevo León Liberal Party’s nominee. 
The highly disputed election between Calles Chacón and Zuazua occurred, 
however, in the middle of the confrontation between Calles and the incoming president 
Lázaro Cárdenas. Cárdenas’ conflicts with Calles and with Nuevo Leon’s economic elite 
(they politically mobilized against Cárdenas who advocated even more statist policies) 
made both Calles Chacón and Zuazua unacceptable to the new president. Instead of 
favoring one of his two enemies, Cárdenas took advantage of the situation and annulled 
the gubernatorial election (Saragoza 2007a, 255-258). Then, he imposed his ally, 
Anacleto Guerrero, as the PNR nominee to compete against Zuazua in a new election to 
rule Nuevo León for the remaining of the term (1936-1939). Guerrero won the election, 
which was marred by multiple allegations of fraud (Saragoza 2007a, 267-269). Although 
Cárdenas and Guerrero enacted new pro-capitalist policies to reconcile with the local 
private sector, Nuevo León’s economic elite not only maintained its opposition to 
Cárdenas but also supported PRM118 dissident Juan Andrew Almazán to compete against 
the PRM presidential nominee, Manuel Avila Camacho. 
                                                
117 The Nuevo León’s capital. 
118 Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, PRM) was the PRI’s second 
previous name from 1938 to 1946. 
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In brief, the local factions, which represented the interests of the powerful Nuevo 
León’s industrial class, engaged in constant conflicts with the center for the political 
control of the state from 1927 to 1939. Nevertheless, a period of relative autonomy for 
the local factions began with the decline of the cardenismo and the emergence of Avila 
Camacho as the PRI ultimate boss. As the next section details, the new era lasted for the 
32 years that followed. 
 
Factions’ Autonomy: From 1939 to 1971 
Critical events could alter the balance of power between local factions and the 
center in favor of either side. One of these episodes occurred in Nuevo León in 1939. It 
consisted of the combination of local resistance and a fundamental change in the center’s 
goals and strategies, and it provided the foundations for the emergence of a new stage of 
autonomy for local factions that lasted until 1971. This subsection offers a succinct 
account of this period. 
Once he took office after winning the election, president Avila Camacho 
abandoned Cárdenas’ economic policy and instead implemented an extensive import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) program, which implied a solid alliance between the 
State and the private sector, including Nuevo León’s businessmen. Under ISI, Mexico’s 
economy grew at annual rates of at least 6 percent from 1940 to 1975. As one of the main 
engines of the “Mexican Miracle,” Nuevo León’s economy grew at even higher rates, 
strengthening its already powerful economic elite (Ortega Ridaura 2007a, 2007b). 
From 1939 to 1967, the PRI gubernatorial nominees were mainly local politicians 
devoted to serving the interests of Nuevo León’s business class. This new trend began 
under President Cárdenas with the PRM’s nomination of General Bonifacio Salinas Leal 
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(term: 1939-1943), who continued with Guerrero’s pro-capitalist policies and quickly 
embraced the economic program of incoming president Avila Camacho. With the 
approval of Nuevo León’s economic elite, Arturo Bonifacio de la Garza y Garza, the 
General Secretary of Government with Governor Salinas Leal, became the PRM nominee 
and governor for the 1943-1949 term. The fact that the economic elite’s opinion was 
more important than that of the PRI’s local factions was demonstrated in the next election 
in which the business sector vetoed Eduardo Livas Villarreal, who was openly supported 
by Governor De la Garza y Garza. As a result, for the 1949-1955 term, president Miguel 
Alemán nominated Ignacio Morones Prieto, who had done his political and professional 
career outside Nuevo León but had the economic elite’s approval (Gutiérrez Salazar 
2007, 26). Morones and his substitute,119 José Santiago Vivanco Lazano, continued to 
favor the private sector, as did the next PRI Governor Raúl Rangel Frías (term: 1955-
1961). 
In order to obtain the nomination for the 1961-1967 term, senator Livas Villarreal 
commit to support the businessmen and convinced them that he was not “too leftist.” 
Moreover, Governor Livas Villarreal agreed to sponsor the political career of the 
business class’s candidate Eduardo Angel Elizondo Lozano in order to set the stage for 
Elizondo Lozano’s gubernatorial nomination for the next election term (Gutiérrez Salazar 
2007, 26-27). With Livas Villarreal’s support, Elizondo Lozano became state Treasurer 
General and then rector of the University of Nuevo León (UNL) before obtaining the PRI 
gubernatorial candidacy for the 1967-1973 term. 
 
                                                
119 Morones Prieto did not end his term because in 1952 left the governorship to become federal Secretary 
of Health under president Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. 
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Under the Center’s Subordination: The 1971 Turning Point 
Deliberate incursions from the center to curtail local factions’ autonomy 
characterized the authoritarian period. When factions failed to resist these pressures, they 
resulted in lasting cycles of subordination to the center. As happened in Morelos in 1958, 
the factions of Nuevo León could not block an intervention from the center in 1971, 
which started a new stage of subordination that shaped this state’s politics for the 26 
years that followed. This section presents a brief history of this period. 
A conflict in the UNL, which propitiated Elizondo Lozano’s resignation in 1971, 
and a confrontation that President Luis Echeverría Alvarez had with Nuevo León’s 
economic elite marked the beginning of a new era of control of the center with regard to 
PRI gubernatorial nominations. From the designation of Luis Marcelino Farías Martínez 
as Elizondo Lozano’s replacement in 1971 onward, the center displaced the local factions 
in the nomination of the PRI candidates (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 29). The local factions 
broke this pattern of subordination in 1997 when, empowered by the new democratic 
conditions, they fought over the gubernatorial nomination, which led their party to lose 
the governorship for the first time. 
The shift had antecedents in 1969 when students mobilized politically demanding 
full autonomy for the UNL from the government, inspired by similar movements that had 
taken place in other Mexican regions and particularly in Mexico City (Sánchez 2007; 
Gutiérrez Salazar 2007). In 1971 President Echeverría Alvarez took advantage of this 
movement to call for the resignation of Elizondo Lozano and take political control of 
Nuevo León through the designation of senator Farías Martínez to finish Elizondo 
Lozano’s term. Echeverría Alvarez also intensively promoted statist policies, which the 
Nuevo León’s business class openly opposed. This struggle affected Elizondo Lozano, 
who was supported by the business class. As a result, the relationship between Echeverría 
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Alvarez and Elizondo Lozano became increasingly conflictive to the point that 
Echeverría Alvarez used the student movement in the UNL as an excuse to force 
Elizondo Lozano to resign (Garza Ramírez et al. 1985, 77-80). Although Farías Martínez 
had represented Nuevo León as senator and federal deputy, he owed these positions to his 
ties to former president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and President Echeverría Alvarez, and he 
had practically no roots in the state. Actually, Nuevo León’s residents made fun of his 
lack of ties to the state, saying that he started living in a hotel when he was appointed 
substitute governor and that he daily drove in the wrong direction to go to his job to avoid 
the risk of getting lost in Monterrey’s streets (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 29). 
As his confrontation with the Nuevo León’s business class escalated because of 
his statist policies, Echeverría Alvarez attempted to preserve his political control over the 
state. As a result, he promoted the nomination of Pedro Zorrilla Martínez as the PRI 
gubernatorial candidate for the 1973-1979 term. Zorrilla Martínez had no links to Nuevo 
León (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 29-35). Although he was born in Monterrey, he left his 
hometown after high school to study law at the UNAM in Mexico City where he did most 
of his professional and political career. During the 1960s he worked for different federal 
secretaries and even acquired political experience at the subnational level, but not in 
Nuevo León.120 In Echeverría Alvarez administration, Zorrilla Martínez was appointed 
General Director of Population in the federal Secretary of Government, 1970-1971, chief 
clerk (oficial mayor) of Mexico City’s government (Departamento del Distrito Federal), 
1971-1972, and Attorney General of Mexico City, 1972-1973, when Echeverría Alvarez 
decided his PRI nomination for governorship of Nuevo León. 
                                                
120 He served as state Secretary of Government in the state of Tamaulipas in 1968. 
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The displacement of the PRI’s local factions continued in the next election (term 
1979-1985) when the PRI nominated Alfonso Martínez Domínguez, a politician who had 
served practically his whole career in Mexico City. In fact, President José López Portillo 
took no local considerations into account in the Martínez Domínguez’s nomination but 
just López Portillo’s own interest in compensating a prominent politician whom former 
president Echeverría Alvarez had ousted (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 34-37). Martínez 
Domínguez started his governmental career in 1937 in Mexico City where he obtained 
numerous bureaucratic, legislative, and partisan positions. Martínez Domínguez was 
elected as federal legislator three times: the first two representing Mexico City (1946-
1949 and 1952-1957) and the third representing Nuevo León (1964-1967). In this third 
election, he developed ties with Nuevo León but only during the campaign, because he 
quickly refocused his attention on national politics by becoming the chief (Presidente de 
la Gran Comisión) of the federal Chamber of Deputies during his term and continuing his 
career in the national arena. President Díaz Ordaz promoted him as president of the PRI’s 
CEN in 1968, and from this position Martínez Domínguez laid the way for the 
nomination of Echeverría Alvarez for the presidency in 1970. In exchange, at the 
beginning of his term Echeverría Alvarez appointed Martínez Domínguez as mayor of 
Mexico City. Nevertheless, Echeverría Alvarez dismissed him after the 1971 student riots 
in Mexico City which were brutally repressed by paramilitary forces under the apparent 
command of Martínez Domínguez (Carrillo Olea 2011, 47-51). 
Despite his ouster, Martínez Domínguez lobbied to obtain the gubernatorial 
nomination for Nuevo León in 1973 (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 30), which was unlikely 
given that Echeverría Alvarez, the central decisionmaker, tried to dissociate himself from 
the actor that he most saliently connected with the 1971 repression, an event that had 
damaged his administration (Carrillo Olea 2011, 47-51). Six years later, by contrast, the 
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efforts that Martínez Domínguez made in Mexico City to become governor succeeded, 
because president López Portillo strongly supported not only his nomination but also his 
administration (López Portillo 1988, 786-788, 865, 942, 951, 1250). In brief, Martínez 
Domínguez obtained the PRI nomination because of his deep involvement in the center’s 
politics but not in Nuevo León’s. 
Similarly, in 1982 PRI presidential candidate Miguel de la Madrid astonished the 
local factions when he instructed Governor Martínez Domínguez to support the PRI 
candidacy of De la Madrid’s friend, Jorge Alfonso Treviño Martínez, for a seat in the 
federal chamber representing Nuevo León in order to set the stage for the Treviño 
Martínez’s gubernatorial nomination for the 1985-1991 term (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 37-
41). Although Treviño Martínez had represented some federal agencies in Nuevo León 
and obtained middle-range jobs in the state government, those positions were technical 
rather than political and related to his expertise on tax law (Camp 2011a, 961). As a 
result, he did not develop significant links with any local faction and entirely owed his 
nomination to his friendship with De la Madrid (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 38). Moreover, 
De la Madrid himself declared that one of the main aspects he considered in this 
nomination was Treviño Martínez’s lack of attachments to local groups, particularly 
those linked to Governor Martínez Domínguez, a way to prevent the emergence of local 
“feuds” (Madrid Hurtado 2004, 369). 
 
The Last Successful Center’s Candidate: The 1991 Nomination 
The last gubernatorial nomination for Nuevo León under the authoritarian period 
took place in 1991. After spending his entire career in the federal government in Mexico 
City where he was even elected as PRI federal legislator to represent Mexico’s capital in 
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1985, Sócrates Rizzo García was imposed as president of the PRI’s CDE in Nuevo León 
in 1988 and then became the PRI’s nominee first for Monterrey’s mayorship in 1989 and 
then for Nuevo León’s governorship in 1991, thanks to the sponsorship of his friends: 
presidents De la Madrid and Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Given that Nuevo León’s 
businessmen not only endorsed Salinas de Gortari’s free market and privatization policies 
but also had obtained multiple concrete benefits from them, the economic elite did not 
oppose Rizzo García’s nomination for the governorship, while the PRI factions endorsed 
the center’s appointee as usual (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 41-42). 
The economic alliance between the local business class and federal government 
was also translated into the local political arena when Salinas de Gortari reestablished 
strong ties between the center and Nuevo León’s businessmen, which had been lost since 
Echeverría Alvarez. As a result, the state economic class accepted the nomination of 
Rizzo García with the condition that prominent businessman Benjamín Clariond Reyes 
Retana, one of its members, would be promoted as Rizzo García’s successor in the next 
election (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 41-47). In line with this agreement, the PRI endorsed 
Clariond Reyes Retana to become federal deputy in 1988 and Monterrey’s mayor in 
1992, which would set the stage to nominate him for the governorship in 1997. In this 
context, Rizzo García won the election by obtaining 63.1 percent of the vote, 30 
percentage points than his closest competitor the PAN nominee Rogelio Sada Zambrano 
(IMO 1991). 
 
ANTAGONISTIC FACTIONALISM UNDER DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONS 
This section analyzes the conflicts among the PRI faction in Morelos and Nuevo 
León that took place in the first gubernatorial elections of the democratic period in 2000 
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and 1997, respectively. In line with the theoretical expectations of this dissertation, it 
demonstrates that given their lack of cooperative antecedents, the factions of these states 
confronted each other to advance their interests in the democratic aftermath. The 
resulting antagonistic factionalism produced internal divisions, which led the PRI to lose 
the governorship in both cases. 
 
Factional Confrontation in Morelos: The 2000 Election 
Given that Jorge Carrillo Olea’s main campaign slogan for the governorship in 
1994 promised a “big alliance” with all political and social sectors, the PRI’s factions 
expected that the nominee would establish ties with them to gain legitimacy and 
leadership as other “external” candidates had done, e.g., former governor Lauro Ortega 
Martínez (García 1993). Nevertheless, three factors prevented Carrillo Olea from 
assuming this leading role. First, he did not have relevant participation in the distribution 
of compensatory positions for his competitors. Without Carrillo Olea’s intervention as the 
state’s ultimate PRI leader (under this party’s tradition) and without any interaction 
among local factions, the center directly compensated most competitors.121 The PRI’s 
CEN directly negotiated with and nominated Becerril Straffon for the Senate, Salgado 
Brito for a seat in the federal low chamber, and Jiménez González for a seat in the 
Mexico City’s local legislature (given that he had held political positions in Mexico City 
in the previous six years). Similarly, Castillo Pombo was appointed delegate of the 
federal Secretary of Labor in Morelos. These politicians had no loyalty to Carrillo Olea 
because they did not owe their positions to him.122 
                                                
121 Confidential interviews. 
122 Confidential interviews. 
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Second, PRI governors reinforce their leadership by becoming arbiters among 
different factions instead of supporting some groups at the expense of other groups. 
Carrillo Olea failed at performing this role by, for example, giving preponderance to 
former governor Ortega Martínez in his campaign. In one of the Carrillo Olea’s main 
campaign events, Ortega Martínez severely criticized his old rival, outgoing governor 
Riva Palacio López, for his poor performance on public security. Members of Riva 
Palacio López’s group interpreted Ortega Martínez’s discourse as a message from 
Carrillo Olea. The message fueled an “unnecessary” resentment among the rivapalacistas 
against Carrillo Olea, weakening Carrillo Olea’s leadership (Becerril Straffon 2006, 6-7). 
Third, usually external governors, such as Ortega Martínez, had tried to obtain 
leadership inside the PRI by incorporating members of the main PRI factions into their 
administration. Carrillo Olea, however, failed to do this, assigning the main positions in 
his administration to people with previous ties with him but with no roots in Morelos; 
thus local factions labeled them as the foreign legion (Bolaños 2011). Moreover, the 
remaining positions were mainly assigned to local professionals linked to the academic 
sector (basically, the Autonomous University of Morelos and research centers of the 
UNAM) but not to PRI factions. 
Despite these leadership issues vis-à-vis the PRI groups, Carrillo Olea’s 
administration initially looked promising. In a context of economic growth, at the 
beginning of his term Carrillo Olea was able to start two industrial zones for major 
national and transnational companies to establish factories. In addition, he showed that he 
had the support of the federal government under Salinas de Gortari to modernize 
Morelos. In a few months, Carrillo Olea received numerous high-ranking officials of 
different federal secretaries and agencies to discuss major projects for the development of 
the state. 
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Nevertheless, new developments took place, leading Carrillo Olea to leave the 
governorship amidst a political scandal and a confrontation with President Ernesto 
Zedillo. He was replaced by Jorge Morales Barud, the President of the PRI’s CDE.123 
After taking office, Morales Barud received immediate support from President Zedillo 
administration and, under the slogan of reconciliation, established close communication 
with different social and political sectors to design and implement public policy. In 
addition, he incorporated into his administration politicians and professionals linked to 
different parties and sectors as well as enacted austerity measures to optimize the public 
budget. Morales Barud’s policies and Zedillo’s support paid off, because in December 
1999 the approval rates of both politicians increased to 70 and 60 percent, respectively 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1999m). Moreover, in November 1999 the PRI 
had an advantage of 21 percentage points in voting intentions for the incoming 
gubernatorial election over the PAN, its closest competitor (Presidencia de la República 
Mexicana 1999n). 
As opposed to his predecessors, President Zedillo did not designate the PRI 
candidate for the gubernatorial election of Morelos in 2000. Instead, the local factions 
were suddenly empowered to decide the nomination when the PRI’s CEN announced that 
the nominee would be elected through an open primary. Nevertheless, senator Rodolfo 
Becerril Straffon and the state delegate of SEDESOL, Juan Salgado Brito, the main 
contenders for the nomination, were afraid that the primary was only a charade that 
would be controlled by the president. They therefore asked for instructions from the 
center before deciding to participate in the primary. Once Becerril Straffon obtained 
encouragement to participate from the PRI’s presidential nominee Francisco Labastida 
                                                
123 The following section on the political scandals of Morelos and Nuevo León details these events. 
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Ochoa (Becerril Straffon 2006, 12) and Salgado Brito received President Zedillo’s 
message that the primary was “legitimate” and that he should participate in it (Vences 
2011, 86-88), both politicians decided to compete for the candidacy. On December 4, 
Becerril Straffon and Salgado Brito, along with the former state Attorney General, José 
Castillo Pombo, and former federal deputy David Jiménez González, registered as formal 
pre-candidates for the nomination. All four politicians had attempted to obtain the PRI 
gubernatorial nomination in previous elections. The fact that the primary attracted public 
attention124 fueled the optimism among the priístas that using a democratic method to 
select their gubernatorial candidate for the first time could preserve and even increase 
support for the PRI. Against the priístas’ expectation, however, the conditions under 
which the primary took place and its aftermath had the opposite effect, deteriorating 
drastically the popularity of the PRI. 
The campaign for the nomination was characterized by an acrimonious dispute 
between Salgado Brito and Becerril Straffon (Fierro 2000b; Granados Chapa 2000). 
Although on February 6, 2000, Salgado Brito won the primary by a margin of 19 
percentage points over the runner-up Becerril Straffon, the election was tainted by 
Becerril Straffon’s formal protest against the results, accusing fraud (Pensamiento, 
Fierro, and Del Riego 2000; Fierro 2000c). Becerril Straffon’s accusation was dismissed, 
yet it damaged the PRI’s image because, according to a survey conducted 15 days after 
the election, one out of three citizens believed that there was fraud in the primary 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 2000a). 
To make things worse, just three days before the primary the National Supreme 
Court of Justice (SCJN) had instructed the state Superior Court of Justice of Morelos 
                                                
124 Seventy-four percent of the population said that they were very interested in the primary (Presidencia de 
la República Mexicana 1999n) 
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(TSJE) to continue the impeachment trial against former governor Carrillo Olea (see the 
following section on the political scandals of Morelos and Nuevo León). Trying to 
minimize a negative effect, the state leader of the PRI labor sector, Vinicio Limón 
Rivera, and the PRI senator candidate and a former Carrillo Olea’s campaign coordinator, 
Jorge Meade Ocaranza, demanded Carrillo Olea’s expulsion from the PRI (Vega 2000). 
In these circumstances, the advantage of 21 percentage points the PRI had just three 
months earlier over the PAN evaporated. A survey conducted on February 21 reported a 
technical tie between both parties: 33.4 percent for the PRI and 34.7 for the PAN 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1997a).125 
The conflicts inside the PRI increased when Salgado Brito excluded the members 
of Becerril Straffon’s faction, including Becerril Straffon himself, from obtaining 
compensatory positions while granting most nominations for the incoming local elections 
to Salgado Brito’s supporters. For example, salgadistas obtained all of the secure spots in 
the PRI’s coveted list of proportional representation (PR) nominees for the state 
Congress. Similarly, most candidacies for state congressional districts went to Salgado 
Brito’s allies and even some of his relatives with limited electoral potential.126 In 
addition, Salgado Brito obstructed Becerril Straffon’s nomination first for the mayorship 
of Cuernavaca and then as PR candidate for the federal congress.127 In response to their 
exclusion, Becerril Straffon openly refused to endorse Salgado Brito and most members 
of his faction started promoting the PAN’s nominee (Vences 2000, 88). 
                                                
125 It is important to note that this variation in voting preferences cannot be attributed to the PAN’s actions, 
because the campaign of PAN gubernatorial candidate Sergio Estrada Cajigal started just three days before 
the survey (Fierro 2000a). 
126 In two of the four highly competitive districts of Cuernavaca were nominated Rosalina Mazari Espín, 
who had never resided in the Morelos’ capital, and Jorge Gómez Ibarra, who was Salgado Brito’s brother-
in-law. 
127 Confidential interview. 
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Furthermore, to avoid negotiating with other groups, Salgado Brito decided that 
the candidates for municipal governments would be selected through primaries, which 
took place on April 9, amidst numerous internal conflicts and protests of fraud. The 
aftermath of the municipal primaries brought negative consequences for the PRI. In some 
cases (e.g., Jiutepec, Xochitepec, and Zacatepec), the protests escalated to the point that 
the losing factions ended up campaigning against the PRI nominees and even leaving the 
party (Arias 2000a; Barberi 2000; Arias 2000b; Morales 2000). In cases where the winner 
did not belong to the Salgado Brito’s faction (e.g., Cuernavaca), the resulting nominee 
and Salgado Brito campaigned separately and their campaign teams frequently boycotted 
each other. As a result, the confrontation, exclusion, and exodus in the PRI that had 
started with the primary to elect the gubernatorial nominee continued to increase until the 
election day (July 2).128 
To complicate the scenario even more, the PAN nominee took advantage of the 
Carrillo Olea scandal by linking the PRI to “the Carrillo Olea’s corruption and protection 
to kidnaping gangs and drug cartels,” whereas the PRI candidates desperately tried to 
distance themselves from the former governor and even associate him to the PAN 
nominee (Martínez 2000b). For example, Salgado Brito and the PRI senate candidate, 
Jorge Meade Ocaranza, claimed that Carrillo Olea was the main sponsor of the PAN 
candidate, and Salgado Brito aired a controversial TV spot in which he said that the bad 
rulers had been punished as the image of Carrillo Olea was displayed (Fierro 2000e; 
Martínez 2000b). The PRI’s strategy was counterproductive because a survey conducted 
to measure the impact of the mutual accusations indicated that 38 percent of population 
                                                
128 In confidential interview, a politician who participated in these episodes explained, “Salgado Brito was 
overconfident of his electoral prospects, so he extended his exclusionary practices to the municipal level; 
he expected a submissive response from the PRI factions to his commands as had traditionally happened. 
He did not anticipate that the factions would react against him. When he realized the magnitude and 
possible implications of this rebellion, it was too late.” 
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linked Salgado Brito to Carrillo Olea and only 3 percent associated the PAN nominee 
with the former governor ("Encuesta: Morelos para el PAN"  2000). Furthermore, four 
out of ten respondents declared that the Carrillo Olea issue influenced their vote intention 
and most of them decided to vote for the PAN nominee.129 
As Figure 4.1 shows, the aftermath of the PRI primaries for governor and 
municipal authorities and events related to Carrillo Olea’s impeachment trial are 
connected with the variation in voting intentions for the PRI, which led this party to lose 
the election by a two-to-one margin against the PAN. By the end of the primary, the PRI 
had lost 22 percentage points in the margin of voting preferences it had vis-à-vis the PAN 
before the beginning of the gubernatorial nomination process. Between November 16, 
1999 and February 21, 2000 the voting intentions for the PRI declined from 42 to 33.4 
percent, whereas the ones for the PAN increased from 21.4 to 34.7 percent. By April 11, 
right after the PRI’s conflictive municipal primaries, the PAN had a 6.8 percent led in 
voting intentions. The margin further grew to 8.6 percentage points by May 1, three days 
after the TSJE dictated its sentence against Carrillo Olea. As PRI nominee Salgado Brito 
campaigned attacking Carrillo Olea, voting intentions for the PRI declined even more. 
The margin of electoral preferences for the PAN vis-à-vis the PRI increased to 15.8 
percentage points by June 4 and to 19.3 by June 20, twelve days before the election. 
Finally, on July 2 the PRI lost the election by a vote margin of 27.4 percentage points 
(54.7 versus 27.3 percent) against the PAN. 
  
                                                
129 The newspaper that conducted the survey did not report this percentage. 
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Figure 4.1. Vote Intentions in Morelos, 1999-2000. 
 
Source: Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1999n, 2000a, 2000b; "Se afianza 
bipartidismo: Ven morelenses hacia horizonte opositor"  2000; "Encuesta: Morelos para 
el PAN"  2000, 2000c; IEEM 2000. 
 
Moreover, survey information indicates that the outlined events were followed by 
systematic increases in citizens’ rejection to vote for the PRI. The percentage of citizens 
reporting that they would never vote for the PRI skyrocketed from 5.4 on December 13 to 
23.9 on February 21, 15 days after the polemic gubernatorial primary (Presidencia de la 
República Mexicana 1999m, 2000a). Then, it rose again to 26.3 by April 11, two days 
after the controversial municipal primaries and nominations for the state congress. 
Opposition to the PRI increased even further after the TSJE issued the sentence against 
former governor Carrillo Olea (April 28) and the PRI nominee reoriented his campaign 
toward attacking Carrillo Olea (June 2). By June 20, 34.8 percent of citizens declared that 
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they would never vote for the PRI (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 2000c). In 
other words, the proportion increased more than six times in a few months. 
In sum, the subordination of the factions in the authoritarian period prevented 
them from developing the seeds of cooperation that could have helped them remain 
united on their own when the center ceased to be a determinant factor in local politics 
after 1994. As a consequence, when they were fully empowered to decide the nomination 
for 2000, factions opted not to collaborate but rather to confront each other, just as 
prevailing theories of cooperation would predict for players with conflicting incentives in 
initial interactions. Additionally, as opposed to what other scholars have suggested (e.g., 
Hernández Rodríguez 1998), the case of Morelos indicates that geographical proximity to 
Mexico City cannot explain factional unity or division.130 
 
Factional Disputes in Nuevo León: The 1997 Election 
As happened in Morelos with Governor Jorge Carrillo Olea in 1998, in 1996 
Sócrates Rizzo García left the governorship of Nuevo Leon amidst a political scandal and 
a confrontation with the President Ernesto Zedillo administration.131 The center took 
                                                
130 The inter-factional disputes prevailed in Morelos in the following two elections, preventing the PRI 
from recovering the governorship. In 2006 the PRI nominated local legislator Maricela Sánchez Cortés as 
its gubernatorial candidate in the middle of a highly contentious selection process where the other 
contenders: local legislator Juan Salgado Brito defected from the party to support the PRD-PT-
Convergencia presidential nominee Andrés Manuel López Obrador; former Substitute Governor Jorge 
Morales Barud left the internal race to join PAN Governor Sergio Estrada Cajigal administration; and 
senator David Jiménez González and local legislator Rodolfo Becerril Straffon strongly criticized the 
selection process. In this context, Sánchez Cortés, also endorsed by the PVEM, was third in the general 
election with 26.57 percent of the vote after the PAN nominee Marco Antonio Adame Castillo (35.14 
percent) and the PRD-PT-Convergencia nominee Fernando Martínez Cué (31.26 percent) (IEEM 2006). In 
2012, the PRI nominated Amado Orihuela Trejo, a local legislator and the President of the PRI’s CDE, 
amid a strong opposition from Manuel Martínez Garrigós, the mayor of Cuernavaca and another main 
contender for the gubernatorial nomination. The winner of the general election was the PRD-PT-MC 
nominee Graco Ramírez Garrido with 43.43 percent of the vote, whereas Orihuela Trejo, also endorsed by 
the PVEM and PANAL, was second with 34.79 percent (IEEM 2012). 
131 The following section explains these events in detail. 
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advantage of the ouster of Rizzo García to set the stage for the PRI gubernatorial 
nomination for the 1997 election at the expense of the PRI’s local factions. Although the 
PRI’s CEN proposed senator Eloy Cantú to replace Rizzo García, federal Undersecretary 
of Government José Natividad González Parás maneuvered to displace Cantú and 
designate Benjamín Clariond Reyes Retana as substitute governor instead. Although the 
PRI’s CEN participated in the process, Chuayffet led the negotiations to replace Rizzo 
García following the advice of his close collaborator and political ally, González Parás, 
given the direct political interest that the former had in the case (Sotelo and Solís 1996). 
By promoting Clariond Reyes Retana, González Parás put out of his way his strongest 
competitor for the PRI gubernatorial nomination the following year. Clariond Reyes 
Retana not only was the PRI politician with the most support among the powerful 
economic elite of Nuevo León but also was about ten times more popular than González 
Parás. Indeed, as one of the least preferred politicians for the governorship, González 
Parás’ popularity was below other competitors, such as senator Alberto Santos de Hoyos, 
senator María Elena Chapa, and former senator Ricardo Canavati ("Encabezan sondeo 
Benjamín y Chuy"  1996; Pérez 1996). In sum, through this stratagem, the center 
discarded the main local contender for the PRI candidacy in the upcoming election and 
set the stage to nominate the less electorally viable González Parás, who was the center’s 
favorite. 
Clariond Reyes Retana administration soon started to pay off politically, because 
the governor’s approval rate, which was 47 percent under Rizzo García, reached 86 
percent just two months after Clariond Reyes Retana took office ("Gobernantes bajo la 
lupa"  1996; Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1996a). Furthermore, the new 
governor’s popularity changed the trend of voting intentions for the incoming 
gubernatorial election, because in the same period the PRI reached a technical tie with the 
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PAN after being below this party for seven percentage points right after Clariond Reyes 
Retana had taken office ("Encabezan sondeo Benjamín y Chuy"  1996). Under these 
conditions, the projected nomination of the center’s favorite González Parás seemed 
promising despite his lack of popularity, so the center imposed him as the PRI nominee 
for the 1997 gubernatorial election, as it had done routinely.  
This time, however, the emerging democratic conditions undermined the center’s 
capacity to enforce party unity. An unexpected series of adverse responses from the 
previously docile local factions damaged severely the PRI’s prospects of retaining the 
governorship. The nomination of González Parás on December 8, 1996, generated 
immediate negative reactions among others contenders, such as senator Santos de Hoyos 
who criticized the center’s interference and refused to endorse González Parás (Ortega 
1996b, 1996a). Furthermore, on December 20, Luis Eugenio Todd Pérez, a former UNL 
rector, a former federal deputy, and a former federal Undersecretary of Education, quit 
the PRI to compete against his former party by becoming the gubernatorial candidate of 
the Partido del Trabajo (PT)132 (Estrada 1996; Leroux 1997). These events preceded an 
evident decline in the support for the PRI. By contrast, support for the PT, which had no 
previous electoral presence in Nuevo León, increased to the point that it displaced the 
PRD as the third largest political party in the state (see Figure 4.2). 
  
                                                
132 Labor Party. 
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Figure 4.2. Vote Intentions in Nuevo León, 1996-1997. 
 
Source: "Encabezan sondeo Benjamín y Chuy"  1996; Presidencia de la República 
Mexicana 1996c, 1996b; "Menos margen y más indecisos"  1997; Pérez 1997; "Ayuda 
voto secreto a Nati"  1997; Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1997c, 1997b; CIDAC 
2011. 
 
In an attempt to stem the decline, González Parás promoted the nomination of 
Clariond Reyes Retana for the mayorship of Monterrey (Avila 1997), a city whose 
metropolitan area comprises around 90 percent of Nuevo León’s total population. He 
hoped that a highly popular politician such as Clariond Reyes Retana, whose approval 
rate as substitute governor averaged 80 percent throughout the whole electoral process 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1996b, 1997c, 1997b), could help pull González 
Parás to victory. Nevertheless, Clariond Reyes Retana quickly refused the nomination 
that might have saved González Parás (Undiano 1997). 
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Instead of helping the PRI, the substitute governor surprisingly initiated a highly 
publicized legal process against former governor Rizzo García and prominent members 
of his administration (see the following section on the political scandals of Morelos and 
Nuevo León). Although all of them were declared free of charges after a long trial, the 
scandalous process unfolded in the middle of the campaign (Escamilla and Martínez 
1997), damaging the PRI’s electoral prospects. A survey conducted 34 days before the 
election indicated that one out of five citizens said that they would never vote for the PRI, 
and another survey conducted nine days before the election reported that the proportion 
had increased to one out of four persons (Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1997c, 
1997b). More directly, 60 percent of those respondents offered reasons related to 
corruption not to vote for the PRI ever. The fact that the accusations against Rizzo García 
and his collaborators occurred in electoral times but were ultimately dismissed as well as 
Clariond Reyes Retana’s refusal to accept the nomination for Monterrey created 
suspicion that the substitute governor deliberately tried to benefit PAN gubernatorial 
candidate Fernando Canales Clariond, his cousin and business partner (Camp 2011a), at 
the PRI’s expense (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 49-51). Under these conditions, on July 2, the 
PRI lost the gubernatorial election by a margin of 6.6 percentage points against the PAN 
(CIDAC 2011). 
Figure 4.2 shows the temporal variation in voting intentions for this election at 
three critical moments: González Parás’ nomination; Todd Pérez’s resignation from the 
PRI to become the PT’s candidate; and the PRI nomination for municipal authorities in 
which Clariond Reyes Retana refused to compete for the Monterrey’s mayorship. The 
PRI and PAN were technically tied in early December 1996. However, the nomination of 
González Parás as well as Todd Pérez’s split put the PRI 11.4 percentage points behind 
the PAN by January 2, 1997. The PRI reduced the differential to 6.3 percentage points by 
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March 2. Nevertheless, after the PRI failed to nominate Clariond Reyes Retana for the 
mayorship of Monterrey, the differential increased to 8.3 percentage points by May 27. 
Finally, the PAN won the gubernatorial election by obtaining 48.5 percent of the vote, 
whereas the PRI received 41.9 percent. By contrast, nominating the PRI defector Todd 
Pérez represented for the PT a historical boost in its voting intentions, which increased 
from 0.5 percent in December 13, 1996 to the 5.8 percent of the vote this party received 
in the election. This proportion was almost the double of the 3.2 percent of the vote that 
the PRD obtained in this election. 
Furthermore, survey data indicate that during the campaign as a result of the 
PRI’s internal problems, potential voters moved away from the PRI towards the PAN and 
the PRI defector Todd Pérez. Between December 13, 1996 (five days after the 
nomination of González Parás as the PRI candidate) and June 22, 1997 (ten days before 
the election), the proportion of self-reported PRI supporters who declared they would 
vote for the PAN and PT increased 1.9 and 2.7 percentage points, respectively 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1996b, 1997b). Conversely, the proportion of 
PAN supporters who would vote for the PRI decreased 2.2 percentage points. During the 
same period, the proportion of independent citizens who said they would vote for the PRI 
increased by less (2.5 percentage points) than the proportion of people who said they 
would vote for the PAN (3.4 percentage points) or the PT (6.6 percentage points). 
In short, the center attempted, as usual, to impose the nominee in 1997. This time, 
however, it faced the adverse reaction of local factions now empowered by the emerging 
democratic conditions. The resulting conflict led the PRI to lose the governorship.133 As 
                                                
133 As opposed to Morelos, the Nuevo León’s factions were able to solve their differences and restore party 
unity for the two following elections, which made it possible for the PRI to recover the governorship in 
2003 and retain it in 20009. In 2003 Natividad González Parás obtained the nomination again through an 
open primary in which he defeated Abel Guerra Garza, Ricardo Canavati Tafich, Eloy Cantú Segovia, and 
Romeo Flores Caballero. The other contenders accepted the results and endorsed González Parás, whose 
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in Morelos, the local factions not only abandoned a sitting governor involved in a 
political conflict but also participated in attacks against him, undermining the PRI’s 
popularity and thus contributing to its defeat in this critical election. 
 
ANTAGONISTIC FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL SCANDALS 
This section examines the reactions of the factions of Morelos and Nuevo León to 
scandals affecting high-ranking politicians during the democratic period (from 1995 
onwards). It shows that the antagonistic factionalism that emerged in these states after the 
authoritarian era extended to abandoning politicians facing political controversies. It 
analyzes scandals involving governors Jorge Carrillo Olea in Morelos in 1998 and 
Sócrates Rizzo García in Nuevo León in 1996. In both cases the local factions, including 
those that had benefited from them, opted to defect from these politicians amidst the 
conflicts they were facing. 
 
Factional Defection in Morelos: The Removal of Carrillo Olea 
National and local events changed dramatically the fate of the Governor Jorge 
Carrillo Olea administration within a few months, after he took office in 1994. One of the 
worst economic crises in Mexico affected the economic prospects of Morelos and 
deteriorated the popularity of the PRI politicians, including Carrillo Olea (Quero and 
González 2004, 105-108). Moreover, Carrillo Olea’s relationship with the center changed 
                                                                                                                                            
nomination was also supported by the PVEM, Liberal Mexican Party, and Fuerza Ciudadana. He won the 
general election by obtaining 56.7 percent of the vote, whereas the PAN nominee Mauricio Fernández 
Garza was second with 33.8 percent (IMO 2003). In 2009 the PRI nominated Governor González Parás’ 
protégé Rodrigo Medina de la Cruz as unity candidate. Medina de la Cruz, also endorsed by the PVEM, 
PT, Democratic Party, and Cruzada Ciudadana, won the election with 49 percent of the vote, whereas his 
closest contender was the PAN candidate Fernando Elizondo Barragán with 43.4 percent (CEENL 2009). 
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completely. Whereas he had an evident support from outgoing President Salinas de 
Gortari, Carrillo Olea’s relationship with incoming President Ernesto Zedillo was distant 
and tense at first and became completely antagonistic over time. 
In fact Carrillo Olea publicly described four episodes illustrating Zedillo’s 
animosity against him (Carrillo Olea 2011, 225-231). The first event occurred in 
September 1994 when Carrillo Olea organized a formal meeting with PRI governors of 
states near Morelos, such as Estado de México, Guerrero, Puebla, and Tlaxcala to discuss 
common public issues related to their states. In reaction to the meeting, the staff of 
elected President Zedillo released press leaks accusing Carrillo Olea of trying to create an 
authoritarian pressure group to exert influence over Zedillo’s administration. The second 
incident, also in 1994, took place in a private meeting where Carrillo Olea handed elected 
President Zedillo an analysis on national security based on Carrillo Olea’s expertise as he 
had done with previous elected presidents. An upset Zedillo responded to Carrilo Olea 
that he had no opinion in Zedillo’s administration. The third incident occurred in 1996 
during Zedillo’s first visit to Morelos as president. This visit was eclipsed by the killing 
of a member of the Comité de la Unidad Tepozteca, a local group that opposed a major 
private real estate project supported by the Carrillo Olea administration. Zedillo refused 
to discuss the incident with Carrillo Olea and in private said that the governor of Morelos 
was a “moron.” From that point on, the federal government’s support to the state 
government waned. The fourth event happened in 1997 when federal attorney general 
Jorge Madrazo Cuéllar opened an official investigation against Carrillo Olea, based on 
leaks published by the New York Times linking Carrillo Olea and Sonora’s governor 
Manlio Fabio Beltrones to the drug cartels (Dillon and Pyes 1997; Dillon 1997). 
To make things worse for Carrillo Olea, kidnappings skyrocketed in his term. 
Opposition groups and PRD prominent politician Graco Ramírez, who was sponsored by 
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Liévano Saénz, the Zedillo’s Private Secretary, took advantage of this opportunity to 
mobilize different sectors against Carrillo Olea, blaming him for the problem and even 
claiming that high ranking officials of the state attorney general’s office and judicial 
police were colluding with kidnapping gangs (Carrillo Olea 2011, 231-234; Quero and 
González 2004; Vences 2000). In this context, the PRI suffered a major setback in 
Morelos in the 1997 election in which, with respect to 1994, the PRI’s vote share 
plummeted from 52.3 to 36.4 percent for the federal congress, from 62.5 to 35.62 percent 
for the state congress, and from 61.1 to 35.4 percent for municipal authorities (Toledo 
Patiño 1998; IEEM 1997a, 1997b; IFE 1994, 1997). As a result, the PRI lost its majority 
in the state legislature (it obtained 13 out of 30 legislators), 17 out of 33 municipalities 
(most of which were the most populated and prosperous ones), and three out of four seats 
in the federal congress. 
Moreover, in 1998 an unexpected event was sealed for Carrillo Olea’s political 
fate. On January 28, the chief of the state Judicial Police’s Unit for Kidnappings, 
Armando Martínez Soriano, and two of his officers were captured in the state of Guerrero 
while attempting to get rid of a kidnapper’s dead body with signs of torture. The incident 
generated a national scandal and a major political conflict for the state government, 
which was even more aggravated by Carrillo Olea’s refusal to agree to the state 
Congress’ formal call to interrogate Carlos Peredo Merlo, the state Attorney General, 
about the episode in a public Congress hearing. Furthermore, a few days after the event 
the federal attorney general office put Peredo Merlo; Rafael Borrego Díaz, assistant state 
Attorney General; and Jesús Miyazawa, the chief of the state Judicial Police, under 
detention for judicial investigation. 
As the political crisis evolved, PAN and PRD leaders and legislators as well as 
different opposition groups started promoting the governor’s impeachment, calculating 
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that Carrillo Olea’s fall was “viable” given his increasing political weakness and lack of 
support from the center (Vences 2000, 81). In an attempt to recover politically, Carrillo 
Olea made numerous appointments in his administration through which he replaced 
members of the foreign legion with local professionals proposed by groups of local 
lawyers in exchange for their support. In addition, he visited numerous localities and 
participated in several public events to gain popularity and support from different groups. 
These actions, however, could not counteract his declining popularity. Between late 
February and early May, his already low approval rating declined from 20 to 16 percent 
(Presidencia de la República Mexicana 1998q, 1998p). Furthermore, the percentage of 
people who believed that Carrillo Olea’s resignation was necessary increased from 55 to 
76 percent in the same period. Finally, on May 15, Carrillo Olea formally asked the state 
Congress permission to leave the governorship indefinitely.134 
The reaction of the local PRI factions to the crisis that led Carrillo Olea to resign, 
the process of his resignation, and the aftermath of it were rooted in their historical 
subordination to the center. As the crisis unfolded, the main factions’ first reaction was of 
bewilderment: they could not decide between supporting a governor they had no identity 
with and who had excluded them but who was their formal leader, and waiting for the 
center’s instructions about what to do but at the expense of more uncertainty. Some 
factions timidly opted for one of these paths but without cancelling the possibility of 
eventually supporting the other. At the time of Carrillo Olea’s resignation, the factions 
that had worked for and received substantial support from him maintained their loyalty to 
the outgoing governor to the point of making it possible for him to decide his successor 
against the center’s will. But as soon as Carrillo Olea left office these groups turned 
                                                
134 Mexican law requires a long and complicated process to quit elected positions, thus most elected 
officials rely on Congress permissions for “indefinite leaves,” which are considerably simpler to process, to 
de facto resign. 
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against him, leaving him on his own, with deleterious consequences not only for Carrillo 
Olea but also for those factions and even the PRI’s electoral prospects (see the previous 
section on the 2000 gubernatorial election). 
 
The Adverse Responses From Local Factions 
In this subsection I examine the factions’ behavior in each of these three periods 
in detail. In the middle of the political crisis the renovation of the PRI’s CDE took place. 
Although it was a PRI tradition that governors appoint the PRI state leaders, particularly 
in between regular elections, this time different groups, including some that had been 
subordinated to Carrillo Olea, tried to snatch from Carrillo Olea this authority, taking 
advantage of his weakness. The PRI’s formal leadership was critical not only for those 
factions but also for Carrillo Olea. The PRI’s CDE represented for the challengers a key 
position for them to negotiate political benefits, including the governorship if Carrillo 
Olea left, whereas it was equally important for Carrillo Olea to preserve the PRI’s CDE 
to improve his waning political leverage. 
The main competitors for the CDE were three: Jorge Morales Barud, sponsored 
by Carrillo Olea, former governor Riva Palacio López, and senator Rodolfo Becerril 
Straffon; Luis Arturo Cornejo Alatorre; and Armando Ramírez Saldívar. Because the PRI 
tradition indicated that Morales Barud should be the only candidate given that he had the 
governor’s support, the unprecedented presence of other competitors was an obvious 
challenge to the governor’s authority from the President of the PRI’s CEN, Mariano 
Palacios Alcócer, and the PRI leader in the state Congress, Víctor Saucedo Perdomo, the 
main sponsors of Cornejo Alatorre and Ramírez Saldívar, respectively ("En 24 horas, 
humo blanco en el PRI"  1998; "Cornejo Alatorre se perfila para dirigir al CDE del PRI"  
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1998; Aragón 1998; "4 aspirantes a la dirigencia del PRI estatal"  1998). In addition, the 
factions of former governor Ortega Martínez and former contender for the PRI 
gubernatorial contender Juan Salgado Brito followed the PRI national leadership in 
challenging Carrillo Olea by supporting Cornejo Alatorre 135 Nevertheless, Carrillo Olea 
overcame this challenge and Morales Barud won easily, obtaining 56.7 percent of the PRI 
state political council’s vote on March 21, 1998 ("Morales Barud, nuevo presidente del 
PRI"  1998). 
After becoming the CDE’s president, Morales Barud organized rallies and other 
events to support Carrillo Olea (Fierro 1998c, 1998b; Vences 2000). In some of them, a 
few groups that had been politically marginalized by the sitting governor, such as former 
governor Riva Palacio López’s faction, participated with the idea that Carrillo Olea’s 
ouster would have negative consequences for the PRI electoral prospects. These 
demonstrations, however, could not prevent Carrillo Olea from resigning. 
On April 7, opposition leaders formally asked the state congress to start an 
impeachment trial136 against the governor, which put more pressure on Carrillo Olea. 
Meanwhile, Carrillo Olea had started a series of meetings with Francisco Labastida, the 
federal Secretary of Government, to evaluate the political situation of Morelos. The 
climax of these meetings took place on May 10 when Labastida asked Carrillo Olea to 
leave the governorship, which Carrillo Olea accepted under the condition that the 
impeachment trial be dismissed. 
The replacement process was not automatic but involved the approval of the state 
Congress, which the PRI did not control. The appointment of the substitute governor 
                                                
135 Confidential interviews. 
136 The impeachment trial was a two-stage trial. In the first stage, the state congress, acting as a preliminary 
jury (jurado de declaración), received the request for impeachment, collected all evidence ad hoc, and 
established the validity of the claim. In the second stage, the state Superior Court of Justice (Tribunal 
Superior de Justicia del Estado, TSJE), as a sentence jury (jurado de sentencia), issued the verdict. 
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required the approval of at least 16 legislators. The PRI had 12 legislators (one of the 
original 13, Ricardo Dorantes San Martín, left the party to join the PRD), the PRD 12 
(including the former priísta), the PAN 5, and the local Partido Civilista Morelense 
(PCM) 1. As a result, the decision required negotiation with the opposition. The Secretary 
of Government (SEGOB) proposed the then-state delegate of the federal Secretary of 
Social Development (SEDESOL) and former PRI gubernatorial pre-candidate, Juan 
Salgado Brito, to be the substitute governor, which was accepted by the two main parts in 
the political conflict: Graco Ramírez,137 the main promoter of the anti-Carrillo Olea 
movement, on behalf of the PRD’s national committee and Carrillo Olea, to whom 
Salgado Brito had political debts.138 The 13 PRD and PCM state legislators, however, 
refused to accept Salgado Brito, arguing they did not participate in the negotiation. 
Instead, they offered to accept anyone from the PRI but Salgado Brito. The 5 PAN 
legislators expressed their intention to vote for any person who had the approval of PRI 
and PRD. Consequently, an agreement between PRI and PRD legislators was necessary 
to appoint the new governor. 
The SEGOB then proposed the former senator and former PRI gubernatorial pre-
candidate, Angel Ventura Valle, who was accepted by the PRD and PCM legislators but 
rejected by the PRI legislators under Carrillo Olea’s command. As result, Carrillo Olea 
managed for the PRI legislators to propose state PRI leader Jorge Morales Barud, whom 
the SEGOB and opposition legislators finally accepted; thus the state Congress appointed 
Morales Barud as governor substitute on May 18 (Vences 2000, 325-349). Although 
under Carrillo Olea’s sponsorship Morales Barud had become a state legislator, the head 
                                                
137 In fact, on March 12, Ramírez telephoned the PRD state leaders from the SEGOB to announce Carrillo 
Olea’s resignation and that Salgado Brito would be the new governor. 
138 Under Carrillo Olea’s sponsorship, Salgado Brito had become representative of the Morelos’ legislators 
in the federal low chamber (1994-1997) and President of the PRI’s CDE (1996-1997). 
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of the state Congress, the state Secretary of Government, the PRI state leader, and now 
governor, once he took office he announced that he would not guard Carrillo Olea’s back 
(Vences 2000, 349). And, in fact, Morales Barud provided no political support to Carrillo 
Olea in his term as substitute governor.139 
Unexpectedly, just eight days later (May 26) opposition state legislators started 
the impeachment trial against Carrillo Olea in the state Congress. The trial seemed 
unnecessary because according to the Morelos’ law the main purpose of an impeachment 
was to dismiss a public official and that goal had been attained with Carrillo Olea’s 
resignation. Nevertheless, the promoters of the trial declared that they wanted to legally 
disqualify Carrillo Olea to be public official at the state level in the future (Fierro 1998a). 
The main charges against Carrillo Olea’s were having appointed as high public officials 
people without the legal requirement of at least 10 years of previous residence in 
Morelos, knowing about the “possible” link between judicial police officers and 
kidnapping gangs, and not having applied his expertise to hear his constituents’ claims. 
Carrillo Olea’s emissary Matías Nazario Morales asked the PRI leader in the state 
Congress, Víctor Saucedo Perdomo, for his help to stop the impeachment. Like Morales 
Barud, Saucedo Perdomo refused to help his main political sponsor,140 arguing that 
Carrillo Olea was not governor anymore, thus he was on “his own.”141 Similarly, Carrillo 
Olea asked directly the new federal Secretary of Government, Diódoro Carrasco 
Altamirano, for help without success.142 
                                                
139 Confidential interviews. 
140 Saucedo Perdomo owned to Carrillo Olea his appointments as state Undersecretary of Government 
(1994-1996) and General Secretary of the PRI’s CDE (1996-1997) as well as his then current positions as 
state deputy and leader of the PRI state deputies. 
141 Confidential interview. 
142 Confidential interview. 
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The impeachment trial brought a series of unexpected events that severely 
damaged the PRI’s image in the 2000 election (see the previous section on this election). 
On June 2, 1999, without any political support from SEGOB and his former protégés, 
substitute governor Morales Barud and PRI leader in the state Congress Saucedo 
Perdomo, Carrillo Olea was declared guilty by the state Congress, which sent the case to 
the state Superior Court of Justice (TSJE) to issue a sentence according to the Congress’ 
resolution (Fierro 1999b). Three days later (June 3), however, the TSJE dismissed the 
case, arguing it was not constitutionally competent to judge state governors (Fierro 
1999a). In response, the state Congress issued a constitutional claim to the National 
Supreme Court of Justice (SCJN), which in the middle of the 2000 state elections 
(February 3) ordered the state court to examine the Carrillo Olea’s case. Just two months 
before the election (April 28), under pressure from opposition state legislators,143 and 
despite the fact that most of its members owned their positions to Carrillo Olea, the TSJE 
declared the former governor guilty, disqualifying from occupying any state office for 12 
years. It sent the trial file to the state Attorney General to prosecute Carrillo Olea for any 
crime he might have committed as governor. The state Attorney General, Rogelio 
Sánchez Gatica, refused to grant the dismissal of the case that Carrillo Olea requested and 
instead left open the case in the remaining months of the term of substitute governor 
Morales Barud’s as well as during the term of interim governor Jorge Arturo García 
Rubí144 (from May to September, 2000). In sum, not only the federal government but also 
the local factions that he had sponsored left Carrillo Olea on his own. 
                                                
143 Opposition state deputies threatened the magistrates of the state court with not confirming their 
appointments and disapproving their economic compensation for retirement if they exonerated Carrillo 
Olea (Quero and González 2004). As a result, the magistrates changed completely their original resolution 
(Fierro 2000d). 
144 Under Carrillo Olea’s sponsorship, García Rubí had been appointed state attorney general in 1994 and 
president of the TSJE from 1995 to 1998. 
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It may be argued that the PRI local factions did not do anything to protect Carrillo 
Olea because his case was so complicated that was beyond their hands to support him. 
The conclusion of Carrillo Olea’s case, however, challenges this explanation. After the 
PRI lost office, the new state Attorney General, Guillermo Tenorio, Avila attempted 
continuously to prosecute Carrillo Olea under incoming PAN governor Sergio Estrada 
Cajigal’s command (Carrillo Olea 2011, 234-236; Fierro 2003). It was in the PAN 
administration’s best interest to prosecute and even incarcerate a prominent PRI 
politician such as Carrillo Olea. However, after a long trial involving resolutions of a 
state judge and a section of the TSJE (then composed by court judges unrelated to 
Carrillo Olea), Carrillo Olea was finally declared free of charges in January 2004 (Fierro 
2004). In other words, without any political support and under the PAN administrations 
of President Vicente Fox and Governor Estrada Cajigal, Carrillo Olea was declared not 
guilty of the charges that had motivated his impeachment. 
In short, as the scandal surrounding Governor Carrillo Olea shows, the lack of 
cooperation of previously subordinated factions led the various factions to abandon and 
attack politicians facing scandals even when they had previously benefited from these 
politicians. 
 
Factional Desertion in Nuevo León: The Dismissal of Rizzo García 
As happened with Carrillo Olea in Morelos, the fate of Governor Socrates Rizzo 
García changed drastically in a few months. In March 1995, former President Salinas de 
Gortari went to Monterrey to launch a hunger strike against President Ernesto Zedillo, 
with whom Salinas de Gortari had an acrimonious confrontation. Because Rizzo García 
failed to express his loyalty to Zedillo at this critical moment, from that point on the 
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federal government became hostile to him (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 45-47; García 1996; 
Carrizales and Cuéllar 1996). During his term, for instance, Salinas de Gortari visited 
Nuevo León 27 times and approved the financial support to diverse state projects. In two 
years, by contrast, Zedillo visited the state only twice and the federal funding for Nuevo 
León was reduced by 30 percent. 
The hostility from the federal government and the fact that his administration 
faced escalating political problems propitiated Rizzo García’s downfall. As had happened 
with Governor Elizondo Lozano in 1971, the center directly intervened to oust him ("Cae 
Sócrates Rizzo"  1996; Cepeda 1996). One of the main problems that the governor faced 
was related to the case of criminal lawyer Leopoldo del Real, who was assassinated while 
having a meeting with Fernando Garza Guzmán, the chief of the state police criminal 
department, in a public restaurant. The scandal around this case escalated when letters 
signed by Del Real were made public. The letters accused state Attorney General David 
Cantú Díaz of being involved with drug traffickers, revealed that Del Real and Cantú 
Díaz were partners in illicit activities, and claimed that Del Real was Rizzo García’s 
protégée. A high-ranking official and two officers of the state police criminal department 
were arrested during the investigation. The second main problem for Rizzo García was 
the allegations of influence peddling that emerged against his sister Celia Fanny Rizzo 
García. In this context, on April 14, 1996, federal Secretary of Government Emilio 
Chuayffet and President of the PRI’s CEN Santiago Oñate asked Rizzo García to resign, 
which he did three days later (Sotelo and Solís 1996). 
During the conflict and his resignation, Rizzo García did not receive any support 
from the local factions. By contrast, his replacement, substitute governor Benjamín 
Clariond Reyes Retana, surprisingly initiated a broadly publicized legal and political 
campaign against prominent members of Rizzo García administration, including Rizzo 
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García himself, who were accused of corruption. Rizzo García was interrogated by the 
state attorney general’s office for more than ten hours amid an extensive mass media 
coverage (Gutiérrez Salazar 2007, 49-51). As happened with Carrillo Olea in Morelos, 
however, the prosecution against the Nuevo León’s former governor was mainly political 
and had weak legal foundations; thus Rizzo García was declared not guilty in a long trial 
he faced without political support and under the legal persecution that the incoming PAN 
governor ordered against him (Martínez 2000a; Juárez, Reyes, and Muñiz 2003). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
As soon as the center’s capacity to enforce party unity waned, the previously 
subordinated internal factions started adopting confrontational and exclusionary practices 
that led the PRI to lose the governorships of Morelos in 2000 and Nuevo León in 1997. In 
both cases, these factions focused on apparent short-term benefits, rather than on the 
long-term costs of conflict. 
Empowered by the center to decide the gubernatorial candidate after the transition 
to democracy, the PRI factions of Morelos reacted with antagonism and exclusion. They 
engaged in an acrimonious dispute to determine the nominee. Although the losing groups 
expected negotiation and incorporation, the winning faction opted to confront and 
exclude other factions from the distribution of political positions, which were mainly 
granted to its own members, calculating that it would not need the support of the other 
internal groups to win. The confrontation was public and hurt the PRI electoral prospects. 
As a means of revenge, the losing factions openly supported opposition candidates, 
taking away more votes from the PRI. As a consequence, the PRI lost the 2000 election 
by a resounding two-to-one margin against the PAN. 
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In Nuevo León, emerging democratic conditions also constrained the center’s 
capacity to enforce party unity. The result was factional antagonism damaging the PRI’s 
image in critical electoral moments. The center’s nominee was openly protested by one of 
the losing factions and this generated a party split. This led to a decline in the voting 
intensions for the PRI. Furthermore, substitute governor Benjamín Clariond Reyes 
Retana not only refused to become candidate for Monterrey’s mayorship to bring votes 
for the PRI gubernatorial nominee but also fueled an scandal involving former governor 
Sócrates Rizzo García, which directly benefited the PAN gubernatorial candidate, 
Fernando Canales Clariond, his cousin and business partner. Under these conditions, the 
PRI was defeated by the PAN in the 1997 election. 
In both states the local factions abandoned and even attacked the governors who 
faced major political scandals. The adverse factional responses to these high-ranking 
politicians caused significant damage to the PRI. Moreover, factions could have 
successfully defended these politicians, given that the legal foundations of their scandals 
were weak to say the least (let us recall that the governors in both cases were declared 
innocent of the charges despite efforts by the incoming opposition governors to convict 
them). Nevertheless, the short-term focus of these antagonistic factions prevented them 




Chapter 5: Conclusions 
This dissertation analyzes the performance of the PRI in gubernatorial elections in 
Mexico and explores the origins, dynamics, and evolution of this party’s local factions. I 
demonstrate that the degree of internal factionalism often determines whether dominant 
parties retain or lose power at the subnational level. Factional cohesion helps incumbent 
parties win even highly contested elections, whereas inter-factional conflicts have 
devastating effects on the prospects that dominant parties will remain in office even 
under apparently favorable conditions. Additionally, I offer a historical-institutional 
theory that explains the propensity of factions to unite or divide in electoral times. 
This chapter first summarizes the core findings of the dissertation. It then 
addresses the implications of this study for research on dominant parties, incumbent 
parties, and political parties in general. It also examines the implications of this 
dissertation for subnational studies in political science as well as for our understanding of 
contemporary Mexican politics. The subsequent section discusses the applicability of my 
arguments to other cases of dominant parties, incumbent parties, and parties more 
generally. The chapter ends by suggesting some promising avenues for future research. 
 
MAIN FINDINGS ON DEMOCRATIZATION AND FACTIONAL POLITICS 
One of the main contributions of the dissertation is that it presents (and provides 
empirical support for) a theory that disentangles the effects that democratization exerts 
over dominant parties at the subnational level. Democratization reduces the likelihood 
that dominant parties will stay in power because it creates a level playing field for 
electoral competition that enables opposition parties to become real contenders for office. 
In addition, democratization forces dominant parties to decentralize candidate selection 
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and empower local factions in order to remain competitive at the subnational level. 
Dominant parties are obliged to decentralize candidate selection because the imposition 
of nominees without local career trajectories and without the support of local factions 
would only reduce their chances of retaining office in subnational settings. As a result, 
emerging democratic conditions make internal cohesion crucial for dominant parties to 
preserve power. At the same time, however, democratization makes it more difficult for 
dominant parties to maintain party unity at the subnational level. Democratic transitions 
restrict the ability of national party authorities to enforce internal cohesion because the 
use of coercive, authoritarian mechanisms to subjugate subnational factions is by 
definition precluded under democracy. In addition, democratic change deters party unity 
by providing viable exit options (i.e., joining opposition parties) to internal factions. 
Thus, it is highly challenging for dominant parties to remain united and stay in power 
after a democratic transformation. 
Democratization does not necessarily mean the end of dominant parties at the 
subnational level, however. As this study demonstrates, dominant parties can continue to 
win subnational elections even after a transition to democracy as long as they preserve 
their internal cohesion and thus their electoral strength. This project shows how factions 
are crucial for dominant parties to retain power at the subnational level and details the 
ways in which these groups affect the electoral prospects of their parties. 
As Chapter 1 explains, inter-factional cohesion provides important assets for 
dominant parties to retain office in electoral times. Internal unity enables these parties 
and their nominees to communicate political stability and policy certainty as well as to 
campaign on issues of public interest, conveying professionalism, competence, and 
reliability, which attract broad and diverse range of voters. Additionally, party unity is 
crucial to preserve the organizational capacity necessary to run effective campaigns. 
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Finally, the image of strength that unified parties transmit also discourages opposition 
leading politicians and activists from challenging them. 
Internal conflicts have the opposite effects, serving as major liabilities for 
dominant parties. First, internal struggles devalue the public image of these parties and 
their candidates. Intra-party problems are usually magnified given the mass media’s 
inherent bias to focus more on crises and conflicts than on policy issues (Leighley 2003). 
As a consequence, party officials and nominees end up devoting more time and resources 
to addressing internal problems than to promoting their policy platforms. Second, internal 
conflicts diminish the organizational capacity of dominant parties. Internal battles 
commonly result in the political exclusion of certain factions and may lead the losing 
factions to withdraw their support for the party or even quit the party and join the 
opposition. Third, conflicts among factions convey weakness, which encourages 
opposition activists and politicians to challenge dominant parties. Moreover, these 
conflicts create bandwagon effects among voters in favor of the opposition. 
This study demonstrates that the level of factional cohesion is a consistent 
predictor of the electoral fate of dominant parties at the subnational level. As Chapter 2 
elucidates, the substantive effect of internal factions is more powerful than that of other 
variables, including those factors that have been highlighted by scholars who study 
dominant parties operating at the national level. Moderate levels of internal unity are 
sufficient for dominant parties to win subnational elections in the presence of one of the 
following conditions: a totally unified opposition, a highly unpopular governor, a state 
with the lowest rates of corporatism, or a state with the lowest degree of socio-economic 
marginalization. Moreover, strong levels of internal unity lead dominant parties to win 
even when a completely unified opposition combines with one of the following 
 226 
conditions: highly unpopular governors, low corporatist ratings, or low levels of 
marginalization. 
Based on data from contemporary gubernatorial elections in Mexico, this 
dissertation also shows that existing approaches fail to explain why factions sometimes 
unite and sometimes confront each other. This study shows that variation is still observed 
in inter-factional behavior even controlling for the possible effects of internal leadership 
and electoral institutions (all elections that are examined here take place in states led by 
PRI governors, who play a key leadership role in this party, and employ the simple 
plurality electoral system). Chapters 2, 3, and 4 present evidence indicating that electoral 
conditions do not influence the level of cohesion of intra-party groups. In other words, 
factions will unite or combat each other regardless of whether their party faces 
competitive elections. Chapter 2 also shows that the methods that parties use to select 
their nominees do not alter the relationship among factions. Similarly, neither the 
factions’ level of access to public resources, nor the number of factions seem to 
determine the likelihood that these political groups will ally or engage in disputes. 
By contrast, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 demonstrate that preexisting levels of autonomy 
of factions from the party central authorities are crucial for these groups to unite or wage 
war when they are fully empowered to decide on party affairs at the subnational level. As 
Chapter 3 shows, more autonomy gives factions more room to interact with each other as 
a means to advance their political interests (mainly the allocation of political positions for 
their members). This interaction provides the seeds of collaboration among factions that 
can expand once factions are vested with more decision-making capacity. Conversely, 
evidence presented in Chapter 4 indicates that less autonomy constrains inter-factional 
interaction, which impedes the emergence of incipient cooperation among factions. 
Where factions do not have autonomy, they pursue their political interests by individually 
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negotiating benefits with the center in exchange for their obedience to the center’s 
decisions. As a consequence, when more subordinated factions acquire full decision-
making power, they react by fighting with each other in an attempt to maximize their 
interests at the expense of the other groups. 
Building on existing theories of cooperation, this project argues that cooperation 
among factions is highly sensitive to initial interactions. In other words, early 
collaboration tends to lead to further collaboration, whereas initial antagonism is 
conducive to subsequent antagonism. The self-reinforcing features that initial interactions 
propitiate among factions explain this path-dependent trend. By cooperating, factions not 
only advance their interests but also learn the value of collaboration. They maximize the 
benefits they can obtain without incurring the high costs of fighting with each other, and 
at the same time they increase the odds that their party will win by working together. 
They also develop mutual trust, which is a valuable political asset. Mutual trust reduces 
uncertainty and thus the associated costs of intra-factional decision-making. In addition, 
cooperation fosters the development of a common identity among members of the 
factions. Because factions realize that their party’s strength resides in its internal unity, 
they are prone to protect each other, and they assume that any attack or threat against 
their leaders has the potential to put their party’s their interests, and hence their own 
interests, at risk. As Chapter 3 documents, under these circumstances, factions will even 
try to protect politicians facing major scandals. 
By contrast, in the absence of collaborative antecedents, factions react by 
combating each other, shortsighted by apparent short-term benefits. They will focus on 
the maximization of their interests (i.e., more political positions) that may result from 
excluding other factions, and they will underestimate the potential of the displaced 
groups to jeopardize their party’s prospects of remaining in office. The antagonism that 
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emerges in this context fuels further exclusion and disputes, instead of collaboration. 
Conflict becomes the dominant strategies for the factions, given that cooperation is 
unlikely to arise if most players do not see the point of it (Axelrod 1984). Thus, initial 
antagonism promotes mutual distrust and hostility and deters the development of a 
common identity among factions. Under these circumstances, factions not only fail to 
develop a sense of loyalty to any politician, but they also are prone to abandon and attack 
high-ranking politicians involved in scandals even if they owe important benefits to these 
politicians. The cases examined in Chapter 4 show that antagonistic factions follow this 
pattern even when it damages electorally their party and hurts their own interests. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation provides theoretical insights that contribute to our understanding 
of factional politics, dominant parties, and party politics. The findings presented here also 
underscore the role that subnational studies play in political science and address the 
limitations of the subnational-enclave literature to explain party dominance at the 
subnational level. 
Scholarly works on factionalism have evolved from their initial focus on the 
deleterious effects of factions on democratic representation and their host parties. More 
recent research has recognized that these groups are actually inherent to and play key 
roles in political parties (Belloni and Beller 1978; Gillespie, Waller, and López Nieto 
1995). Some studies have even examined the impact that factions exert over the electoral 
fate of dominant parties (Boucek 2009, 2010, 2012). This study contributes to the 
literature on factionalism by demonstrating that factions matter beyond the typical 
settings in which they have been explored: national politics and parliamentary and 
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centralized regimes (Belloni and Beller 1978; Bettcher 2005; Boucek 2009, 2010, 2012; 
Browne and Kim 2003; Chambers 2008; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1999, 2000; 
Gillespie, Waller, and López Nieto 1995; Leigh 2000; McCubbins and Thies 1997). The 
dissertation shows that factions are also crucial for dominant parties in subnational 
politics, presidential regimes, and even when they are informally and discreetly 
organized. Consequently, its findings call for the extension of research on factions to 
different levels of politics, varying types of political and electoral systems, and diverse 
forms of factional organization. 
The dissertation establishes that factionalism shapes the electoral fate of dominant 
parties. It demonstrates that factions exert an independent impact on their host parties and 
that this effect is not an epiphenomenon of variables, such as electoral conditions, 
institutions, the number of factions, party leadership, and the methods of candidate 
selection that their parties employ, as existing studies suggest (Boucek 2010, 2012; 
Langston 2003). As a result, any analysis devoted to assessing the prospects that 
dominant parties will maintain or lose power must take into account the level of inter-
factional cohesion existing in these parties. 
Furthermore, this study disentangles the causal mechanisms through which 
factions affect dominant parties. It shows that these groups influence the organizational 
strength, reputation, and quality of campaigns of their parties and their parties’ nominees. 
Nevertheless, these factors are crucial in electoral times not only for dominant parties but 
also for parties in general (Green and Gerber 2008; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Shea 
and Burton 2001; Stokes 1999). Thus, one implication of this dissertation is the 
importance of expanding the analysis of factionalism beyond dominant parties to include 
other parties and topics, such as the impact of factions on the electoral prospects of 
incumbent parties as well as other types of parties. 
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This project also illustrates the relevance of subnational research in political 
science. The benefit of studies conducted at the subnational level is that they are 
necessary to explore relevant phenomena that take place below the national political 
arena and that national-oriented scholarly works commonly overlook (Fox 1994; Gibson 
2005). In addition, subnational studies have the potential to refine the knowledge of 
national phenomena by providing insights that can be explored at the national level. In 
comparison with national projects, subnational studies have the methodological 
advantage of dealing with more homogeneous units of observation, thus they are more 
likely to provide valid findings and inferences than cross-national studies. Associated 
with this attribute is the capacity that subnational research offers to increase the number 
of observations without creating heterogeneity problems among them as typically 
happens in cross-national analysis (Snyder 2001). 
Given these strengths, subnational studies can supply important lessons to 
improve existing explanations of national phenomena. For instance, the findings 
presented here indicate that electoral institutions and competitiveness and institutions do 
not affect inter-factional behavior in dominant parties, contrary to the predictions of 
extant theories (Boucek 2010, 2012). It may be argued that the results of this dissertation 
are more solid methodologically, because they derive from statistical and qualitative 
evidence on more homogenous observations, whereas the outlined theories are based 
largely on small-N studies on more heterogeneous cases explored at the national level 
(i.e., the Conservative Party of Britain, the Liberal Party of Canada, the Christian 
Democratic Party of Italy, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan). In this regard, this 
study contributes to the examination of factionalism at the national level by pointing out 
the need for future research on the possible impact of electoral competitiveness and 
institutions on inter-factional behavior. This research should address issues related to 
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sample size and the heterogeneity of the units of analysis in order to offer more reliable 
conclusions. 
Conversely, national-level studies can be an important source of information that 
enhances research at the subnational level. National-level studies provide valuable 
insights to guide the exploration of subnational phenomena. This study, for example, 
demonstrates that prevailing theories devoted to explain national party dominance are 
also applicable to subnational cases. Therefore, it shows that the interplay between 
national and subnational studies can produce an insightful and beneficial synergy for 
political science. 
The dissertation demonstrates the inability of authoritarian-enclave theories to 
account for single-party dominance at the subnational level. It shows that these theories 
are unable to explain why the PRI has lost seven of nine autocratic bastions that it 
traditionally held and it demonstrates that formerly nationally dominant parties are 
capable of preserving their primacy at the subnational level under democratic conditions. 
Therefore, this study provides valuable lessons to scholars looking at non-democratic 
strongholds. Certainly, authoritarian-enclave explanations have provided important 
insights about the persistence of autocratic practices in subnational settings in countries 
that have experienced democratization at the national level (e.g., Cornelius, Eisenstadt, 
and Hindley 1999; Gervasoni 2010b). However, scholars in this tradition have not tested 
alternative approaches, nor demonstrated that their measures of the democratic quality of 
subnational autocratic regimes are valid. Moreover, in their efforts to corroborate their 
findings, these scholars tend to use as indicators of autocracy attributes that are 
compatible with democratic regimes, such as low levels of electoral competition, unified 
government, a small number of effective parties competing in elections, and the absence 
of alternation in office. 
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Gervasoni (2010b), for example, constructs an index of “subnational democracy” 
using five factors that studies on consolidated democracies typically use not to measure 
levels of democracy/autocracy but to assess differences in features they consider 
democratic, such as the level of electoral competitiveness (the margin of vote between the 
incumbent party and the runner up in gubernatorial and legislative elections), level of 
unified government (proportion of state legislative seats of the party’s governors), 
alternation in gubernatorial office, and legal constraints for governors’ reelection.  
Giraudy (2010) uses a similar index with slight variations. To measure electoral 
competitiveness, she also employs the formula that Laakso and Taagepera (1979) propose 
to estimate the effective number of parties. She assesses alternation in office by party and 
by person separately. She does not include term limits but an indicator of electoral 
cleanness, based on the existence, durability, and intensity of post-electoral conflicts. In 
their respective indices, more margins of vote, less effective number of parties, more 
unified government, less alternation in office, and fewer limitations for governors’ 
reelection mean less democracy, which is highly debatable because these results can be 
observed not only in authoritarian regimes but also in consolidated democracies. In fact, 
retrospective voting theories that have been used to examine elections in the United 
States since the 1950s argue that large winning vote margins for the incumbent, repeated 
reelection, and unified government are totally compatible with democracy as long as 
these outcomes respond to the voters’ will to reward incumbents for their performance in 
office (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966). 
As a consequence, it is not possible to associate these indicators with democracy 
or autocracy per se. What really matters to define their meaning is to uncover how they 
are produced. That is why more nuanced contributions on dominant parties in 
authoritarian regimes (e.g., Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006) do not focus on the fact that 
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these parties are constantly reelected, control congress, and obtain high margin of votes 
but disentangle why they do so despite being highly unpopular sometimes. They analyze 
and measure the mechanisms through which these parties manipulate the will of their 
citizens to obtain reelection, high vote margins, and unified government. In other words, 
the democratic/authoritarian quality of any regime needs to be assessed empirically using 
appropriate indicators. This is an important methodological lesson that authoritarian-
enclave scholars should extract from the literature on dominant parties. Accordingly, the 
measurement on electoral cleanness that Giraudy (2010) uses is a step in the right 
direction, although she dilutes the value of this variable by blending it with six more 
problematic indicators. 
Additionally, the literature on authoritarian enclaves needs to take more seriously 
the insightful notion of dominant parties that Greene (2007) has provided in the sense that 
these parties are hybrids that combine democratic and undemocratic means to remain in 
power. This conceptualization has profound implications for the examination of dominant 
parties because it suggests that any research on the topic should take into consideration 
explanations that derive from both democratic and authoritarian frameworks. In this vein, 
this project explores variables that derive from theories of democracy as well as theories 
of autocracy. 
This dissertation sheds light on existing theories of cooperation by showing the 
self-reinforcing patterns that are created by the early interactions (or lack thereof) of 
factions. It showed how the factions developed different alternative rationalities for their 
actions depending on the type of incentives they focused on, which in turn was based on 
the existence or not of cooperative precedents among them. The absence of early 
interaction and collaboration led factions in the antagonistic cases to concentrate on 
maximizing the potential benefits (i.e., political positions) they could obtain for their 
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members while discounting the risks (i.e., losing elections, which implied no positions for 
them) they might incur by not having the excluded factions on board. By contrast, early 
interaction and collaboration led other factions to focus more on the cooperative side of 
the equation—they assumed that internal unity based on multi-factional coalitions was 
crucial for them to obtain the benefits they were looking for. In other words, they were 
prone to trade risky short-term benefit maximization for more certainty in reaching their 
long-term goals. As these insights integrate historical-institutional and rational-choice 
approaches, they consequently demonstrate the utility of combining frameworks to 
produce nuanced explanations of political phenomena. 
This investigation also sheds light on contemporary politics and important 
historical events in Mexico. Factional politics at the national level in this country has 
attracted the attention of a number of scholars (e.g., Bailey 1988; Camp 1990, 2002; 
Langston 1995; Smith 1979), who have provided valuable insights about the high degree 
of cohesion existing in the national factions during the period of PRI dominance at the 
national level (1929-2000) and how these groups operated to advance their interests 
without putting party unity at risk. Because they mainly focus on Mexican politics from 
the late 1950s and early 1980s when the national political elites did not face any 
significant internal problems, these studies overlook the long and conflictive process that 
led these groups to unite. As this study points out that antagonism is most likely to occur 
where competing factions do not have previous collaborative experiences, it helps explain 
not only the initial stages of Mexico’s post-revolutionary politics, which was 
characterized by intense inter-factional struggles, but also the hazardous route that 
Mexican factions took to achieving cooperation. 
In fact, it was easier for Mexican revolutionaries and their heirs to eliminate the 
dictatorial regime that motivated their armed rebellion than it was to end the constant 
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disputes that emerged among them after the dictatorship. It only took six months for the 
insurgents to depose the powerful dictator Porfirio Díaz (the revolution started in 
November 20, 1910 and Díaz left power on May 25, 1911). By contrast, they required 
more than 40 years to build sustained cooperation among them. 
Different episodes illustrate the intensity of the struggles that occurred among the 
various factions during this period. After being elected president, the main revolutionary 
leader, Francisco I. Madero, confronted the other revolutionary factions that abandoned 
him, propitiating a coup d’état and Madero’s assassination by the chief of Mexico’s 
army, Victoriano Huerta, on February 19, 1913 (Knight 1986). Madero was only 15 
months in office. The revolutionary movement reemerged to defeat Huerta, who left 
office on July 15, 1914. Revolutionary factions leaded by Francisco Villa and Emiliano 
Zapata controlled the presidency for the following three years until their rival Venustiano 
Carranza was elected president in 1917. 
During his term, Carranza killed Zapata and combated his followers. He also 
attempted to block his former ally Alvaro Obregón from becoming president by 
promoting one of his subalterns instead. In response, Obregón organized an armed 
rebellion that killed Carranza in 1920. Obregón maneuvered for his comrade Adolfo de la 
Huerta to become substitute president, and then Obregón won the election for a new four-
year term. As president, Obregón hired De la Huerta as Secretary of Treasury. In 1923, 
however, De la Huerta, who wanted to be president again, broke with Obregón and 
launched an armed rebellion against his government, which Obregón suffocated a few 
months later (Castro 1998). In Obregón’s term, Francisco Villa was killed, and this 
assassination was attributed to his government (Castro 2009), given that Villa opposed 
Obregón’s project of making Plutarco Elías Calles president (Castro 1998). After 
eliminating his opponents, Obregón managed to engineer the election of his close ally 
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Calles as his successor in 1924. Four years later, Obregón returned to compete for the 
presidency. This time, however, he faced the strong opposition of his former partners and 
now competitors for the presidency, Francisco R. Serrano and Arnulfo R. Gómez, who 
ended up massacred along with numerous of their followers after they were charged with 
conspiracy and sedition by the federal army under president Calles’ and Obregón’s direct 
command (Castro 2005).145 Without contenders, Obregón easily won the election, but he 
could not take office because a religious fanatic assassinated him under unclear 
circumstances in 1928 (Castro 2009).  
To institutionalize and eliminate violence in the struggles for power, Calles 
promoted a constitutional provision prohibiting any form of reelection for presidents and 
created the PNR. Certainly, these policies reduced violence in political competition, but 
they were insufficient to prevent cyclical disputes among the post-revolutionary factions 
to control the presidency in the following 23 years (from 1929 to 1952). As a result, in 
1929, the former Secretary of Education under Obregón, José Vasconcelos, challenged 
the political elite he had belonged to by running against the PNR nominee, Pascual Ortiz 
Rubio. In 1932 Ortiz Rubio resigned from the presidency, protesting that Calles 
controlled Mexico’s politics behind the scenes (Buchenau 2007). In 1940, Juan Andrew 
Almazán left the revolutionary family to challenge, as the PAN and Revolutionary Party 
of National Reunification presidential nominee, the PRM candidate Manuel Avila 
Camacho. Similarly, in 1946 Ezequiel Padilla Peñaloza left the federal Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs to compete, with the PAN’s and Mexican Democratic Party’s support, 
against his former colleague in Avila Camacho’s cabinet and PRI nominee, Miguel 
                                                
145 In fact, the corpses of Serrano and 13 of his followers were taken to the presidential palace where 
Obregón looked at Serrano’s body to be sure that he was dead and Calles expressed his relief, knowing that 
the episode had concluded (Castro 2005, 197-228). 
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Alemán Valdés.146 Finally, in 1952 Miguel Henríquez Guzmán defected from the PRI 
and became the presidential candidate of the Federation of People’s Parties of Mexico 
and Mexican Constitutionalist Party to contend against Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, the 
nominee of his former party.  
Only after 1952 did the PRI factions begin a continuous period of cohesion that 
ended in 1987 when former president Lázaro Cárdenas’ son and prominent PRI member 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas quit the PRI to assemble a leftist opposition front to compete 
against his former party. This means that the PRI preserved internal harmony during the 
nomination of five presidential candidates: Adolfo López Mateos in 1958, Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz in 1964, Luis Echeverría Alvarez in 1970, José López Portillo in 1976, and Miguel 
de la Madrid Hurtado in 1982. Because most scholars have mainly examined the period 
comprising these nominations, it is understandable why they have highlighted the 
cohesive features of the PRI’s factions. By doing so, however, they have overlooked the 
long and highly contentious road that the PRI groups took to build internal unity. 
In addition, existing studies have primarily focused on how the organization and 
dynamics of Mexican factions at the national level have helped them solve disputes and 
share power. They have ignored the potential of subnational factions to participate in and 
even assume a leading role in national politics. This dissertation sheds light on this issue. 
Chapter 3 highlights the tendency of cohesive subnational factions to expand their 
participation in national politics. It provides historical evidence that reveals the deliberate 
efforts of the groups in the Estado de México to become involved in national politics and 
how the members that obtained national positions promoted the participation of other 
local politicians in the national arena. These features of the Estado de México’s factions 
                                                
146 Alemán Valdés served as federal Secretary of Goverment under President Avila Camacho. 
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shed light on recent developments in Mexico’s politics, such as how incoming President 
Enrique Peña Nieto (elected for the 2012-2018 term) has organized his government. The 
core of his administration is in the hands of the Estado de México’s cadres. In six out of 
the 18147 cabinet positions Peña Nieto appointed prominent politicians from Estado de 
México: former PRI gubernatorial pre-candidate Luis Videgaray Caso was named 
Secretary of the Treasury; former Governor Emilio Chuayffet Chemor was appointed 
Secretary of Education; former PRI gubernatorial pre-candidate Alfonso Navarrete Prida 
was nominated to be Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare; former state Secretary of 
Economic Development Juan José Guerra Abud became Secretary of Environment and 
Natural Resources; former state Secretary of Communications Gerardo Ruiz Esparza was 
named Secretary of Communications and Transportation; and former state legislator 
Humberto Castillejos Cervantes was appointed as Counselor at Law of the Federal 
Executive Branch. 
The new president also appointed politicians from Estado de México to posts that 
are right below other six cabinet positions: former state Secretary of Government Luis 
Enrique Miranda Nava was named Undersecretary of Government in the Secretary of 
Government; former PRI gubernatorial pre-candidate Ernesto Javier Nemer Alvarez was 
chosen as Undersecretary of Social and Human Development in the Secretary of Social 
Development; former PRI gubernatorial pre-candidate Enrique Jacob Rocha was 
appointed Undersecretary for the Small and Medium Enterprise in the Secretary of 
Economy; former PRI gubernatorial pre-candidate Ricardo Aguilar Castillo became 
Undersecretary of Nourishment and Competitiveness in the Secretary of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Rural Development, Fishing, and Nourishment; former state Secretary of 
                                                
147 The Secretaries of National Defense and the Navy are not considered, because they are assigned to 
personnel trained in those institutions. 
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Environment Gustavo Cárdenas Monroy was nominated to be Undersecretary of Rural 
Property Ordering in the Secretary of Agrarian, Territorial, and Urban Development; and 
former state Attorney General Alfredo Castillo Cervantes was made Assistant Attorney 
General of Regional Control, Penal Procedures, and Constitutional Protection at the 
Attorney General’s office. 
Additionally, Peña Nieto promoted his former private secretary when he was 
governor of Estado de México, Roberto Padilla Domínguez, to be Technical Secretary of 
the Cabinet. Whereas former presidents Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-2006) and Felipe 
Calderón Hinojosa (2006-2012) usually made room in his staff for prominent members of 
the PAN (their party), Peña Nieto granted all these positions to personnel he had as 
governor in Estado de México: Aurelio Nuño Mayer became Chief of the President’s 
Office; Erwin Lino Zárate was named his Private Secretary; David López Gutiérrez was 
appointed as Communications Coordinator; and Francisco Guzmán Ortiz was made Chief 
of Advisers. 
Furthermore, Peña Nieto also relied on Estado de México’s groups to keep control 
of the PRI by promoting former Governor César Camacho Quiroz as President of the 
National Executive Committee of this party. In sum, under Peña Nieto’s command, 
members of the Estado de México’s factions have expanded their direct influence over 
two-thirds of his cabinet, the cabinet’s coordinating staff, the president’s personal staff, 
and the PRI’s national leadership. Given the extensive and encompassing political 
infrastructure they are building, it will hardly be a surprise if the next PRI presidential 
nominee comes from the Estado de México. 
This study also speaks to the history of politics at the subnational level in Mexico. 
In particular, it detected two interesting episodes of Mexican subnational politics that 
have not been sufficiently explored. One is the assassination of Estado de México’s 
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Governor Alfredo Zárate Albarrán in 1942 and the political motivations that might have 
existed behind this crime (see Chapter 3). Zárate Albarrán led a group of governors who 
openly started opposing President Manuel Avila Camacho. After his murder, the 
remaining governors dismantled their bloc and declared their loyalty to Avila Camacho, 
while a highly controversial resolution from the National Supreme Court (under Avila 
Camacho’s control) put Zárate Albarrán’s killer free. The other episode is the polemic 
nomination of Norberto López Avelar as the PRI candidate for the governorship of 
Morelos in 1958 (see Chapter 4). This decision was deeply significant and paradoxical 
for three main reasons. First, López Avelar was linked to the assassination of Emiliano 
Zapata, the main revolutionary hero from Morelos. Second, until that moment and since 
the revolution, Zapatista groups had controlled Morelos’ politics. Third, since 1924, the 
PRI regime had made Zapata one of its main symbols to the point that routinely all 
presidents traveled to or sent emissaries to Morelos to honor Zapata’s memory every 10th 
of April (his birthday) and 10th of August (the anniversary of his murder). 
It is understandable that Mexican historians have overlooked controversial 
episodes given the conditions of censorship that prevailed in Mexico after the revolution 
and until the early 1990s. Castro, for example, describes the restrictions that the regime 
imposed on Martín Luis Guzmán who published La Sombra del Caudillo,148 based on 
De la Huerta’s rebellion against Obregón and the assassination of Francisco R. Serrano 
and 13 of his followers (see above), as well as on the producers of a movie based on this 
novel (Castro 2005, 252-258). Without that control, contemporary scholarly works have 
been able to uncover important events in Mexico’s history, providing important insights 
                                                
148 The shade of the caudillo. 
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about diverse political features of this country (e.g., Castro 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009). 
Now is the time to expand these efforts to the subnational sphere. 
 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
Although this project has focused on the link between factionalism and party 
dominance at the subnational level in Mexico, its theoretical framework applies to 
political parties in other regions, especially subnationally dominant parties, and parties in 
transitional regimes. The dissertation shows that internal groups affect the organizational 
strength, prestige, and quality of campaigns of their parties and their parties’ nominees, 
which are critical aspects for the electoral prospects of all types of parties, not just 
dominant parties (Green and Gerber 2008; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Shea and Burton 
2001; Stokes 1999). Because factions matter for party politics, the study of the electoral 
effects of factionalism can be extended to other cases of dominant parties, incumbent 
parties, and parties in general. 
In addition, existing evidence suggests that the approach presented in this 
dissertation can be generalizable to other interesting cases, such as Russia and Argentina. 
My theory associates the levels of autonomy of subnational factions under conditions of 
central party control (such as those existing under autocratic rule) with the prospects that 
those groups will cooperate once that control disappears (due to democratization); thus it 
can explain factionalism at the subnational level in transitional regimes that were 
previously ruled by former dominant and hegemonic parties. Russia seems to be an 
appropriate case to explore my approach, because existing studies suggest that the local 
groups in charge of the subnational political units (republics, okrugs, and oblasts) 
belonging to the Russian Republic had different levels of relative independence vis-à-vis 
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the powerful center during the Soviet era (Hale 2006). As a result, this variation may help 
explain the differences in the levels of internal cohesion and control over their 
jurisdictions that have been observed among the political groups that rule those settings 
in the post-Soviet times and support the emergent dominant party United Russia (Hale 
2006). 
After the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the creation 
of the Russian Federation, subnational factions under the command of provincial 
governors established their own informal organizations to mobilize and expand their 
electoral base, displacing the nascent parties (Hale 2006). The power of these groups 
grew to the point that in the 1999 parliamentary elections a coalition of them created 
Fatherland-All Russia as a common front to challenge the national elites for the political 
control of Russia. Although the Kremlin defeated this opposition, the threat led president 
Vladimir Putin to enact policies aimed at diminishing the power and electoral potential of 
provincial governments and their groups (Hale 2006). The most important of these 
policies have led to the gradual incorporation of subnational factions into United Russia, 
a type of dominant party that the regime created to preserve the control of this country 
(Reuter and Remington 2009; Reuter 2010). In sum, these antecedents indicate that the 
preexisting levels of autonomy of subnational factions during the Soviet era may help 
account for their behavior during the contemporary era in Russia and, therefore, provide 
an alternative and more nuanced explanation of the emergence of United Russia as a 
dominant party. 
Furthermore, given the subnational focus of the dissertation, its approach can be 
extended to contemporary cases of party dominance at the subnational level. Particularly, 
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the Justicialist Party149 is an interesting case to examine using my theory, because it has 
continuously ruled almost a third of Argentina’s provinces in the last 30 years despite not 
being a nationally dominant party (Argentine Provinces Since 1983). Existing studies 
suggest that subnational party dominance in Argentina is due to authoritarian practices 
(Gervasoni 2010b, 2010a; Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2010). However, I suspect that inherent 
biases of these studies (i.e., they tend to equate party dominance with authoritarianism 
and only test hypotheses deriving from autocratic theories, so they fail to account for 
alternative approaches; see the previous section) may prevent them from providing more 
nuanced explanations of the Justicialist Party’s dominance at the subnational level. 
Moreover, exploring cases such as the Justicialist Party may help uncover a different set 
of causes of cooperation and confrontation among factions at the subnational level than 
the ones existing in cases that have had nationally dominant parties. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The findings of this dissertation point to several promising areas for future 
research on factional politics. The previous section delineates three of them. First, we 
need to extend the examination of factionalism beyond the realm of dominant parties to 
include incumbent parties and parties in general, given that the potential electoral effects 
of intra-party divisions seem to be similar across different types of parties. Second, we 
need to explore party dominance at the subnational level not only because it is an 
important phenomenon in its own right but also because it can provide useful insights that 
will enhance our understanding of dominant parties operating in the national arena. The 
study of dominant parties in diverse spheres opens interesting questions for political 
                                                
149 Partido Justicialista. 
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science, such as to what extent are national dominant parties similar to or different from 
dominant parties at the subnational level? Is party dominance at the subnational level 
conducive to party dominance at the national level? Third, this project demonstrates that 
factionalism helps determine whether formerly national dominant parties maintain or lose 
power at the subnational level after a democratic transition. Nevertheless, the fact that 
different scholars have highlighted the crucial role that political elites play in both 
democratic and authoritarian change (e.g., Brownlee 2007; Huntington 1991; McFaul 
2002; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986) suggests that studies of factionalism should 
examine various types of political transformation, not just democratization. 
Further research on the mechanisms through which factions affect the electoral 
prospects of their parties is required as well. For instance, experimental studies might 
assess how, to what extent, and what aspects of intra-party unity affect different types of 
voters as well as the campaign strategies of opposition parties. It is also relevant to 
explore in more detail the impact that internal conflicts, or the lack thereof, may exert 
over the networking potential of dominant and incumbent parties. For example, if these 
parties rely heavily on clientelism to mobilize their voters, internal divisions may produce 
a negative impact on these parties’ clientelist machines and thus over their prospects to 
remain in office. The excluded factions may push clientelist brokers to orient their efforts 
towards opposition parties or at least to refrain from mobilizing their clients to vote for 
their traditional party. Under these conditions, the clientelist machine could be seriously 
impaired given the key intermediary role that brokers play between their electoral 
clientele and party leaders and candidates (Auyero 1999, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007). 
Other avenues for future research include the factors that propitiate intra-factional 
cohesion. The dissertation has highlighted the lack of civil service in the federal and state 
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bureaucracy as well as the prohibition on immediate reelection for national and state 
legislative positions and municipal posts as factors that favor the unity that has been 
observed among Mexican factions (see Chapter 1). These conditions create high levels of 
uncertainty and rotation in employment in Mexico’s public sector, which in turn lead the 
members of factions to be particularly loyal to their leaders in order to obtain positions. 
As a result, it is important to extend the study of intra-factional dynamics to settings 
where political positions and employment in the bureaucracy are less dependent on the 
will of leading politicians. In these contexts, individuals may rely less on factions and 
more on other strategies (e.g., developing their own professional skills and networking) 











Table 1A. Coding Rules for PRI Factionalism. 
Category Cases 
Strong cohesion Governor and contenders support the nominee 
Moderate cohesion a. Governor and at least some competitors endorse the nominee but 
a minor internal rival quits the party to support the opposition, or 
b. Governor endorses the nominee, but the other competitors do 
not, or 
c. All competitors support the nominee, but the governor does not 
Weak cohesion a. Governor and competitors do not endorse the candidate, or 
  b. A minor internal rival becomes candidate of minor opposition 
parties, or 
  c. Main competitors openly protest the results, or 
  d. A leading party figure becomes candidate of a major opposition 
party, or 
  e. Main competitor(s) quit(s) to support the opposition, or 
  f. Followers of a main competitor support the opposition and an 
intraparty conflict revolves around the governor, or 
  g. A main internal rival becomes opposition candidate, or 
  h. A minor internal rival becomes candidate of minor opposition 
parties and an intraparty conflict revolves around the governor, or 
  i. A leading party figure becomes candidate of a major party and 







Table 2A. Behavior of PRI Factions by Gubernatorial Election, 1995-2010. 
Category Election State &Year Case Description 
Strong Cohesion 
 Campeche 2009 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Coahuila 1999 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Coahuila 2005 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Colima 2009 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Estado de México 2005 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Hidalgo 1999 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Hidalgo 2010 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Michoacán 1995 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Oaxaca 1998 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Puebla 1998 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Puebla 2004 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Quintana Roo 2010 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Sinaloa 1998 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 San Luis Potosí 1997 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Sonora 1997 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
 Tamaulipas 2010 Governor & contenders support the candidate 
Moderate Cohesion 
 
Durango 2004 Main contenders support the candidate but the 
governor does not 
 
Estado de México 1999 Governor & some contenders support the 
candidate; former contender quits to support 
PRD 
 
Quintana Roo 1999 Governor supports the candidate but the other 
contenders do not 
 
Sonora 2009 Governor supports the candidate but the other 
contenders do not 
 
Tamaulipas 1998 Governor & main contenders support the 
candidate; minor contender quits to support PRD 
Weak Cohesion 
 
Aguascalientes 1998 Governor & contenders don't support the 
candidate 
 Baja California Sur 1999 Main contender becomes candidate of PRD-PT 
 Campeche 1997 Main contender becomes candidate of PRD 
 
Campeche 2003 Internal fight governor-former governor; two 
main contenders question results; later they quit 
to support PRD 
 
Chiapas 2000 Main contender becomes candidate of coalition 
including PAN-PRD 
 Colima 1997 Main contender quits to support PRD 
 
Colima 2003 Main contender becomes candidate of PRD & 
another quits to support PRD 
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Distrito Federal 1997 Governor & main contenders don't support the 
candidate 
 Durango 1998 Minor contender becomes candidate of PRD 
 
Durango 2010 Main contender becomes candidate of coalition 
including PAN-PRD 
 
Guerrero 1999 Internal fight between governor and former 
governor; main contenders question results; 
governor & contenders declare support; minor 
candidate quits to support PRD  
 
Guerrero 2005 Main contender quits to support the candidate of 
PRD-PRS-Convergencia 
 
Hidalgo 2005 Governor & contenders support the candidate; 
former contender becomes PRD candidate 
 
Jalisco 1995 Governor & contenders don't support the 
candidate 
 Michoacán 2001 Main contender quits to support PRD 
 
Morelos 2000 Followers of main contender support opposition 
candidate & political scandal involves governor 
 
Nayarit 1999 Main contender becomes candidate of coalition 
including PAN-PRD 
 
Nuevo León 1997 Minor contender becomes candidate of PT & 
political scandal involves governor 
 
Oaxaca 2004 Main contender becomes candidate of coalition 
including PAN-PRD 
 
Oaxaca 2010 Former main contender is again opposition 
candidate; former governor & two contenders 
support opposition candidate 
 
Puebla 2010 Main contender becomes candidate of coalition 
including PAN-PRD 
 
Querétaro 1997 Main contender, PRI candidate's brother, 
becomes candidate of PFCRN 
 Quintana Roo 2005 Main contender becomes candidate of PAN 
 
Sinaloa 2004 A high-ranking member of the PRI incumbent 
government becomes PAN candidate & two 
contenders protest results & quit PRI 
 
Sinaloa 2010 Main contender becomes candidate of coalition 
including PAN-PRD 
 
San Luis Potosí 2003 Main contender becomes candidate of PRD & 
another quits to support PRD 
 
Sonora 2003 Governor & contenders don't support the 
candidate 
 Tabasco 2000 Main contender becomes candidate of PRD 
 Tabasco 2006 Main contender quits to support PRD 
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Tamaulipas 2004 Minor contender quits to become PRD candidate; 
governor & main contenders support the 
candidate 
 
Tlaxcala 1998 Main contender becomes candidate of PRD-PT-
PVEM-PCD 
 
Veracruz 1998 Minor contender becomes candidate of minor 
parties; contenders but the governor support the 
candidate 
 
Veracruz 2004 Former main contender becomes candidate of 
PRD; another contender quits PRI to support 
PAN 
 
Veracruz 2010 Former main contender becomes candidate of 
PRD 
 
Yucatán 1995 Governor & contenders don't support the 
candidate 
 Yucatán 2001 Most contenders question results 




Table 3A. Description of Variables. 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent Variable 
PRI Vote Margin(t) PRI vote as % of valid vote - Main opposition 
vote as % of valid vote 
Author’s calculations based on 
official results and CIDAC 
2011. 
Main Independent Variable: PRI Factionalism 
Strong Cohesion(t) Strong Cohesion Author’s own data. 
Moderate Cohesion(t) Moderate Cohesion Same as above. 
Weak Cohesion(t) Weak Cohesion Same as above. 
Alternative Hypotheses/Control Variables 
PRI Vote(t-1) PRI previous vote as % of previous valid vote - 
Main opposition previous vote as % of previous 
valid vote 
Author’s calculations based on 
official results and CIDAC 
2011. 
SF Ratio(t) Ratio of second to the first opposition’s party 
vote total 
Same as above. 
Governor’s Popularity(t) % of governor’s popularity Survey data obtained by major 
Mexican polling 
organizations. 
Pork(t) Personnel (total state’s public budget devoted to 
personnel as % of the state's Gross Domestic 
Product, GDP, in the election year) + Works 
(total state’s public budget devoted to public 
works & social programs as % of the state's 
GDP in the election year) 
Author’s calculations based on 
INEGI 2011b, 2011c. 
Federal Funding(t) Participations (federal participations to the 
state's public budget as % of the state's GDP in 
the election year) + Contributions (federal 
contributions to the state’s public budget as % of 
the state's GDP in the election year) 
Same as above. 
Corporatism(t) Public Workers (% of public workers of state's 
Economic Active Population, EAP) + Union 
Workers (% of unionized workers of state's 
EAP) 
Author’s calculations based on 
INEGI 2011a. 
Marginalization(t) Official Mexican index based on 8 socio-
economic indicators related to marginalization, 
including: % population over 15 illiterate and 
with less than 6 year schooling without 
schooling, % of households overcrowded, with 
dirty floors, and without basic services (water, 
sewerage, and electricity), and % of population 
earning less than two minimum wages and 





Table 4A. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
PRI Vote Margin(t) 58 4.45 13.64 -28.05 31.53 
Main Independent Variable: PRI Factionalism 
Strong Cohesion(t) 58 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Moderate Cohesion(t) 58 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Weak Cohesion(t) 58 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Alternative Hypotheses/Control Variables 
PRI Vote(t-1) 58 26.34 22.52 0.00 87.02 
SF Ratio(t) 58 0.28 0.25 0.00 0.98 
Governor's Popularity(t) 58 58.62 15.65 20.50 90.00 
Pork(t) 58 3.54 2.25 0.84 11.65 
Federal Funding(t) 58 10.98 5.27 1.97 28.62 
Corporatism(t) 58 23.15 4.42 13.42 31.91 
Marginalization(t) 58 0.16 0.98 -1.74 2.41 
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PRI Vote Margin(t-1) 1.00 
  
 
      Strong Cohesion(t) 0.06 1.00 
 
 
      Moderate 
Cohesion(t) 0.14 -0.19 1.00  
      Weak Cohesion(t) -0.14 -0.82 -0.41 1.00       
SF Ratio(t) 0.14 0.15 0.18 -0.25 1.00 
     Governor's 
Popularity(t) 0.06 0.13 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 1.00 
    Pork(t) -0.28 -0.10 -0.12 0.16 0.00 0.10 1.00 
   Federal Funding(t) -0.20 -0.24 -0.18 0.33 -0.23 0.08 0.61 1.00 
  Corporatism(t) -0.01 -0.08 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.26 -0.23 1.00 





Table 6A. OLS Regression on the PRI Vote Margin(t) by State, 1995-2010. 
Variable Model 3 
PRI Vote Margin(t-1) .04 
 
(.06) 
Strong cohesion(t)1 16.42*** 
 
(3.07) 
Moderate cohesion(t)1 12.37*** 
 
(4.77) 






SF Ratio*PAN-PRD(t) 53.63 
 
(76.17) 



















Adjusted R2 .52 
1Weak cohesion is the reference category. 
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